


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22 MAY 1990



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-028

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Constitutional Oversight Committee Chairman Interviewed

90UN17844 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 May 90
pp 1-2

[Interview with USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee Chairman S.S. Alekseyev by A. Pankov: "Solely Within the Framework of the Law"; date, place not specified]

[Text] Thousands of letters came in after the editorial board announced that USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee Chairman S.S. Alekseyev had agreed to respond to our readers' questions. We selected the most typical questions from the readership mail for the conversation with Sergey Sergeyevich.

[Correspondent] Sergey Sergeyevich, let us begin our talk with a question from Yalta resident F. Totsny: "The Constitutional Oversight Committee is being created. But what is it for, if there is no constitution? Is this really a constitution, if it is constantly being amended and reworked?"

[Alekseyev] Here is the sense of the organization of the Constitutional Oversight Committee. The process of creating democratic institutions, the process of separating powers must be brought to its logical conclusion. Such a separation is necessary first of all in order to prevent usurpation of power, its concentration in one center, its transformation into an autocratic dictatorship, or a slide into totalitarianism, which, unfortunately, has happened here in previous historical periods. The idea of the separation of powers will be fully realized only in the event that an independent organ begins to monitor the legislation itself. But as I understand it, our committee must not simply monitor the literal correspondence to the laws, but is called upon to see to it that any state statute or undertaking not contradict democratic principles.

Is it necessary to defend the "obsolete" constitution? Against widespread opinion, I will say that the 1977 Constitution contains democratic statutes, and more than a few of them (it is another matter that the majority have not been implemented in practice). Still, to some degree it even reflected the democratic processes that began in connection with the unmasking of the cult of Stalin. In particular, it speaks of glasnost, the presumption of innocence, and the accountability of the apparatus to the court. In Brezhnev's time, these statutes bore a formal nature, but now they can be utilized for the activization of democratic processes. And new statutes have been introduced to it. And they must be strictly observed.

Finally, the Constitutional Oversight Committee must see to it that normative acts correspond to the new laws on property, on leasing, and on land. And this is extremely important because, as practice has shown, the laws adopted are far from always observed; moreover, they are not infrequently blocked by departments.

[Correspondent] Z. Parenko and T. Sudnik from Sochi write that you will get a million letters. After all, it's impossible to imagine what is happening in our country today! Authority everywhere has become ineffective. Further on, the letter's authors describe in detail how they made the rounds with their tragedy of all the organs of local power, and achieved nothing. They ask, can the Constitutional Oversight Committee somehow help in such situations?

[Alekseyev] The consideration of complaints and statements concerning concrete cases does not enter into the functions of the Constitutional Oversight Committee. We can reduce the flow of citizens' appeals only when we reach the point where all laws and other normative judicial acts correspond to the constitution, in order that human rights be strictly implemented, in order that the democratic processes proceed consistently.

[Correspondent] The question of lawyer Yu. Krasnov (Kishinev) would seem to be personal, but it concerns each of us. "Will the committee, at its own initiative, consider the legality of the passport system? What do you suppose, will we ever be rid of this 'serfdom'?"

[Alekseyev] At this time, it is difficult to talk about the work plan of our entire committee. But I think that the committee will take up the issue of the residence permit. This problem is associated with human rights, and merits our consideration.

Yet this is not an easy question. Let us say that we create free conditions for residence permits. Then certain individuals from well-known areas of our country will instantly fill up Moscow and Leningrad, increasing social tension in these cities. Therefore, some sort of regulation of demographic flows is necessary all the same. However, this must be decided by democratic methods, without a feudal fixation of people at their place of residence.

[Correspondent] V. Orlik from Krasnodar asks, "Won't the Constitutional Oversight Committee be a fourth power, after the legislative, executive, and judicial power?"

[Alekseyev] No, because in effect, the Constitutional Oversight Committee is a judicial power, although to some degree, it is a legislative power as well. It is judicial with regard to the legislative. And in general, for me, the title constitutional court is closer.

[Correspondent] A. Zhichkov, a resident of the village Izvoroten, Kalinin Oblast, is interested in what the mutual relations between the Constitutional Oversight Committee and the USSR President will be like. "Who will be higher?" he asks.

[Alekseyev] Neither is "higher." These are independent organs in the system of our statehood. The chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee is subordinate to the President only as a citizen. Presidential power is in the field of activity of the Constitutional Oversight

Committee: The acts of the President may also be halted, if they do not correspond to the constitution.

[Correspondent] In many letters, readers ask about possible influence on your position on the part of party organs, of party activity under the new legal conditions, and of your committee's role in the multiparty system.

[Alekseyev] The Constitutional Oversight Committee must confirm the principle of genuine statehood, that is, powers not directly dependent upon any sort of ideological factors.

[Correspondent] That is, legality is above ideology?

[Alekseyev] Civil rights are above ideology!

[Correspondent] The readers are interested in how the committee chairman himself regards a multiparty system.

[Alekseyev] I feel that the multiparty system is an achievement of civilization. The implementation of the principles of democracy is impossible without a multiparty system. Yet I assume that a multiparty system can be built only upon a real basis, in accordance with our socialist choice. Without giving any political evaluations, but simply reflecting, I would note that, let us say, the monarchist, or the constitutional democrats, it seems to me, simply do not have firm ground, a social basis in our country, by reason that we have made a socialist choice here, and there does not exist the form of property corresponding to their interests. But the unions of leasees, cooperative members, and farmers have firm support. And the corresponding parties may emerge. They will comprise a more realistic multiparty structure, which will influence the political course of the country.

[Correspondent] Yet the political movements you named, the cadets and monarchists are fighting for common humanitarian goals, for human rights, and in this they can find support...

[Alekseyev] Now everyone is proclaiming human rights, the Christian democrats, the liberals... But human rights reinforced by definite objective conditions are needed. Here the social democrats, toward whom I experience sympathy, are not only proclaiming these rights, but are underpinning them with a definite economic and social base. I, for example, am an advocate of the Communist Party itself accepting the values of social democracy, as was the case until 1917. Incidentally, here is one of the aspects of our party's elevation and acquisition of it previous authority. And if we fence ourselves off from social democratic values, then we may just remain behind with Stalinism...

[Correspondent] Apropos of Stalinism. Many readers ask biographical questions of you, and in particular, they ask, is it true that your father was repressed under Stalin?

[Alekseyev] Yes, he spent 10 years in camps in Yakutia. He participated in the Civil War, then worked in the accounting and statistical organs in the Urals, and after

this, was repressed. My father later told me: I stayed alive apparently because unlike others (including party members; he was a non-party member), I did not sign false protocols; I did not slander anyone. However, those 10 years did not break him, nor leave him embittered...

[Correspondent] Tell me, Sergey Sergeyevich, did your father's fate influence your views as a legal scholar, a lawyer; did they influence your attitude toward the totalitarian state?

[Alekseyev] Yes, of course. While the national struggle against spies and murderers was wreaking havoc, I myself knew that my father was not a spy... I was convinced that human rights can never be violated. This leads to national tragedy, to dictatorship, a totalitarian regime. After all, any totalitarian regime is always struggling against someone. Let us say, the fascists were fighting against the plutocrats and the Jews. We hear calls for struggling against the party apparatus, the Masons, the cooperatives...

[Correspondent] That is, we must necessarily seek an enemy?

[Alekseyev] In the given case, any "suitable" object becomes the enemy. Then, well, in the heat of the "national struggle," without notice, democracy is dealt with. Such a scenario can lead to nothing else.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, the editors received many letters in which readers express their disbelief that your committee can defend human rights. They draw their conclusion based upon the bitter experience of "making the departmental rounds."

[Alekseyev] It should not be thought that we will create some sort of powerful organ and all human rights will immediately be observed here. We had gone so far along the path of flouting human rights, particularly in the name of some "great" goals of the struggle for the bright future, that everything cannot be changed with a one-time act. This will require no small amount of time. And concentrated efforts are needed here. The Constitutional Oversight Committee is prepared to work indefatigably and intensely in this direction first and foremost. We will do everything possible to not let through a single normative act that could serve as a legal basis for the violation of human rights.

[Correspondent] A. Nikolayev from Cheboksary, in recalling cases of abuse of power on the part of departments, ministries, party and soviet organs, inquires whether your committee can bring criminal charges against workers of the highest echelon of power?

[Alekseyev] We do not have such rights. That is a matter for the law enforcement organs. On the other hand, we have the right to demand the revocation of any sort of resolution, statute, and other normative act that violates legality.

[Correspondent] A. Mamrov, from Konstantinovka, Donetsk Oblast, asks you if you can resolve pension issues.

[Alekseyev] No, we have no right.

[Correspondent] But what if the flood of complaints becomes very big?

[Alekseyev] The Constitutional Oversight Committee has the right to legislative initiative. If we see that some sort of problems associated with human rights and democratic arrangements are unresolved, then we can raise the issue of changing the law.

[Correspondent] There are very many questions on the cooperatives, especially on the "ANT" story.

[Alekseyev] This is not a subject for the consideration of our committee. Yet as a lawyer and a USSR people's deputy concerned until recently with the problems of legislation, I cannot get out of answering. I still have questions in connection with the formation of "ANT." At the congress, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov said that positive principles have been laid in this structure. That is probably so. But for me, the question arises, why was "ANT" placed in such a special, privileged position? Not one of our economic structures, neither cooperative nor state, must occupy a special position. Incidentally, perhaps this served as the precondition for those abuses that have been established?

As far as the cooperatives in general are concerned, I will say this. The very law on cooperatives is a progressive, perestroika law, associated, in particular, with the introduction of market relations in our economic life. But it was introduced in the purely bureaucratic economy, which exploited this situation for mercenary purposes. And that is why it is necessary to make corrections in the law.

And of course, unjustified, sub-legal acts and local decisions have had their effect. Instead of bringing order to the cooperatives' economic activity, certain state organs and local soviets set limits, violating the law. This enters the sphere of our committee's activity, and we will take up this problem.

[Correspondent] There are many complaints in the editorial mail that a person who has reached retirement age can immediately be fired. Isn't this a violation of the human right to work?

[Alekseyev] Yes, this problem requires our attention.

[Correspondent] M. Lazarchuk of Rovno asks if the committee will supervise the sentencing of minors.

[Alekseyev] No, it will not. That falls within the competence of the procuracy.

[Correspondent] P. Igoshin of Achinsk asks you to be of some assistance in adopting a law on privileges for those

who have been rehabilitated. He writes that rehabilitation has been formally accomplished, but people's material losses have not been compensated.

[Alekseyev] This problem concerns legislative activity, and we will support the preparation of such acts.

[Correspondent] There are many letters on the problems of labor legislation. The readers demand the abolition of the "black lists" of officials, Nos. 1 and 2; they demand the review of the rule according to which a complaint cannot be filed over unlawful dismissal after one year has elapsed.

[Alekseyev] The lists cited are being reviewed at the present time. And if they are not abolished in the near future, then our committee will have grounds to raise this issue.

Concerning other labor problems, I recently met with the representative of the International Organization of Labor (MOT), and we agreed to work together in order to bring our labor legislation into correspondence with international acts.

[Correspondent] A plethora of questions on how to get an appointment with you, the committee's address, and so on.

[Alekseyev] For the time being, the committee does not have its own definite place. But even when we get it, appointments will be limited to only those issues being considered by the committee—legislation, and normative acts.

[Correspondent] You are going to be meeting with lawyers for the most part?

[Alekseyev] No, not at all. With people of various professions, but only on legislative issues. I would like to particularly emphasize this. Otherwise, people will turn to us with concrete personal problems. The committee has already received about 2,000 letters, almost all of which are outside of our competence. We are forced to return them, since we have no right even to send complaints to departments.

[Correspondent] What should be done if people come up against violations of the law?

[Alekseyev] Go to the legal organs—the procuracy, the court. All the more so since on 1 July the Law on the procedure for petitioning the actions of state organs will go into effect. And it will be possible to go to court against any organ.

[Correspondent] A. Koba from Dneprodzerzhinsk asks if your committee can send a group or commission somewhere in order to resolve a conflict with the authorities at the scene?

[Alekseyev] No, that is not within our competence.

[Correspondent] But let us say, what if there is some sort of very serious conflict in some union or autonomous

republic or city, and they request of you from there that you solve this conflict, can you really stay on the sidelines?

[Alekseyev] If it concerns concrete legislative acts, then we will get involved, but within the limits of our committee's competence. All of this must be within the framework of the law.

[Correspondent] Well, I wish you success in this affair so new for the country; as I understand it, how soon we begin to live in a rule-of-law state also depends upon this.

[Alekseyev] Thank you.

Armenian Youth Paper Publishes Moscow Engineer's Political Reform Program

90US0679A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETs in Russian
17 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Doctor of Technological Sciences I. Tyutrin: "Move Forward, Relying on Reality"]

[Text] In recent times we have unwittingly witnessed a strange phenomenon. In the past, people who wanted to be heard, who wanted people to pay attention to their pain, dream or idea, would try to get to the center, to the capitol of the Union, to Moscow. On the whole I don't think there is any need to explain this altogether understandable phenomenon. But then, you see, the flow changed direction; first it was just a narrow streamlet, but now it is becoming wider and wider.

We are getting more and more letters, not only from the union republics, from all corners of the land, but also from the center, from Moscow. People who cannot get a hearing at home are writing in hopes of receiving a rostrum and an audience.

Here is one of the latest epistles of this nature—an open letter to the People's Deputies of the USSR, from Doctor of Technological Sciences I. Tyutrin. The author had prepared an article, "In What Kind of Socialism Do We Live," which in his opinion deals with fateful questions for the entire country; but which—alas, he was unable to have published in any of the central publications. The open letter, which we are publishing today, raises questions which are in Tyutrin's view very important, and must be brought to the immediate attention of the people's representatives.

Without commenting on the author's often controversial views and suggestions, we nevertheless found it possible to publish them in the hope that either our readers, or USSR People's Deputies from Armenia, or those deputies who may find KOMSOMOLETs in the press center of the Moskva Hotel at the on-going session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, might find a grain of truth, or at least a starting point for reflection in this appeal.

That the 70 years of development of the socialist system did not lead to fundamental changes in the country's economy and realization of the advantages of socialism,

is a consequence of the influence of groups of the following well-known, basic, peculiar features:

1. An absolute monopoly over the national economy, and the fact that the party leader, the state and the party were above the law.
2. Elimination of the workers from the sphere of management and distribution.
3. Ineffectiveness of constitutional guarantees of man's development and human rights; the absolute power of the bureaucratic apparatus; the non-democratic nature of society; and the conformism of the masses.

All the past years of developing socialism occurred under the third group of peculiarities. The results of these efforts turned out to be sadly ineffective, and naturally so, since this group is by definition arbitrary, and depends upon the first two. Therefore, if you, esteemed deputies, will direct your main energies toward solving the problems in the third group (and this is the basic component of your pre-election programs)—you shall fail, just as your predecessors have for all those 70 years, some temporary gains notwithstanding. Without changing the definitive nature of the command-administrative system, it is impossible to significantly improve the secondary, dependent aspects. The theory of socialism has not been worked out.

Scholars and politicians find it difficult to define the essence of building socialism: complete, developed, developing, utopian, feudal, slave-owning. All these titles can be generalized as subjective socialism, on the basis of the law of unity (part of the law of unity and the conflict of opposites). The law of unity determines:

- a) leadership of the country as a subject of administration independent of the people, in which the General Secretary and party Central Committee act in the name of the party and the people;
- b) use of reactionary theories of socio-centralism and personalism, dogmatism and demagoguery in ideology, and a metaphysical method of cognition of phenomena;
- c) use of a far-fetched system of non-objective economic laws; and,
- d) development of a subjective theory of the state and the law, which does not provide effective guarantees of the rights of man.

The problem of perfecting socialism consists of transforming its essence—subjective socialism, into objective socialism, based upon the use of the entire formula of dialectical law: the unity and conflict of opposites, which naturally, presupposes:

- a) a structure of leading organs and development of the country on the basis of dialog, and a dialectical approach to cognition of phenomena;

b) use of normal commodity-monetary circulation and the law of value;

c) use of the independent, objective, and only definitive guarantee—the political activeness of the masses, for the purposes of economic development and human rights.

With a change in the essence of the system, its definitive peculiarities will change as well.

The state and party automatically become principally new; property becomes public property and subject to lease. The people are the masters of the country, and determine the policy of taxes, prices and cadres. Trade unions and the KGB will naturally wither away. The bureaucratic apparatus serves the people and is financed by them. And the court serves the Law.

The fundamental condition for the functioning of objective socialism, in accordance with the demands of the law of unity and conflict of opposites, is the division of the subject of administration—the party, into two equal and independent groups, each with its own central committee. Capitalist countries have practically from the beginning developed on the basis of political pluralism, which permitted them in the shortest period (4-5 years rather than 70 endless years) to demonopolize production in the years 1929-1934; as a result of which the crash and the decay of monopolistic capitalism which the communists were expecting turned out to be a period for monopolistic socialism.

In 1989 demonopolization of the political system is taking place in socialist countries too: Hungary, Algeria, Poland, CSSR, GDR, Bulgaria and Romania. These countries have taken advantage of the structure of bourgeois democracy—the multi-party system, for antagonistic classes. In conditions of socio-political unity of socialist society and ideological monism, it seems more expedient to introduce political pluralism, dividing the state monopoly party into two equal and independent groups in accordance with the demands of theory.

It would be expedient to hear reports and recommendations from the organizations responsible for the crisis situation in the country.

1. Theoretical Report from the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium:

a) For the Philosophy Department. Modern interpretation of the category of "development" and the theory of the individual; the applicability to socialism of the dialectical law of development; the theory of the party

and trade unions in conditions of popular rule, and distribution of competent authority in a hierarchy of organizations.

b) For the Economics Department. Correlation of "bourgeois" commodity-monetary turnover and socialist cost-accounting; formulation of the fundamental contradiction of socialism; forms of using public property; distribution of competent economic authority in a hierarchy of organizations; ownership of property; distribution of newly-established values; a strategy of prices and values.

c) For the Law Department. Formulation of unconditional guarantee of human development and human rights, and distribution of competent juridical authority in a hierarchy of organizations.

2. Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee.

a) Development of political relations in capitalist and socialist countries.

b) The peculiarities of the Programs and periods of constructing a communist society developed under the leadership of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev.

3. Economic Report of the USSR Government.

The peculiarities of planning and working out the basic national-economic programs for the periods of war communism, NEP, the complete and final victory of socialism, developed and developing socialism.

4. Discussion of Reports and Adopting Resolutions on Problems.

a) Transformation of the existing subjective form of socialism into objective socialism by means of demonopolizing the national economy, with automatic resolution of questions of a law-governed state and the party; objective guarantees and national relationships.

b) Affirmation of a national state and property by means of transferring competent authority to the Soviets, distribution of national property, distribution of newly-established values, determining the amounts of taxes and prices, and the instruction of cadres.

c) Clarification and interpretation of laws on the functioning of a democratic society: pensions, benefits, the press, defense, motherhood, and so on.

d) Regulation by the Soviets of the amounts of the average norms for profits in the transitional period, under conditions of production shortfalls, in order to limit state, group and cooperative speculation; along with a gradual transition to the market mechanism of regulating the average norms of profits in conditions of abundance of commodity production.

Formation of Russian Communist Party Discussed

90UN1515A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No. 16,
16 Apr-22 Apr 90 p 5

[Interview with D.A. Barabashov, former CPSU Central Committee Instructor and member of the Moscow Action Committee for Restoring the Communist Party of Russia, by V. Strokin; date and place not specified: "A Double Standard"]

[Text] Our weekly has already reported on preparations for the constituent congress for restoring the Russian Communist Party which is planned to be held in Lenin-grad on 21 and 22 April, as well as on an extraordinary conference of the communists of Moscow and Moscow Oblast which elected delegates to this congress.

These reports proved to be of interest to our readers. The editorial office decided to continue the discussion, and approached one of the speakers at the extraordinary conference, member of the Moscow Action Committee, Instructor of the CPSU Central Committee D.A. Barabashov. However, the continuation of the topic was unexpected.

[Barabashov] As of 31 March, I am no longer a CPSU Central Committee instructor.

[Strokin] What?

[Barabashov] On Saturday, 24 March I made a report at the extraordinary conference, and as soon as Monday 26 March, there was a phone call... from the Minkhimprom [Ministry of the Chemical Industry]: Supposedly, they had a burning desire to hire me. I was surprised because I had not told anybody about wanting to transfer anywhere at all, much less to the Minkhimprom. Besides, my immediate superiors had no complaints about my work. Usually, if an employee of the Central Committee apparatus is transferred at best two to three weeks elapse between the request and the resolution of the Central Committee secretariat. In this case, fantastic dispatch was displayed: On 31 March, a resolution on my transfer to the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry in order "to be assigned within the industry" was adopted. There is such a wording for those who are undesirable, unlike those who have not incurred the wrath of the leadership.

[Strokin] Whose wrath have you incurred?

[Barabashov] I will say it straight out, bluntly. My imaginary "transfer" was so clumsily arranged that there may be only one conclusion. These are political reprisals.

[Strokin] For what?

[Barabashov] For daring to have my own opinion, and not just have it but express it publicly.

[Strokin] Indeed, the public is aware of your clear-cut, unequivocal party position taken in our time of sharp discussions and unfolding political and ideological struggle. Unlike some party functionaries who strive to retire to the shade and keep silent at a complicated

moment you ventured out into the open. Last year, you became a co-chairman of the "Russia" Club and subsequently a member of the Moscow Action Committee for Creating the Communist Party of Russia, took part in the pre-election struggle for a seat of the Russian Federation deputy representing the bloc of social and patriotic forces, and spoke extensively before working-class audiences, rallies, and meetings with voters. Your speech at an evening event in the cinema and concert hall "Rossiya" where you said bluntly that CPSU Central Committee Secretary A.N. Yakovlev promotes a campaign in the press aimed at debunking communist ideals had considerable repercussions. However, can this speech of yours from long ago be tied to the recent transfer?

[Barabashov] There is a direct connection. As soon as I reported to work, I was called in by Deputy Chief of the Socio-Economic Department M.V. Barbarich who expressed, putting it mildly, the displeasure of the leadership: "You criticize the apparatus." I countered that I criticize the actions of a particular person, a political leader rather than the apparatus, and have a right to criticize a leader of any rank under the statute of the party. At the end of the conversation, I was insistently admonished to refrain from participating in the forthcoming rally of the social and patriotic forces of Russia in Ostankino. I spoke at the rally nonetheless. I was called in again and warned unequivocally that after the election campaign is over my services will no longer be required in the department.

[Strokin] However, the party was exactly the one to begin the process of democratization and elimination of all zones and persons not subject to criticism. Judging by the last CPSU Central Committee plenums, there are no "inviolable ones" in either the Secretariat or the Politburo. Ye.K. Ligachev, M.S. Gorbachev, and A.N. Yakovlev were all criticized, incidentally, approximately for the same things which you referred to in the "Rossiya" auditorium.

[Barabashov] The peculiarity of our present-day democracy is in the fact that the notion of pluralism of opinions embraces the people belonging to a certain circle. I, a rank-and-file "apparatchik," a representative of "conservative party structures" have no such right.

[Strokin] Dmitriy Aleksandrovich, allow me to disagree. If we were to use this criterion—who works where and in which position—then it would turn out that no party functionary may speak out. Meanwhile, it is not the case! For example, rank-and-file instructor of the Moscow Higher Party School V.N. Lysenko and Rector of this school V.N. Shostakovskiy whose place in the party hierarchy is more prominent are also the "representatives of conservative structures" through and through. However, they do not just state particular views before a particular audience. Being members of the Coordination Council of the CPSU Democratic Platform, they organized in the Moscow Higher Party School a conference of party clubs which gave the Democratic Platform its

organizational format. Moreover, on 3 March, on the eve of the elections, the newspaper PRAVDA provided its pages for the publication of the documents of the Democratic Platform and materials of the roundtable at which Lysenko and Shostakovskiy had an opportunity to outline their considerations in quite some detail. Therefore, could it be that something else matters rather than just one's affiliation with the apparatus?

[Barabashov] Indeed, you are right. Of course, the content of statements, one's position do matter.

[Strokin] What does the leadership find objectionable in your views?

[Barabashov] It is hard for me to say definitively what exactly it is. I can only speculate. Specifically in reference to my position, I believe that all talk of "the people" in general is a non-class, harmful illusion which has nothing in common with Marxism.

After all, our society consisted and still consists of classes. The continuing technological heterogeneity of production and the enormous bulk of hard manual labor, a multisectoral economy, and complex social and class differentiation of the populace are objective prerequisites for this. The process of "reverse" formation of classes picked up spontaneously in the 1970's, and in the 1980's—in an organized manner. "The shadow economy" has grown and picked up speed. The stratum of private-enterprise (for now, underground), bourgeois elements has grown. The position of these forces in our society and the volume of "shadow" capital make it possible to pressure our society economically and ideologically pushing us toward a political decision on restoring private property by passing corresponding laws. The reality of the threat of bourgeois conversion of the party necessitates the consolidation of healthy patriotic, democratic, and socialist forces of our society on a Marxist-Leninist platform. Having restored the class character of the party, we will bring its fuzziness to an end. The democratic platform proposes the opposite: The party expresses the interests of all strata present in our society. However, if the party is a party of all people, and a stratum of "shadow" capitalists and hard-boiled "fighters" for the restoration of capitalism (many of whom belong to the CPSU) grows in our society, how can we say that the party expresses the interests of the working class, of toilers?

[Strokin] I would admit that I find this approach very convincing. It is hard to understand what causes such rejection by your superiors. Is it your opposition to the Democratic Platform?

[Barabashov] I believe that I am not in a position to discuss the program planks of the Democratic Platform. I do not accept them. Perhaps, only familiarity with their documents will ensure an objective assessment.

[Strokin] I had to take his advice. I am quoting excerpts from the resolutions and declarations adopted at the meeting of the All-Union Coordinating Council (KS) of

the "CPSU Democratic Platform" held on 19 March in order for our readers to be able to draw their own conclusions:

"The KS believes that the course of events has brought about the unavoidable split in the CPSU and creation of new parties. The KS proclaims its intention... to begin the process of formation of a new political party on the basis of the Democratic Platform and that of the Interregional Group of Deputies... To fight for democratic elections to the 28th Congress without any filters; to assume the initiative in forming party districts... To nationalize the assets of the CPSU and to transfer them to the soviets with a view to creating equal conditions for the political parties and pursuant to the new wording of Article 6."

Here is another KS document: **bold** "On the introduction of presidential rule":

"Instead of a step toward the resolution of problems, our society received a dangerous unknown in the person of the president..."

"On working in the soviets of people's deputies."

"To create deputy groups of the adherents of the democratic Platform, and to have the deputy groups develop a platform and the program of activities before the first session of the soviet... work out proposals on the structure of the soviet, procedures for electing the leaders of the soviet and the executive committee... nominate candidates for positions in the leading organs of the soviet and the executive committee. If clearly in a minority, create an organizationally established opposition..."

"On the attitude toward the creation of the Communist Party of Russia."

"The KS is adopting a decision in principle on the need to create independent republic parties. However, we believe that at present participation in the preparatory congress in Leningrad on 21 and 22 April which was proposed by the United Front of Toilers and the party apparatus would ideologically discredit the proponents of the Democratic Platform."

V.N. Shostakovskiy issued the following directive: "...in the immediate future, form working groups in the regions with a view to preparing documents for creating a truly democratic party of the Russian Federation." Yu.N. Afanasyev made a more sincere statement: "On the issue of creating a Russian Communist Party. We've got to understand that in this matter we are again being drawn into a connection with that infamous 'communism.'"

A KS member stated: "We've got to forestall the Gidaspov initiative."

Another one chimed in: "We've got to sever the umbilical cord tying us to the CPSU. We need a small party which is capable of leading a majority, as is the case in civilized countries. Politically active non-party members who have not joined the CPSU because it is communist are our

growth base. Pay no attention to the fact that we have few workers. The workers need an economic program."

N.I. Travkin elaborated on how the sympathy of the workers is to be gained: "We must assign our theoreticians to develop the economic chapter of our platform. We have made arrangements with some cooperatives which will keep them on their payroll, and by the end of April the program is going to be ready. Not only Tarasov (yes, the one famous for the case of party dues based on 3 million rubles!—note by V. Strokin) is ready to help us but also some of the joint enterprises being formed."

In light of this, the fact, insignificant at first sight, of the hasty reassignment or, more precisely, banishment of a rank-and-file instructor from the apparatus of the Central Committee looks quite different. A much more stringent standard was applied to his deeds than to the activities of the Democratic Platform functionaries. Apparently, some people are indeed not happy with D.A. Barabashov speaking out in defense of the communist workers' ideals of our party.

The author requested that the honorarium be deposited in the settlement account No. 609421 MFO N-7 (Association "United Council of Russia"—Refugee Assistance Fund).

Baklanov on Sverdlovsk Party Organization

90UN15464 Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 16, Apr 90 p 3

[Comments by O.D. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "Newspaper Interview"]

[Text] Participating in the work of the conference was the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee O.D. Baklanov who, at the request of our correspondent, commented on the situation in the Sverdlovsk party organization.

The work of the conference which took place in one of the largest party organizations of the country is of principal significance. As I see it, it took place on a high political level. It will be a landmark in the further deepening and acceleration of the perestroika processes in Sverdlovsk Oblast, which has a colossal intellectual, industrial, and economic potential. The communists spoke honestly and critically about all the shortcomings that have accumulated here. This conference will produce a great impetus for further development of the national economy and the reform of the political system in the oblast.

I was in Sverdlovsk a year and three months ago at the preceding conference. I must say that you would not recognize the people now. There are new people who have been elected on a competitive basis. But even those I knew previously had changed inside. And this is the main merit of perestroika: We have all become different people.

But I must say directly that, unfortunately, these changes have not yet reached the national economy. All of our industry, including in Sverdlovsk Oblast, is operating with concealed but great shortcomings. The tasks that

were set in the area of revival of agriculture, increasing the output of consumer goods, and building housing have not been fulfilled. But the conference that just took place inspires certain hopes, even confidence, that the situation will be rectified. One can sense this in the attitudes of the people, especially those who are members of the new obkom [oblast committee]. New, energetic people have come to work, and this is the main result of the conference.

At this point I would not try to give any recommendations or advice to the new obkom. It has a high enough intellectual potential to figure things out. And I think the new first secretary acted correctly when he postponed organizing the plenum for a week in order to look attentively at the experience of his predecessors, to select personnel who thought the same way, and consider his program and strategy of action.

For the main mistake of the former leadership was that it lost contact with the local party organizations. If the work had been arranged on the basis of dialogue with people and consolidation of all forces, that would not have happened. Aleksandr Petrovich Gusev and I met with advocates of the Democratic Platform and there I saw people who would have taken extreme positions and would have impeded dialogue. Now every communist must determine his own position and not wait for any instructions from above. Everyone must make his own choice. There are times when in order to reach the goal successfully, it is necessary to separate before uniting. Therefore I do not rule out the possibility that we shall have to part ways with some people. Let there be fewer of us in the party but we shall think alike and work for a common cause. Under the conditions of a multiparty system there must be even more discipline within the party.

A creative atmosphere must now be created for the new obkom. And I think Aleksandr Petrovich will succeed at this. He will be able to combine the experience of old cadres—not all of them worked poorly—and the energy and ideas of those who are attracted to joint work. We must arrange the kind of connection, the kind of contact with local organizations that will make people come to the obkom not on summons but in response to a call of the heart. The conference that just ended is an example of this kind of creative atmosphere.

RSFSR People's Deputy Candidate Gleb Yakunin Interviewed

90UN10754 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8,
19-25 Feb 90

[Interview with Gleb Yakunin, priest, RSFSR people's deputy candidate for national-territorial okrug No 11, by Aleksandr Nezhnyy, writer: "To the Fatherland and to God"; date and place not specified]

[Text] He is, perhaps, somewhat hot-tempered, impetuous, and sharp, which is why it sometimes seems to me that, under his robes of a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church, the pea-jacket of the zek [prisoner] of a Soviet

political camp shows through, which he wore for 3.5 years, having been imprisoned for a year and a half in the Lefortovo Prison of the KGB. He went through the classic path of the rights advocate: Prison, camp, and exile (in the Yakutsk village of Ynykehanskiy, where for over 2 years he worked as a car mechanic); and there, in exile, he said, the amnesty overtook me. It was the year 1987, Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov already lived in Moscow, and in many respects thanks to his efforts people left the camps and exile, who had been stigmatized by Article 70 of the Criminal Code, which already now, one would like to think, has been forever cursed and cast from our life. The comrade-in-arms of Academician Sakharov in the human rights movement, the priest Gleb Yakunin, who now has been nominated as RSFSR people's deputy candidate for the 11th national-territorial okrug by the collectives of a number of enterprises of localities near Moscow, returned home, to Moscow.

[Nezhnyy] Your name, Father Gleb, became widely known in 1965, when you, together with the now deceased priest Nikolay Eshliman, addressed an open letter to Aleksiy, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia. You were the first to speak openly about the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is, in essence, the captive of the state and that the leadership of the church unconditionally submits to illegality and arbitrariness on the part of the authorities. You, in particular, wrote: "Can one imagine that, during the days of the apostolic sermon, when according to the word of the first disciples of Christ, many thousands of the people were baptized, before the performance of the sacrament selected members of the church community, WITH THE ASSENT of the Apostles, registered all those wanting to be baptized, and then turned over these lists into the hands of the Roman or Judaic administration? The sinfulness of such designs is obvious! Meanwhile, however bitter it is to say this, precisely such a situation exists now in the Russian Church and its pastors, through a circular of Your Holiness...are forced...to actively assist in this sin." One can imagine what deafening impression it produced then. Did you, at that time still a young priest—you were 30 years old—fully realize what awaited you?

[Yakunin] The 1960's—this is truly a terrible time for the Russian Orthodox Church. If in the 1920's-1930's it proved to be in the zone of a terror which was undoubtedly aimed at its complete destruction, approximately from the end of the 1950's the administrative slip-knot was thrown on it, which was pulled more and more tightly every year. By 1965, more than 10,000 orthodox temples were closed in our country—more than half of those which were operating. The appropriate subdivision of the USSR Committee for State Security (now, according to the words of the chairman of the KGB, V. Kryuchkov, abolished) and the Council for Religious Affairs, which, in essence, was a branch of the KGB, strictly regulated all aspects of church life. Admission to the ecclesiastical schools, their programs, the appointment of priests to parishes, bishops to eparchies, the

foundations of the church administration—all these purely internal questions were decided, in essence, not by the Moscow patriarchate, not by the Holy Synod, not by the Patriarch, but by the state, from which the church was formally separated. It should, however, be said that the slip-knot was tightened not only by the former NKVD official G. Karpov, who in 1943 from Stalin's hands accepted the post of chairman of the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and his successor, V. Kuroyedov. With respect to the conscience, the most agonizing aspect of the tragedy of the Russian Orthodox Church consists, perhaps, precisely in the fact that many bishops, intentionally or unintentionally, took part in its destruction.

[Nezhnyy] Is that not going too far, Father Gleb? There is no method against a crow-bar—and I would like to know with what and how the leaders of the church could have opposed the state crow-bar? The recently declassified archive of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church provides quite a few examples to the effect that all concessions in one way or another were compelled. Although, to be honest, the Patriarch and the members of the Holy Synod, even if they tried to defend the interests of the church, did so very timidly.

[Yakunin] Precisely! There should have been open protests against the general closing of temples, and the overwhelming majority of our bishops dared only to ask for leniency. Indeed, if the late Patriarch Aleksiy and Patriarch Pimen who replaced him had remembered the heroic deed of Patriarch Tikhon, who has now been canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church...

[Nezhnyy] We proved to be side by side in the Troitskiy Sobor of the Danilov Monastery during the glorification of Patriarch Tikhon and, if you remember, you agreed that this canonization has great moral significance for the church and for all of society. It ended with the lie, which the official propaganda for decades piled up around the name of the Patriarch. It is a pity, however, that the church this time, too, as it were, evaded the Metropolitan of Petrograd Veniamin (of Kazan), who was executed in 1922, and other priests and bishops, who became the innocent victims of the war, which the authorities had then declared on religion.

[Yakunin] I will tell you, what you have here is the recurrence of the old malady of the church apparatus—a frightened look back at authority. The Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna Yuvrenaliy explained somehow that the church cannot glorify Metropolitan Veniamin until he will be officially rehabilitated. Thus, legal sanction from the state is needed in order for the church at last to have its say! Indeed, both the Metropolitan Veniamin and all the other new martyrs in the hearts of millions of our believing fellow-citizens acquired the crown of holiness a long time ago. And it is a bad thing when the church leadership lags behind the spiritual development of society. And so, I continue: If our church leadership had defined its position through the example of Patriarch Tikhon, who knows, would this not also

have exerted an influence on the actions of the state? And really in any case we would not be talking now about the fall of the moral authority of the episcopate. Indeed, it is terrible when through their lie, through their silence, and through their direct assistance, the bishops promote the silent and secret suffocation of the church! How many cases, unfortunately, were there when, with their own hands, they took communion cloth from the Holy Thrones and signed orders [ukazy], according to which priests were compelled to stop their service—and the life of the temples came to an abrupt end. Sevastian, the Bishop of Kirovograd and Nikolayev, quite recently, in 1986, in spite of the protests of the believers, in this manner closed one of the temples of his eparchy, thereby giving it up to destruction. In the 1960's, this was a mass phenomenon. Against him and against the servile position of the church, we raised our voice, having addressed open letters to Patriarch Aleksiy, the episcopate, and the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. Podgornyy.

[Nezhnyy] I repeat my question: You understood what was expected of you? What path you were selecting? Indeed, at that time you had a family, a child growing up....

[Yakunin] My friend Nikolay Eshliman and I could not think about this... But he and I were united in the fact that above all is our duty of priests, pastors before the Russian Orthodox people, the Russian church, before our Lord Jesus Christ. It is said in the Gospel: "And Jesus went into the temple of God and drove out all those who were selling and buying in the temple, and overturned the tables of the money-changers and benches of the dove sellers, and he said to them: It is written—'My house is called a house of prayer; but you have turned it into a den of robbers.'" We perceived with the deepest pain the disastrous situation of the church, we saw that its bishops—with the exception, perhaps, of only Yermogen (Golubev) and Pavel (Golyshev) and some others—agreed to any concessions humiliating and insulting the church and society, only so as not to be deprived of their material well-being, and we understood that someone must assume responsibility and speak the truth.

The silence continued for decades; it covered up the disgrace of the priests and, according to our conviction, it would be immoral not to try to break it.

[Nezhnyy] Father Gleb, you are perfectly right in asserting that everything which insults and humiliates the church, insults and humiliates society. For the church separated (for the time being, as before, mainly only on paper) from the state cannot be separated from society, tens of millions of whose members are believing people. But were you in time with your letter? From many church people I happened to hear that the church is something self-developing and that the time will come when its internal self-purification, without any assistance from the outside, will put all in their places. And the bishops at that time will not please the representative

of the Council for Religious Affairs and other representatives of power, the church administration will be subordinated to the principles of conciliarism [sobornost], and the people will again receive the right to elect the bishops.

To tolerate a lie is humiliating. And it is impossible to be reconciled with a situation which perverts the very essence of the church. In the end there was and there remains before us the experience of the National Council [Pomestnyy Sobor—literally "local council", but in fact a national assembly] of 1917-1918—a Council which not only restored the patriarchate abolished by Peter I, with the candidacy of the Metropolitan Tikhon who had become Patriarch, being one of three....

[Nezhnyy] Nevertheless, people, whom I call "new friends of the Russian Orthodox Church," and whom one can encounter among responsible officials, are hurrying to declare the idea of alternative elections to be blasphemous and insulting to the church. Thus one can even reach the point of multi-mandate okrugs they exclaim with pathos.

[Yakunin] To appoint the bishop and especially the Patriarch, as, in essence, the Patriarchs Sergiy, Aleksiy, and Pimen were appointed by state authority, is, of course, much easier and simpler. So then, the Council of 1917-1918, in addition, took a number of fundamental decisions, determining the actual democratization of church life. The necessary changes cannot happen by themselves, they must be prepared, they must be helped, including the changes in the church. And it is revealing, I know this quite precisely, that Patriarch Aleksiy acknowledged as justified the criticism contained in our letter.

[Nezhnyy] But he punished you.

[Yakunin] A gentle person, he strove to avoid severe measures, but V. Kuroyedov, the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, came to him and demanded that these trouble-makers, Eshliman and Yakunin, be banned. The Patriarch sighed a lot and said that he, in his old age, did not want to take this sin upon himself, but apparatus obedience this time, too, gained the upper hand. The Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna Pimen (the present Patriarch) summoned us and ordered us to repent—we refused. Then, on 14 May 1966, we were prohibited from the performance of divine services. My prohibition remained in effect for exactly 20 years—to 13 May 1987.

[Nezhnyy] A sort of record for the Guinness Book.... But neither prohibition nor prison, camp or exile, removed in you, Father Gleb, the aspiration to contribute to the purification of the church and society. On the eve of the National Council devoted to the 1000th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia, you, as is well known, addressed a letter to Patriarch Pimen as well....

[Yakunin] It was written by me and the priest Georgiy Edelshteyn. We are disturbed by a great deal in the

present situation of the Russian Orthodox Church. Yes, the changes for the better are obvious, and I talk about them with great gladness. But I would like to underscore now that quite recently the Romanian Orthodox Church took part in the creation and strengthening of the personality cult of the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu.

[Nezhnyy] I understand: You are trying to obtain analogous repentance of the Russian Orthodox Church. But, indeed, almost 4 decades have passed since the day Stalin died, and, in my opinion, the church leaders who glorified him are already no longer among the living. For this reason, is it worthwhile?

[Yakunin] Is it worthwhile, you are saying, to raise the sad pages of history that have already been turned over? Is it worthwhile, when even during a light contact of this past one is struck by the grotesqueness and ludicrousness both of the "cult of the personality" itself and the deep humiliation of the "fool's" role under the bloody tyrant played by the Moscow Patriarchate? Is it worthwhile to look into this abyss of spiritual-moral collapse, which is unprecedented in all past church history? I answer: Quite necessary! For without this, the most shameful stain cannot be washed off. And if that is the way you will have it, then the spiritual rebirth of the Russian Church seems unthinkable to me. Many people—especially young people—in the search for truth are now turning to the church. But, you see, the church can preach the truth of Christ only after it has repented of its sin of idolatry, which its devotion to the cult of Stalin, in essence, was. Unrepented sin, sin which has not been overcome, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers, is the root of still more terrible sin.

[Nezhnyy] The roots of the phenomenon, which you with bitter laughter call "devotion to the cult" are deeper than merely the church administration's fear of the repressions. Stalin almost killed the church—but in 1943 allowed it to go on living. The fear remained—but, side by side with it, there was a glimmer of hope for some kind of state-church, Byzantine, concord or symphonia. According to my observations, this hope is now also rising among the present leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile I am convinced that, the more strictly the church will maintain a certain distance between itself and [state] power and the sooner our state will repudiate its atheism and become equally neutral with respect to it and with respect to religion, the more fully the church will be able to realize its service.

[Yakunin] I add: There are serious reasons to suggest that in the postwar period the Moscow Patriarchate had a premonition of great impending changes. Patriarch Aleskiy and his closest entourage, apparently, expected that rather soon Stalin—the "New Constantine"—will dismiss or completely re-form the Communist Party, will proclaim the country a pan-Slav, orthodox empire and, having solicited the Moscow Patriarch for coronation as tsar, will make orthodoxy the official state religion. In complete accordance with these expectations, the Patriarch calls Stalin not simply "God-sent and God-given,"

God's chosen one, "whom the Providence of God selected and supplied to lead our Fatherland along the path of prosperity and glory...." One can hardly add anything to these words.

[Nezhnyy] Except that the nostalgia for Stalinism from time to time breaks through among some church figures....

[Yakunin] It manifested itself especially distinctly in the question on the recognition of the Greek-Catholic, or the so-called Uniate church. Shocking to the highest degree are the assertions that there is no such church at all and that the decisions of the Lvov Council of 1946, which reunited the Greek-Catholic with the Orthodox Church, are quite canonical.

[Nezhnyy] If you consider Stalin and Karpov primates...

[Yakunin] A dialogue with the Greek-Catholics has been necessary for a long time, but instead of this the Metropolitan Nikodim of Lvov (recently transferred to Kharkov) is turning for help to the procuracy. Indeed, this is a moral loss for Orthodoxy! And the events which are now taking place in the Western Ukraine, I am convinced, are the historical atonement for the evil inflicted on the believing Greek-Catholics of the Moscow Patriarchate in close cooperation with the NKVD in 1946. And for the unwillingness to repent of the evil committed and to adopt a wise decision in time.

[Nezhnyy] I would nevertheless like to note that the Union [uniya] was introduced into Orthodoxy with the help of the most brutal force. But since 1596 all but 400 years have passed, the memory of the sufferings endured has become worn down, and the Greek-Catholic Church found tens of thousands of devoted followers. For the majority of the population of the Western Ukraine, it has become their church, and it is impossible not to take this into account, given the whole contradictoriness of its position during the Great Patriotic War.

[Yakunin] That is so, but at the same time it must be acknowledged with mournful grief it is extremely difficult for the church leadership, educated in a completely fixed spirit, to rid itself of extreme conservatism and passiveness. There are, in addition, subjective aspects—fortuitous or, on the contrary, far from fortuitous people in the entourage of Patriarch Pimen. A certain Nadezhda Nikolayevna Dyachenko, for example, whom they have already baptized the "Nadezhda [Hope] of all Russia" and without whom not a single more or less responsible decision and appointment would have been made in the past few years. . . .

[Nezhnyy] Excuse me, these are purely internal problems.... The movement "The Church and Perestroika," established by you and other priests and laymen, whose founding conference was held not long ago in Moscow, as far as I understand, sets itself the goal, among other things, of the purification of the church?

[Yakunin] Undoubtedly. Indeed, it is no secret that there are still bishops who personify the gap that exists between the church leadership and the people, a gap fraught with the most unpredictable consequences.

[Nezhnyy] In your fate, Father Gleb, there was already one public committee.

[Yakunin] Yes, at the end of the 1970's, I, along with like-minded persons, created the "Christian Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Believers," which has become part of the Soviet movement for the protection of rights. We succeeded in publishing abroad 13 volumes of collections of documents, letters, and testimonies, which have conclusively refuted the myth about freedom of conscience in our country and corroborated the numerous cases of brutal persecutions of religion, the church, and believers. On 1 November 1979 I was arrested. The scythe cut a wide swath—some time later, the priest Dmitriy Dudko was arrested, together with whom I sat in the same prison—Lefortovo. We did not experience physical force, but on the other hand there was the strongest psychological pressure both of the "decoy ducks", who for many months suggested to you what best in all to confess, through what to ruin one's life, and, of course, the investigation team....Once—this was in Lefortovo—they led me into a spacious office, where I got acquainted with Colonel Konkov, the chief of the investigation department of the Moscow Administration of the KGB. In the office there stood a Japanese television and a video tape-recorder. They showed me a film which gave a memorable description of the confession of Father Dmitriy Dudko. I knew that some people do not endure prison—they "pour forth", as the prisoners say. But it was difficult for me to believe that Father Dmitriy also "poured forth." Konkov smiled and said: "Well, what of it. Gleb Pavlovich, perhaps you would like to go free?" We do not want to punish to no purpose—especially if the person has sincerely repented and promises not to repeat his mistakes. Here Father Dmitriy is returning to his family—perhaps, you, too, will follow his example. "I have not yet matured," I replied to him and soon I went from prison to camp. I did not blame Father Dmitriy then, as God is my witness! To be imprisoned for the second time is incredibly difficult—but, you see, he had already 8 years of camps behind him. A much more oppressive and painful impression was produced on me by the interview he gave recently to LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA. Having come out in 1980 with his confession, he supposedly disappointed the expectations of the "dissident community", which had expected the martyr's death of him....Good heavens, why does he confirm this evil rubbish? Why does he repeat this word "dissident community" with its scornful-disdainful attitude to people who put the good of the Fatherland above their own life? Why does he attempt to justify his weakness with belief in Russia? It would be much simpler, appropriate and courageous to say: I am guilty, brothers and sisters, forgive me. And that's all! But he endeavors now to

prove that the renunciation of his convictions—this is also the deed of God. It was bitter for me to read this. And I am not the only one.

[Nezhnyy] In accordance with the procedure recently adopted in the Russian Orthodox Church, a priest who intends to be a candidate for deputy is obligated to obtain the permission of the ruling bishop for this. The Metropolitan Yuvrenaliy of Krutitsy and Kolomna refused such permission for you. Nevertheless, you did not withdraw your candidacy and now are engaged in an election battle. You are again transgressing?

[Yakunin] Don't you see, the church apparatus would like to insure itself in this manner the appearance of uncontrollable priests in the organs of popular sovereignty. And it is indeed impossible to control me—I serve God and my Fatherland.

FROM THE EDITORS: Confessionally the discussion between Gleb Yakunin and Aleksandr Nezhnyy was with bitterness....A great deal has already changed for the better in the relations of society and the church, the state and the church. The 1000th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity by Russia, the active participation of believers in the concerns of perestroika—all these are advances, landmarks.

Not sharing a number of the tenets of the discussion, the editors considered that it does not have the moral right to refuse its publication in the column "Free Platform."

Armenian Official Assesses Receipt, Use of Quake Relief Foreign Aid

90US0675A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
18 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Vasilii Khachaturovich Kazaryan, head of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, by ARMENPRESS correspondent R. Karagezyan: "Foreign Aid to Armenia"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] From the first days following the earthquake in Spitak, Armenia has been receiving offers from help from the Soviet people and the entire world community. Assistance in healing the republic's wounds has become a genuine internationalist cause, an expression of the world public's humane and charitable feelings for the victims of the natural disaster, and a sign of compassion for the suffering Armenian people who are courageously surmounting the effects of the quake.

[Correspondent] What forms has the aid to Armenia taken?

An ARMENPRESS correspondent began his interview of Vasilii Kazaryan, the head of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Republic Council of Ministers, with this question and then asked him for a more detailed account of the aid from foreign countries.

[Kazaryan] In the beginning, Armenia was receiving help from everywhere, ranging from donations of blood and medicine to blankets, clothes, tents, food, and other vital necessities. Later, when the shock had subsided and the Armenian Government had drawn up a construction and recovery program, the things the republic needed most for the elimination of the after-effects of the natural disaster were determined. A program was drawn up, with a view to the needs of the quake zone and the extensive development of Armenia's economic potential, for the efficient use of the donations and the potential of foreign government, social, religious, charitable, and other organizations and individuals, including the Armenian emigre communities which took Armenia's pain to heart.

In view of the urgency of the problems to be solved and the fact that the economy needed modern equipment and progressive technology more than the population of the republic needed food and blankets, the Government of Armenia informed foreign organizations of the republic's needs and brought specific proposals to their attention.

To this end, the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers sent working groups of specialists to the United States, Canada, France, Italy, Bulgaria, Argentina, Brazil, Austria, Israel, and other countries to investigate the possibilities for the acquisition of modern equipment, technology, medical instruments, and quarry and masonry machines and mechanisms with the donated funds. They also investigated the possibility of joint ventures for the manufacture of consumer goods and several scarce commodities.

A broad exchange of opinions on the aid to Armenia was conducted in the foreign countries and in the republic with our partners. The dozens of protocols, contracts, and agreements which were signed as a result of this are already being implemented under the unremitting control of the republic Council of Ministers. We have established direct fax, telex, and telephone communications with all interested foreign organizations and Soviet overseas establishments and are conducting regular correspondence on all of the matters of interest to us.

Through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other union organs, the republic government organized the receipt of the donated goods shipped to the ports of Klaypeda, Leningrad, Odessa, Izmail, Poti, and Batumi. An air bridge was established to connect Armenia with the outside world, with stops in the airports of Moscow, Yerevan, and Leninakan. Goods are also coming in by rail and on the highways.

In the overwhelming majority of cases the Soviet side has secured payment for the transport costs in rubles. We have also assumed the responsibility for the allocation of transport vehicles for the purpose of saving the foreign currency collected abroad and needed for specific relief programs to alleviate the after-effects of the quake.

Although the transport costs would constitute a large sum in the currency of foreign states, we did this not only

for the purpose of saving the foreign currency, but also to expedite deliveries of donated goods.

[Correspondent] How smoothly has the receipt of the donations been organized?

[Kazaryan] The work has been going on steadily, but the blockade of Armenia last fall hurt the work immensely. It disrupted the schedules for deliveries, the work on the programs, and mutual commitments. It took considerable government effort to restore the regular shipment of freight. This is why we asked the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Civil Aviation to assume all of the responsibility for the air freight.

At the request of our government, for example, our country's Ministry of Defense arranged for 14 round-trip flights by the Ruslan, the world's largest cargo plane. Three house-building plants, a gift to the republic from the Armenian Assembly in the United States, and technological equipment from the FRG for the processing of rubble were delivered to the republic on board this plane. The flights were part of the aid to the republic and were made for free. Incidentally, if the Ministry of Defense had not helped us, Armenia would have had to spend almost 750,000 dollars of relief funds to cover these expenses.

The planes of Aeroflot delivered bakeries from France, a mixed feed plant from Italy, and other freight to the republic.

In connection with the blockade of the republic, a constituent assembly of seven Armenian social and religious organizations was held in the United States last November. They united under the title "United Armenian Fund" and decided to send the vital necessities to Armenia. In December of last year and January this year they sent three Boeing-707 planes of the American Southern Air Transport company to Yerevan with medicine, medical equipment, food, warm clothing, wheelchairs, computers, and duplicating machines.

Two other planes from the United States arrived with donations of goods from the U.S. State Department and the America Cares organization.

In all this time, there were only two cases in which flight schedules were disrupted, and these were connected with the aggravation of the situation in the region.

[Correspondent] What is the reason for the issuance of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation's directive signed on 19 January by Deputy Minister V.Ye. Panyukov and printed in full in YEREKOYAN YEREVAN?

[Kazaryan] In connection with the exacerbation of the situation in the transcaucasus—the state of emergency in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and some border regions in Armenia—the news media of some foreign countries began spreading rumors about the alleged transfer of soldiers and weapons to the Armenian SSR on the planes carrying the donated goods.

The rumors were specifically denied in the 7 February edition of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Nevertheless, the news passed through channels in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and naturally affected the organization of the air lift, causing delays in scheduled deliveries. In our opinion, this was the reason for the directive in which the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation instructed its offices to work out a procedure of flight authorization by the republic Council of Ministers. It must be said that the Government of the Armenian SSR was not informed of the ministry's official instructions. A xerox copy of the document was delivered to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers on 1 February by representatives of social organizations—Kh. Stambolt-syan, A. Sadovyan, and others—who were informed that the government would investigate the matter without delay and take the necessary measures in the event that the ministry's official instructions would change the previously approved flight schedule.

Chairman V.S. Markaryants of the republic Council of Ministers immediately contacted the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and was told that the instructions of 19 January were issued in connection with the state of emergency in the region and were intended to provide for the more efficient scheduling of flights by foreign aircraft on the basis of requests submitted in advance by the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers for Yerevan landing permits.

The government reached an agreement with the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the approval of regular flights, and the directive of 19 January was rescinded.

The members of the social organizations who had asked the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers for an explanation were informed of this agreement, but it appears that the authenticity of our information was of little interest to them, because the rumors about the deliberate disruption of scheduled flights to the disaster zone were then repeated at public rallies and in the press. Just this week four planes arrived in Yerevan with donations from the United States and France to the Armenian Gosstroy, Echmiadzinskiy Katolikosat, and the Veratsnund social organization.

[Correspondent] Vasily Khachaturovich, does the government have any guarantee that similar situations will not occur in the future?

[Kazaryan] I must say that before this happened, the government was settling more complex issues with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and other state organs, and that they displayed complete understanding and support in the organization of deliveries.

Problems arose with foreign donors in connection with the choice of routes, shipment dates, freight contents, and so forth. All of these issues had to be resolved with

the help of superior agencies, with which we established a complete mutual understanding.

Furthermore, the freight shipped to our social organizations represents a negligible part of the total shipments made within the framework of the program worked out by the government with foreign firms and organizations.

Now the Armenian community in Syria has prepared 70 tons of freight, but it has no material or transport resources. The republic government solved the problem in conjunction with the Soviet Embassy in that country, and soon the freight will arrive in Armenia.

It must be said that the republic Council of Ministers has repeatedly appealed to various Soviet embassies and trade representations and to foreign social and other organizations to advise donors to send the republic technological equipment for the construction industry, equipment for the production of food and the processing of agricultural products, and other goods instead of disposable items and foodstuffs.

Our appeals, as I said before, were based on a program the government drew up for the purpose of the quickest possible eradication of the after-effects of the earthquake and the development of all of the republic's economic potential.

Last year the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers formed a task force, headed by Deputy Chairman Yu. Arustamyan of the republic Gosplan, to facilitate the receipt of incoming freight and the allocation of motor vehicles for its delivery.

Incoming shipments are distributed by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for the Observance of Social Justice and Glasnost in the Expenditure of Earthquake Relief Funds and by representatives of Echmiadzinskiy Katolikosat and social organizations.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I had several conversations with representatives of official and unofficial social organizations even before the article "Love Thy Neighbor" appeared in YEREKOYAN YEREVAN, and they asked me questions about the receipt and distribution of donated goods. I gave them complete answers based on the documents in the government's possession. This is why I was so surprised by the appearance of the newspaper article, which certainly could not aid in improving the organization of these shipments.

I can say with complete confidence that no plane carrying donated freight has been detained through the fault of the Armenian SSR Government to this day.

The author requests that his fee be deposited in the earthquake relief fund.

1981-1989 Statistics on Georgian Communist Party

90US0721A *Tbilisi KOMMUNIST GRUZH in Russian No 1, Jan 90 (signed to press 10 Jan 90) pp 48-53*

[Report by the Party Building and Cadre Work Department of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee: "The Georgian Communist Party in Figures"]

[Text] The statistical materials cited below were prepared by the Party Building and Cadre Work Department of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and characterize the quantitative and qualitative changes in the composition of the Georgian Communist Party between the 26th and 27th congresses and during the years 1986-1988.

I. Composition of the Georgian Communist Party and the Growth of Its Ranks

Table 1. Numerical Strength of the Georgian Communist Party

Date	CPSU Members	CPSU Candidate Members	Total Communists
As of 1 Jan 1981	337,639	12,796	350,435
As of 1 Jan 1986	368,027	15,445	383,472
As of 1 Jan 1988	381,865	13,448	395,313
As of 1 Jan 1989	387,270	12,310	399,580

During the 3 years following the 27th Congress, the party's numerical strength increased by 10,307 people. The average annual increase of the party ranks during 1986-1988 was 1.4 percent, compared to 1.9 percent between the 26th and 27 CPSU congresses.

Table 2. Admission of Members to the Party

Year	Admitted as Candidate Members	Total Admitted as CPSU Members
In 1985	11,985	10,906
In 1986	12,164	14,307
In 1987	11,383	12,002
In 1988	9,822	11,605

Table 3. Occupational Composition of CPSU Candidate Members Admitted (in percent)

Occupation	Between 26th and 27th CPSU Congresses	During 1986-1988
Total admitted as candidate members	100.0	100.0
Including		
Workers	56.5	55.8
Kolkhoz farmers	14.8	14.8
Engineering and technical personnel, agronomists, scientific workers, teachers, physicians, and other specialists of the national economy	24.8	25.2
Administrative and managerial apparatus workers	2.2	2.5
Students	1.6	1.7

Workers take the leading place in new party personnel. Of them, about 70 percent work at enterprises in industry, transportation, construction, and agriculture. In 1988, workers and kolkhoz farmers accounted for 71.4 percent of those becoming candidate members (61.2 percent for the CPSU as a whole). All sections of the intelligentsia were also widely represented in those admitted to the party.

Table 4. Number of Komsomol Members Admitted as Candidate Members

Year	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage of Total Number Admitted
In 1985	8,949	74.7
In 1986	9,132	75.1
In 1987	8,479	74.5
In 1988	7,164	72.9

Table 5. Number of Women Admitted as Candidate Members

Year	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage of Total Number Admitted
In 1985	4,837	40.3
In 1986	4,900	40.3
In 1987	4,604	40.4
In 1988	3,712	37.8

Table 6. Composition of CPSU Members and Candidate Members by Social Status

Social Status	1981		1986		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
Total CPSU members and candidate members	350,435	100.0	383,472	100.0	395,313	100.0
Workers	127,622	36.4	152,499	39.8	166,131	41.6
Peasants (kolkhoz farmers)	82,628	23.6	89,929	21.6	81,824	20.5

Table 6. Composition of CPSU Members and Candidate Members by Social Status (Continued)

Social Status	1981		1986		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
White-collar workers	140,195	40.0	148,044	38.6	151,625	37.9
Of them, by occupation (in percentage of total number of white-collar workers)						
managers of organizations, institutions, enterprises, construction projects, sovkhozes, and their structural subdivisions		11.4		12.0		11.7
engineering and technical personnel, agricultural specialists		26.9		29.1		29.2
workers in science, education, public health, literature, and art		32.0		31.3		31.9
workers in trade, public catering, supply, and sales		6.5		6.2		6.1

Table 7. Composition of Communists by Education (as of 1 Jan of the corresponding year)

Education	1981		1988		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percent	In Absolute Figures	In Percent	In Absolute Figures	In Percent
Total CPSU members and candidate members	350,435	100.0	383,472	100.0	399,580	100.0
With:						
higher education	117,379	33.5	140,203	36.6	154,580	38.7
incomplete higher education	15,314	4.4	14,309	3.7	13,793	3.4
secondary education	138,689	39.6	162,234	42.3	172,138	43.1
incomplete secondary education	45,035	13.1	40,732	10.6	375,554	9.4
primary education	27,432	7.8	22,402	5.8	18,869	4.7

The percentage of communists with a higher, incomplete higher, and complete secondary education as of the beginning of 1989 was 85.2 percent, compared to 82.6 percent in 1986.

Today, 237,711 communists (60 percent of the Georgian Communist Party) are specialists in various fields of knowledge: 5,885 party members and candidate members have a candidate of sciences degree, and 1,036 have a doctor of sciences degree.

Table 8. Number of Women in Georgian Communist Party

Date	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage of Total Number of Communists
As of 1 Jan	94,627	27.0
As of 1 Jan	112,751	29.4
As of 1 Jan	119,420	30.2
As of 1 Jan	121,786	30.5

Table 9. Nationality Composition of Georgian Communist Party (as of 1 Jan 1989)

Nationality	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
Total CPSU members and candidate members	399,580	100.0
Including by nationalities:		
Georgian	317,600	79.5
Russian	18,360	4.6
Ukrainian	3,180	0.8
Belorussian	438	0.1
Armenian	23,235	5.8

Table 9. Nationality Composition of Georgian Communist Party (as of 1 Jan 1989) (Continued)

Azerbaijani	9,848	2.5
Abkhazian	7,253	1.8
Ossetic	12,042	3.0
Greek	4,200	1.0
Kurdish	366	0.1
Jewish	1,514	0.4
Tatar	240	0.06
Assyrian	234	0.06
Other nationalities	1,070	0.3

Table 10. Composition of CPSU Members by Length of Party Service

Length of Party Service	1981		1986		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
5 years or less	51,132	15.1	56,511	15.3	61,160	15.8
6-10 years	40,242	11.9	50,117	13.6	54,208	14.0
11-20 years	91,879	27.2	87,559	23.8	87,480	22.6
21-30 years	57,581	17.0	70,948	19.3	81,019	20.9
31-50 years	93,298	27.6	99,046	26.9	99,956	25.8
over 50 years	3,507	1.0	3,846	1.0	3,447	0.9

By the beginning of 1989, the Georgian Communist Party had 3,447 members with more than 50 years of service; 8 of them joined the party in 1917, 70 between 1918 and 1923, and 19 during the Lenin Enrollment (1924). More than 29,000 people joined the CPSU during the Great Patriotic War, and about nine-tenths joined during the postwar period, including 15.8 percent who were admitted as party members in the last 5 years.

Table 11. Distribution of Communists by Sectors of the National Economy (in percent, as of 1 Jan of the corresponding year)

Sector of the National Economy	1981	1986	1989
Total communists employed in the national economy	100.0	100.0	100.0
Of them:			
In material production sectors	68.9	68.9	68.4
Including:			
in industry, construction, transportation, and communications	35.2	35.9	36.2

in agriculture	28.1	25.9	25.1
Of them:			
at sovkhozes	10.7	10.2	9.6
at kolkhozes	14.6	13.7	13.4
in trade, public catering, procurement, material and technical supply, and similar material production sectors	6.5	7.0	7.0
In nonproduction sectors	31.1	31.1	31.6
Including:			
in science, education, higher educational institutions, public health, culture, and art	19.6	19.2	19.7
In state and economic management bodies, in the apparatus of party and public organizations	9.2	9.3	9.3
In housing, public utilities services, and domestic services	2.3	2.5	2.6

II. Primary Party Organizations

Table 12. Network of Primary Party Organizations (as of 1 Jan of corresponding year)

	1981		1986		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
Total primary organizations	11,609	100.0	12,705	100.0	13,166	100.0
Including:						
of industrial, transportation, communications, and construction enterprises	2,751	23.7	3,027	23.8	3,184	24.2
of sovkhoses	486	4.2	577	4.5	651	4.9
of kolkhozes	701	6.0	724	5.7	800	6.1
of trade and public catering enterprises	479	4.1	611	4.8	579	4.4
of educational institutions	2,531	21.8	2,660	20.9	2,682	20.4
of scientific establishments	224	1.9	296	2.3	315	2.4
of cultural-educational and entertainment establishments (theaters, clubs, museums, parks of culture, etc.)	301	2.6	312	2.4	333	2.5
of medical establishments (hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoriums, etc.)	605	5.2	642	6.0	668	5.1
of establishments, organizations, and economic bodies (from central to city inclusively)	1,264	10.9	1,255	9.9	1,337	10.1
of establishments of rural regional centers	1,023	8.8	1,221	9.6	1,179	8.9
rural territorial, at house administration, and other types	1,244	10.7	1,380	10.9	1,438	10.9

Table 13. Distribution of Primary Party Organizations by Number of Communists (as of 1 Jan of the corresponding year)

	1981		1986		1989	
	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage	In Absolute Figures	In Percentage
Total primary organizations	11,609	100.0	12,705	100.0	13,166	100.0
Of that number, those with:						
up to 15 communists	5,780	49.8	6,445	50.7	6,504	49.4
15-49 communists	4,176	36.0	4,461	35.1	4,807	36.5
50-100 communists	1,119	9.6	1,249	9.8	1,330	10.1
over 100 communists	534	4.6	550	4.3	525	4.0

Table 14. Structure of Primary Party Organizations (as of 1 Jan of corresponding year)

	1981	1986	1989
Primary party organizations having party committees	744	873	897
including party committees having rights of a party raykom	7	10	11
Shop party organizations	7,107	8,396	8,434
of them, those with rights of primary party organizations	5,262	6,218	6,048
Party groups	8,677	10,972	10,075
Junction party committees in railway transport	7	9	9

Kazakh Supreme Soviet Summarizes New Decrees

90US0740A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 2

[KazTAG Report: "On the Ratification of Legislative Acts by the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Speaking on this question at a session of the republic's highest organ of state power, Secretary of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet K. Z. Zhusupov noted that at one time the Building Materials Industry Ministry had been abolished and its enterprises and organizations transferred to the purview of the Kazakh SSR Gosstroy and oblsipolkoms. However, an analysis of work under the new conditions has shown

that the absence of a single organ supervising the said branch has had a negative effect on the development of the building materials industry.

In keeping with a suggestion of the Kazakh SSR government, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, by a 4 January 1990 decree, formed a Kazakh SSR Building Materials Industry Ministry.

Expanding foreign economic ties have created a need for a republic-level government organ for foreign economic ties. By a decree of 4 January 1990, the corresponding state committee was formed. In this connection, changes were made in the law "On the Kazakh SSR Soviet of Ministers."

A series of decrees has been passed concerning the introduction of changes into legislation.

By a decree of 30 November 1989, "On the Introduction of Changes and Additions in the Kazakh SSR Code on Administrative Legal Violations," the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet established administrative responsibility for leaders and other officials, enterprises, institutions, and organizations who supply participants in unsanctioned assemblies, meetings, street marches, or demonstrations with rooms, means of communication, duplication and other technology, equipment, transportation, or enabling the organization and conduct of such undertakings in any other way.

On 12 December 1989, in connection with the numerous proposals and desires of citizens and public organizations, as well as the recommendation of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Health Care and Social Welfare, a decree was passed "On Administrative Responsibility for Producing Foodstuffs with Elevated Levels of Pesticides, Nitrates, or Other Substances Harmful to Human Health."

In implementing the social program projected by the first Congress of People's Deputies, maternity leave without pay until the child is three years old was lengthened. By a decree of 30 November 1989, the appropriate changes were made in the Kazakh SSR Labor Code.

By a decree of 30 November 1989, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet introduced changes into its decree of 29 June 1989 "On Income Tax Rates for Cooperatives," which was forth in a new edition, establishing that cooperatives involved only in producing goods earmarked for invalids and the elderly, as well as for the care of the sick, invalids, elderly, and children, are to be wholly exempted from paying income tax.

Maximum income tax rates were set for cooperatives involved in organizing paid concerts, discotheques, artistic events, entertainment programs (50 per cent), and rendering middleman services (40 per cent).

In the remaining cases, tax rates vary between 10 per cent and 35 per cent, depending on the type of cooperative and for whom it carries out its production (labor,

services)—the population, or an enterprise, institution, organization, and at what price.

In connection with the change in Article 34 of the Precepts of the Criminal Justice System of the USSR and the union republics, a decree was passed on 22 December 1989 "On the Introduction of Changes and Additions into Article 71 of the Criminal-Legal Code of the Kazakh SSR."

The article's new wording establishes a stricter procedure for observing the length of time an individual can be held in custody during the investigation of a crime and their extension, as well as the maximum length of time an individual can be kept in custody.

A decree of 12 December 1989 affirmed the statute dealing with workers' detachments assisting the police. It defines the legal status of these detachments, which under present conditions are one of the most effective organized ways for workers to participate in safeguarding public order.

On 11 January 1990, the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet approved a statute on a board of judge experts for the courts of the Kazakh SSR, a statute on the disciplined responsibility, response, and prompt release from work of judges and people's assessors.

Up for approval now as well are decrees on changing the makeup of the Kazakh SSR government, including naming N. M. Makievskiy deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Soviet of Ministers and his release from the responsibilities of the deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Soviet of Ministers as chairman of the State Construction Committee, naming F. Kh Galimov chairman of the State Construction Committee and, as ministers, M. T. Bersenev for internal affairs, A. Kh. Arystanbekova for foreign affairs, and A. K. Minibayev for the building materials industry, S. Zh. Abishev as chairman of the Kazakh SSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, A. D. Yermegiyayev as head of the Kazakh SSR Soviet of Ministers Chief Territorial Construction Administration for the city of Alma-Ata and Alma-Atinskaya Oblast, and others.

Decrees were passed concerning changes in the makeup of the republic's Supreme Court and oblast courts.

Following a public proposal, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet transformed a working group into a commission to pass definitive judgment on the circumstances surrounding the events in the city of Alma-Ata on 17-18 December 1986.

In the name of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, K. Z. Zhusupov requested that the deputies pass the draft laws and resolutions he had presented with respect to ratifying the legislative acts cited.

Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro on 1990 Secretariat Activities

90US0697A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 27 Jan 90 p 1

[Communique issued by the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Secretariat: "On Certain Priority Directions of the Work of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Secretariat for 1990"]

[Text]The Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro has examined a proposal of the Central Committee Secretariat concerning the necessity of concentrating the main attention of Central Committee secretaries and departments on a number of priority work directions during 1990. Having approved these directions of the activity of Secretariat, the Central Committee Buro has approved a decision to publish them in the press.

With the aims of raising the level of information available to Communists and all workers and of developing glasnost, the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Secretariat considers it necessary to publish in the press the basic problems upon the solution of which the main efforts of the secretaries and departments of the Central Committee will be concentrated in 1990.

1. All-round improvement of party management of the economy and energizing preparations for the republic's transition in 1991 to work under conditions of self-financing and self-management. For this:

- to carry out constant organizational and political work among Communist managers, specialists of ministries and departments, scholars, and party organizations with regard to strengthening economic methods of management and effectively introducing economic accountability and to organize the instruction of cadres concerning these questions;
- to meet with, discuss, and define the concrete tasks of party organizations and of workers within the apparatuses of Gosplan, the State Agroindustrial Committee (Gosagroprom), the Academy of Sciences, and other republic ministries and departments;
- jointly with the party organizations of the mass information media, to ensure systematic publicity of these problems in newspapers and journals and on television and radio;
- to examine the state of the republic's preparedness for the transition to new conditions of economic management at a meeting of party and soviet activists and economic workers during the 3rd Quarter.

2. Exercise party oversight of the course of fulfillment of the Food Program approved by plenums of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee and improvement of the supply of food products to the population. With these aims:

- in the course of February 1990, through a visit to local areas, to examine the reasons why certain rayons and

farms are lagging in the production of animal husbandry output and, with the participation of local party and soviet organs, to determine measures for correcting the situation that has developed. To draw into this work Communists and scientists from the scientific production associations and scientific research institutions of the agroprom system, while turning principle attention to increasing livestock productivity and agricultural crop yields:

- with the participation of Communist specialists from Gosagroprom, the People's Control Committee, the Academy of Sciences, and the Council of Ministers, to discuss and designate practical measures to eliminate various losses of livestock and crop products, which have been raised, during their transport, processing and storage.

3. Ensure party oversight of the development and implementation of measures for the ecological revival of cities and large population points and for the protection of unique natural areas, and attract into this work the scientific potential and entire public of the republic.

4. Extend practical assistance and support to soviet organs with regard to increased production of consumer goods, to more rapid solution of the housing problem, and to improvement of social and everyday services for the population. With these aims:

- to participate regularly within the Council of Ministers in reviewing the results of work in these directions, while exerting timely party and political influence on the implementation of these tasks;
- with the participation of the party committees of oblasts, cities, and rayons, to uncover and effectively utilize the internal reserves of each sector, enterprise and organization.

5. Implement the plan of practical actions of the Central Committee and its Buro aimed at carrying out the decisions of the 14th plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee in light of the provisions of the CPSU platform on "The Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Contemporary Conditions."

To attract into this the elected members of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee and representatives of the intelligentsia. To achieve a stable situation within the republic. To activate work aimed at strengthening and deepening fraternal ties and good-neighborliness with the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the other regions of the USSR.

6. Strengthen party influence on the activities of the Komsomol, provide help and assistance in the matter of the education of young people, their more active inclusion in the social and economic processes of the republic's life. For this:

- secretaries and Central Committee department heads are to meet regularly with working young people,

students and pupils and to react on a timely basis to requests and proposals from young people;

- to conduct frank discussions with them, through Communist managers, to manifest concern for the everyday life and the organization of services for young men and women;

- to maintain regular ties with veterans of the party, making use of their rich experience in order to strengthen the authority of the CPSU and to improve the international and patriotic education of young people.

7. Raise the role and responsibility of primary party organizations for realizing the economic, social, and political tasks of perestroika. For this:

- regularly to visit the primary party organizations, to meet with Communists and with labor collectives, to conduct a frank dialogue with them, to examine questions that arise on a timely basis, to assist in their resolution;

- Central Committee secretaries and department heads are to meet by regions with the secretaries of primary party organizations and to discuss questions of raising the vanguard role of Communists;

- with participation of oblast, city, and rayon party committees, to ensure that forthcoming reporting and election meetings and conferences are conducted on a higher level;

- on the basis of broad democracy and glasnost, to take part in organizing the holding of elections of people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and of local soviets and the formation of organs of popular power within the republic.

8. Examine and implement complex measures to prepare for and conduct the 19th Kirghiz CP Congress and for a worthy reception for the 28th CPSU Congress. For this:

- to practice discussion and debate concerning current questions of the party and organizational and ideological activity of party organizations, drawing into this matter Communists, non-party members, and a broad segment of the republic's public. To work out new approaches to further improvement and democratization of the work of the republic's party organization;

- to more precisely delimit the functions of party and soviet organs and to improve the results of their activities while not weakening attention paid to strengthening party and state discipline and the rhythmic fulfillment of national economic plans.

- from the republic party organization, to prepare and send to the CPSU Central Committee proposals for changing and amending the CPSU Rules, having organized broad discussion of them within the primary party organizations and among party activists.

9. Quarterly, inform Communists and the working people of the republic about the activities of the Central Committee Secretariat via the mass information media. In connection with this, practice the use of statements by Central Committee secretaries on television and in the press, and also to use other forms of work.

When providing information concerning certain priority directions of its work in 1990, the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Secretariat is counting on the support of party organizations and on the active participation of Communists, members of the Komsomol, and of all workers in solution of the complex problems of the republic's social and economic development and hopes that each person will manifest personal initiative and enterprise and will make his own contribution to our common cause of progress.

Masaliyev Speaks on Youth Problems, National Demands

90US07011 *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 15 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[KIRTAG report: "The Komsomol on the Path of Renewal"]

[Excerpts] As already reported, the 1st conference of the Kirghiz Komsomol has taken place in Frunze.

Presenting a report "On the Situation Within the Komsomol," the first secretary of the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee, T. Tabylnov, noted that, against the background of the changes that are occurring within the country, a new view of socialism is taking form and that an attempt is being made to come to an understanding of the contemporary problems of socialist society. These problems are disturbing to literally everyone, including young people. Today, an understanding has matured in the consciousness of a majority of Komsomol workers and activists of the fact that we cannot work in the old manner, that fundamental changes are needed. [passage omitted]

A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee [also] addressed the conference.

Our goal is the building of a renewed socialism and its consolidation, he said. This large and very difficult task cannot be solved and we cannot move forward without the Communist Party and the Leninist Komsomol. We should and are obliged to know this. Therefore, we need to raise the role of these, our two largest political organizations. It is very necessary to do this.

First of all, several words about the expanded plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that met two days ago. The plenum discussed the Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th Party Congress and the report by comrade M. S. Gorbachev concerning this question. The materials from the plenum have been published in the press. The draft platform will be submitted for discussion by the party and all the people. I think that this

document answers the basic demands of the times. It will be further improved if Communists, members of the Komsomol, and the citizens of the entire country take part in discussion of it, if they express their opinions and judgments regarding it. Following publication of the document, you may send specific opinions and additions to us or directly to the CPSU Central Committee.

I want to report that the plenum was a heated one. Discussion concerned the fate of the party and its role in society. It is pointed out in the platform that, with the goal of increasing the role of the soviets, the party is changing its functions, is voluntarily relinquishing direct management of the economy and economic questions, and is giving up important powers. At the direction of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, a proposal is being prepared with regard to Article 6 of the Constitution, which will be examined at the next Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The party will structure its work with the labor union and with the Komsomol on a democratic, comradely, partnership basis and will support them.

Today, we cannot live and work in the old manner. The plenum once again affirmed the policy of party renewal, of unity of its ranks. Taking into account proposals made by party organizations, a decision was reached to move up the date for holding the 28th CPSU Congress.

Discussion of questions connected with the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party was continued at the plenum and an appropriate resolution was approved.

A great deal of difficult work will be necessary within the party. The Central Committee plenum underlined the necessity of strengthening discipline and of getting down to concrete work at all levels and in all spheres.

If the activities of the Komsomol are examined from the viewpoint of these high demands, then, unconditionally, it, as an active participant in the processes of perestroika, is devoting a great deal of energy to the social and economic development of the republic. The course of this conference shows that the participation of Komsomol members and of young people in social life has grown. The speakers today have told about the good deeds of young men and women. For this we are grateful to the Komsomol and to all young people. Your successes and contributions are strengthening the economic potential of our land.

During the past four years, thanks to the active work of the workers of the Kirghiz SSR, noticeable changes have taken place in the social and economic life of the republic.

But the results of the work that has been carried out do not satisfy either Communists, or Komsomol members, or our citizens in general. Because the needs of people are growing from year to year. It is necessary to state openly that the Komsomol frequently does not carry its

own initiatives to their conclusion. This has been occurring particularly in recent times. There is insufficient consistency, competence, and purposefulness. This, perhaps, is the main thing that is reducing the authority of the Komsomol, of its leaders, and of Komsomol committees.

The main goal of the party and the Komsomol is improvement of the lives of the people. Both today and tomorrow our lives will be unfairly deprived, will not be of full value, without those things that make up the material basis of life—grain, corn, meat, milk, wool, not to speak about housing. I would like to ask you not to become angry, to think about everything. I want in this connection to turn your attention to production questions. For decades, the Komsomol has acted as an overseer of animal husbandry and the raising of corn. A necessary and useful matter. We have analyzed what specifically has been done during the past four years by Komsomol members in this direction.

On the whole, there has been movement. But the Central Committee of the republic Komsomol and the oblast and rayon Komsomol committees have not succeeded in establishing necessary oversight over these important questions. As a result, the situation is not improving in many rayons. Such an attitude toward obligations it has taken upon itself is unfitting. And indeed we are talking about a matter of first-rate importance, about providing food for the population.

Acting as overseer, in my view, does not mean not discussions and loud slogans, but painstaking work. If we are talking about corn, then it is necessary to raise its yields. In animal husbandry, it is necessary to improve productivity and the safekeeping of young animals. There are still many reserves here.

How can this be done? You will not help matters here with only empty appeals alone. It is first of all necessary to concern yourselves about the everyday lives and rest of those who are engaged in this. To help them master the best approaches to work, to organize study, to disseminate available experience. In this regard, there is much that is positive. Today, delegate Madaliyev Maksutaly spoke about his own achievements. He obtained 143 centners of corn each from 100 hectares of land and his earnings came to 36,000 rubles. These are high indicators, a remarkable contribution. The Komsomol Central Committee and Komsomol activists must make broad use of similar achievements.

It is possible that some will complain: Again they are pressuring us, again commands are being issued. This is not pressure, comrades. The Komsomol has been given broad rights; it is an independent organization. But think a bit, can the party and the older generation stand aside from the affairs of the Komsomol organizations, not extend help? Of course not. It is far from being a matter of indifference to us how and from what young people are living. Both the party and the Komsomol have one goal—improving the lives of the people. This means that

our plans, our actions, should be in accord, on the same track. I assume that the advice and the support of older people will not be superfluous to you.

The more so because, under conditions of democratization and glasnost, some people's heads have begun to spin, some people have lost control over themselves and have given in to the influence of certain extremist elements. I have in view the unauthorized meetings that have taken place in recent days in the city of Frunze.

In the name of the CP Central Committee Buro and the republic government, I wish to state that the questions that were raised at these meetings had already been resolved earlier and that young people were led out into the square by agitation that made use of conjecture and false rumors.

Today, a representative of the Kirghiz State University expressed the view that we may be deprived of a part of our young people. I want to ask why this should occur, do you really intend to separate yourselves from the people, from the workers of the Kirghiz SSR? The state educates, raises you with the hope that you will become worthy people and will bring benefit to the Fatherland.

I consider it necessary to dwell in more detail on certain questions, as this is not a matter of indifference to the Komsomol and its leading organs.

About the shortage of housing for workers of Kirghiz nationality, and not only for them.

The housing problem is becoming a critical, plus there have also been distortions concerning it, but this question will not be solved by meetings. Last year alone in the city of Frunze, about 10,000 plots, more than 1000 hectares of land, were allocated for individual construction. Besides this, order is being introduced into the allocation of housing and the registration of citizens. We have said that after the allocation of plots for construction you will need construction materials, water, electric power and the government of the republic is taking all this upon itself and is providing necessary help. But why are the organizers of these meetings silent about this? Such a stance is being maintained by students at Kirghiz State University (comrade A. T. Chukin), by certain teachers, and by comrades from the Academy of Sciences. This is impermissible. The students are being distracted from the correct path. We look at our students with the hope that, having successfully completed your studies, you will become good specialists and will work for the good of the people. But, for this, you must spend the main part of your time on your studies, on deepening your knowledge.

Unjustified appeals have been heard to put an end to the development of collective gardening and market-gardening. Plots are allocated to all, including the Kirghiz as well. It is another matter if there are violations. These need to be eliminated and the public should be directed toward this.

How is this problem being solved here, with us? In 1987, the CPSU Central Committee, having examined the question of further developing collective gardening and market-gardening, judged it expedient to remove all imitations and barriers in this matter and, within the course of two to three years, to satisfy the needs of citizens for garden plots. We look upon this as a very important socioeconomic and political task, aimed at satisfying the health requirements of the population, as one of the reserves for improving people's food supplies. This work is being carried on and land is being assigned to gardening associations mainly from areas that are not suitable for tillage.

Concerning internal migration within the republic and the strict regulation of the structure of the population of the capital.

I must say directly. The person who manipulates such slogans is doing this deliberately or not is not well informed. The facts speak to something different. During the past ten years, the number of Russians increased by a total of 5000 and their relative share in overpopulation population numbers declined from 25.9 percent to 21.5 percent. During this same period, the number of Ukrainians declined from 109,000 to 108,600. So that there can be no talk of any kind of internal migration.

Speaking at a plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee in July of last year, I cited, in the name of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro, several problems which have a direct relationship to the activities of the Komsomol. There is no need to repeat them today. But I will say that they have not been realized as they should have been. The Komsomol Central Committee must return to them. These are not questions for just single day and they have a direct relationship to young people; it is necessary to work on them constantly.

Take, for example, the employment of youth. Today this is not only a social but also a political problem. Within the republic there are more than 38,000 young people in ages from 16 to 30 years who are not employed in social production. A result of this is disillusionment with the values of life, moral degradation and, as a consequence, an increase in the number of crimes and negative manifestations.

The republic's government is working on the solution of this problem. During the past four years, about 60,000 new working places have been introduced and dozens of branches and shops of industrial enterprises and associations have been opened in rural localities. But this is insufficient and we must urgently solve these problems.

And, at the same time, a shortage of manpower is being experienced in a number of sectors. Overall in industry and construction, there is a shortage of 9000 working places. It is necessary to attract unemployed young people here, to train them, to help them get started. The Komsomol organizations must actively work in this direction; they must study the state of affairs in the cities and rayons and submit appropriate proposals. If such

problems are not being resolved as they should be on the local level, you should appeal right up to the CP Central Committee and the government of the republic. We have solved many problems and will continue to solve them in the future. But bear in mind, you will not help here with meetings. Many Komsomol organizations are having a weak influence on improvement of the working and everyday conditions of life of working young people. Consequently, initiative and enterprise by the Komsomol are also needed here.

Questions of the interethnic, cultural, and political upbringing of the rising generation, of interethnic relations, are acquiring special significance today.

In connection with this, I want to state once more today that we value the generally stable situation which has developed within the republic and will give a firm rebuff to any attempts to destabilize it. If you, young people, have any kind of questions, views, and judgments, do not take them into the streets but come in groups to the party organs or the republic Council of Ministers. We are the only ones who can solve them.

Problems of interethnic relations were discussed in January this year at a plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee and a plan of practical actions by the Central Committee and its Buro was worked out for realization of the party's nationalities policy. We are placing particular hopes here on the Komsomol organizations and on educational institutions, relying on an open, continuous and direct dialogue with the student body.

Problems that are being advanced by young people are to a definite degree being realized. A law on the state language of the Kirghiz SSR has been passed and a complex program has been worked out for improving research, teaching and popularization of the history of Kirghizistan. Training has been begun of teachers of the Kirghiz language for schools having a language of instruction other than Kirghiz. At the same time as this, we have initiated training of teachers of the Dungansk and German languages and of beginning classes for schools that have Uzbek as their language of instruction. Considering the wishes of students, at certain institutes, instruction has been begun in the Kirghiz language for disciplines in the general education cycle and the social sciences.

There is one other important question. Along with you, we are not working at all with young people at their places of residence and, indeed, a great deal can be accomplished there to eliminate negative manifestations. The Komsomol is overlooking clubs, discotheques and video halls. Meanwhile, it is specifically in this sphere that people with narrow minded aspirations are penetrating. Both you and we can surmise what they are presenting from the screen. Is there really any guarantee that, having come into contact with such art, young people will not themselves fall into violence and debauchery? To bring order here is a job for the Komsomol.

And what is the position of the Komsomol here? Unfortunately it is overlooking this area of work and, by the

same token, the upbringing of a particular segment of the young people is remaining outside the area of concern of the Komsomol organizations.

The tendency toward a reduced flow of young people from the Komsomol into the party is also a cause for concern. While in 1986 they accounted for 72 percent of the candidate members accepted into the CPSU, then in 1989 this was about 56 percent. This does not mean that we should force their acceptance, but we also cannot weaken this work. New replenishment of the party should take the form of accepting the true leaders of our youth, who enjoy authority and who have made a positive showing of themselves in practical matters. Problems of the Pioneers have been touched upon at the conference. We accept criticism that is addressed to party organs. Their representatives are present here. It is necessary to consider and to help the Pioneer organization.

Reform of the political system regards restoration of the full powers of the soviets to be of paramount importance. And this means that the Komsomol must seek new forms of contact with these organs and an expression through them of the interests of youth.

In connection with this, appropriate representation of young people in the Supreme and local soviets of peoples deputies has important significance.

For today, Komsomol members and young people under 30 years of age comprise a little more than 8 percent of candidates nominated as Kirghiz SSR deputies, 16 percent of those nominated as oblast deputies, 18 percent—as city and rayon deputies, and 22 percent—as settlement and village deputies. This is very few. This is far from being in agreement with the age structure of the population. The reasons for such a situation lie not only in an absence of necessary experience on the part of Komsomol cadres and activists and in sometimes insufficient help from party committees. But mainly, in the inertia of Komsomol organizations themselves, a part of which have in general not made use of their constitutional right to nominate their own candidates for deputy.

A. M. Masaliyev responded to a large number of questions from participants in the conference.

The conference elected delegates to the 21st All-Union Komsomol Congress. It recommended candidates for membership in the central electoral organs of the All-Union Komsomol.

Masaliyev on Kirghiz CP Perestroika, Party Official Salaries

90US0697B *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 2 Feb 90 p 1

[KIRTAG dispatch: "Meeting with the Communists of a Plant"]

[Text] On 31 January, at the head enterprise of the Machine-tool Building Plant imeni V.I. Lenin production

association, Kirghiz CP Central Committee secretaries and apparatus workers met with the association's Communist Party members. First Secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee A. M. Masaliyev addressed the gathering.

Today, all of us, along with you, he said, are concerned about the future fate of the party. Under conditions when it is being subjected to criticism first from right and then from the left, it is necessary to work out our own determined position, to think about how we will continue to structure our own work. Perestroyka within the party is following the general course of political reform. Having been freed of economic functions that do not belong to it, the party is striving to intensify the policy of perestroyka, is fighting to see this policy not only accepted but also actively supported by the people, to see it implemented decisively.

In order confidently to keep a finger on the pulse of the times, party organs must seek new forms of work, must be closer to the primary party organizations, to Communists and labor collectives. This, unconditionally, will contribute to improvement and strengthening of the party's authority and will facilitate more effective solution of all the important problems that are directed at improving the life of the people.

Now renewal of the party is leading to an expansion of glasnost, to closer contacts with the people who are called upon in practice to implement all plans of social and economic development. Recently, the republic press published a communique "On Certain Priority Directions of the Work of the Kirghiz Central Committee Secretariat for 1990." Formerly, the speaker said, documents of such a sort carried a "Secret" stamp, but now we have considered it necessary to broadly inform Communists and all workers in the republic about the basic problems on the solution of which the secretaries and departments of the Central Committee will be concentrating their principle efforts during the current year.

Publishing this document, the secretariat of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee is counting on the support of party organizations and of all Communists and is hoping that each of them will make his own worthy contribution to the common cause.

Further, A.M. Masaliyev familiarized those who had gathered with the organizational structure of the apparatus of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee and introduced Central Committee department heads present in the hall to the gathering. Frank answers were also given to questions of interest to the broad public—in particular, about the size of salaries paid to party workers. Today, following a salary increase beginning in October 1989, each worker in the apparatus of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee receives an average of 302 rubles monthly, which includes 443 rubles for responsible workers. By comparison, the speaker said, for you in the plant, the salary of shop chiefs is 1.5-fold greater. In terms of salary level, party workers equate to 10th-15th

place among specialists working in the sectors of the national economy. It is also necessary to keep in mind that those engaged in party work are highly qualified people who have a full right to be well paid for their labor. Also discussed was what is being done for more strict observance of the principles of social justice. Such information, received from the horse's mouth, as it were, helps people to recognize the real truth, to distinguish it from various kinds of rumors and conjecture.

Communists from the plant who spoke at the meeting emphasized the importance of such meetings held directly within labor collectives. Such contacts have enormous significance for giving meaning to party policy in modern conditions, when complex processes of party renewal are going on.

We hope, said A.M. Masaliyev, that in the future as well workers of the apparatus—of the rayon and city party committees and of the Central Committee—will spend not less than half their working time within the collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations. That they be there not on flying visits, not only so as to be noticed and "to be checked off," but in order, together with the people, to penetrate deeply into the essence of problems that arise, that they be able to suggest ways for seeking solutions in one or another specific case and themselves do some work, as appropriate.

There was also talk at the meeting about the responsibility of every Communist for the state of affairs within the party. It has now become fashionable to only tear down workers of the apparatus. In fact, restructuring of it is still going slowly and does not always keep up with the stormy events of the day. But the party's strength lies not only in its apparatus alone. In our republic, there are 155,000 Communists, and if each of them will act as is written in the CPSU Rules, the battleworthiness of our party ranks would considerably increase. However, many of our comrades lack initiative, a vital, specific cause, and indeed such a situation also influences the authority of the party.

In the process of self-purification, the CPSU is restoring its own moral qualities, and we cannot allow a situation where, using their party cards, some people have been solving their own personal affairs, have been misusing their position.

Great attention was devoted at the meeting to questions of interethnic relations. In a number of the country's regions these have been exacerbated, have become a major destabilizing factor, a negative reflection on all aspects of people's lives. Correct solution specifically of these problems will help to reduce tensions within society, and only the CPSU is up to such a task. Therefore, while acting in the interests of one's own republic, it is necessary to preserve the unity of the party, to give a firm rebuff to any attempts to pull it apart on the basis of national characteristics.

While concerning ourselves about the unity of CPSU ranks and about remaining faithful to its basic principles

of internationalism, we cannot at the same time take a dogmatic attitude toward the new problems which life is presenting. The party will specify guideposts, will work out new approaches, but at the same time it remains the main political force which bears full responsibility for the state of affairs within the country.

Having characterized the situation within the republic as a stable one, A.M. Masaliyev stressed that, in the future as well, it is necessary to preserve this peaceful and businesslike situation that makes it possible to work creatively and to successfully solve plans for social and economic development, for improving people's lives.

Those who were gathered asked many questions which touched upon the most varied problems. What needs to be done in order to strengthen party ranks, how can the authority of a party leader be increased within a shop party organization, why is the struggle against speculation going badly in the republic's capital, when will trade in products that are in everyday demand, and the work of urban passenger transport, be straightened out? A.M. Masaliyev gave exhaustive answers to these and other questions concerning the forthcoming elections of Kirghiz SSR peoples deputies and of local soviets, the ecological situation in the city of Frunze, cooperative activities, and interethnic relations.

The questions of the Communists were also answered by the first secretary of the Frunze city party committee, U.K. Chinaliyev, and Kirghiz CP Central Committee department heads Zh. Saadanbekov, A.M. Mamyrov, and M.F. Vasilenko.

Taking part in the meeting were the second secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, N.M. Chepelev, and Kirghiz CP Central Committee secretary M.N. Paryshkuras.

Kirghiz Party Official on Membership Trends, Resignations

90US0701B *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Kirghiz CP Central Committee department chief M.F. Vasilenko by SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent V. Chernyshev: "Energy, Openness, and Glasnost"]

[Text] **Democratization of intraparty life, glasnost in the work of party organs, and the forms and methods of work of their apparatus are of particular interest to Communists today. But false rumors and various questions are arising, depending upon the extent to which they are informed. In connection with this, our correspondent met with the chief of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee department of organizational party and cadre work, M. F. Vasilenko, and asked him to respond to a number of questions.**

[Correspondent] Perhaps today we are experiencing a deficiency not only in the attention being given to the

party and its program. Communists and many non-members of the party as well would like to know more about the structure of the Kirghiz Communist Party and about its social and ethnic composition.

[Vasilenko] It is true that people should know everything about the party. Today, closed subjects are becoming are fewer and fewer, and people need reliable information like they need air. Only openness and glasnost will help us to determine our positions in this complex and contradictory time, to evaluate objectively the situation that is developing within the party and society.

At the present time there are more than 154,000 Communists in the Kirghiz Communist Party. During the past year, its numbers grew by almost 2000 and during the time that has passed since the 18th Party Congress—by 10,000. Within its ranks, about half are workers, one-fifth are peasants, and more than a third are specialists of the national economy. There are students and pupils—they comprise about one percent. Retired persons account for almost 15 percent. A third of the Communist Party members have higher education.

People of 73 nationalities belong to the Kirghiz SSR Communist Party. Among them, more than half are Kirghiz, a third are Russians, more than seven percent are Uzbeks, and five percent are Ukrainians. Representatives of other nationalities comprise less than two percent of the total number of Communists.

[Correspondent] Are today's processes of perestroika having an influence on the composition and structure of the republic party organization?

[Vasilenko] The republic's main party forces are concentrated in the sphere of material production. Ninety-five thousand Communists, or three-quarters of the total number employed in the national economy, work here. In industry, in transportation, in communications and construction, and in the agroindustrial sector, every third worker is a party member.

Reorientation of our economic policy toward the social sphere is having a marked influence on the distribution of Communists. It is sufficient to say that during recent times there has been an increase in the number of party members who are employed in trade and public catering, in housing, in municipal and everyday services, education, public health, and in the sphere of culture and the arts.

[Correspondent] For many years, acceptance into the party was restricted by a framework of all sorts of instructions and limitations. Is perestroika breaking down these artificial barriers today?

[Vasilenko] Indeed, party organs were guilty of this up until recently. Two or three years ago, it was considered usual artificially to maintain the percentage relationship of workers to employees and of young to mature workers. In this connection, party organizations would receive regulatory instructions that completely prevented any

manifestation of independence. After the 7th plenum of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee and especially after the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the party organs began boldly to rid themselves of regulatory fetters on replenishment of their ranks. Today, the doors of our party have been opened to all.

Today, the main thing in selecting candidates for the party is their dedication to perestroika and their indispensable possession of high work and political qualities. And also, I would say, of conscientiousness and decency, of an ability through their personal example to have a real influence on others. Without commands from above, the party organizations must themselves determine who and how many they should accept into their ranks, subordinating this work to the interests of perestroika. As a positive example, I can cite data from an analysis of replenishment of party ranks during the past year in comparison with the preceding one. The acceptance of candidate members into the CPSU grew by 168 persons. Among the new members, more than 38 percent are employees, 45.3 percent are workers, and 15.5 percent are kolkhoz workers. The numbers of representatives of the intelligentsia and of the workers, you will note, are almost the same. Behind these percentages, there are 437 engineering and technical workers, 111 workers in public health, 510 in education and higher educational institutions, 60 in science, and 46 in culture, the arts, literature and the press. The weak influx of young students into the ranks of the party is necessarily a cause for regret.

Selection into the party has begun to be made primarily from among leading workers who have been tempered by labor. The average age of those accepted as candidate party members was 29 years. In 1989, 120 managers entered the CPSU as candidates.

But even despite this growth, the party representation within the republic is one of the lowest in the country—barely more than 8.5 percent. For comparison purposes, this equates to 14.2 percent in Azerbaijan, 10.7 percent in the Ukraine, and 10.1 percent in Kazakhstan. We are still modest in augmenting our ranks.

I see the reason for this in the fact that all party committees have not yet been restructured into the new style of work. In a number of rayons and cities they are still working in the old way and are not paying the attention they should to the growth of party organizations, to bringing fresh forces into them, energetic people who think along other than conventional lines. Thus, in the city of Frunze, 319 fewer persons were accepted into the party than in 1987. At the same time, there people in every organization who want to join the CPSU. But the party committees and buros still are waiting for some sort of directions on this score. And in Sokulskiy and Kalinskii rayons, they have carried away with accepting only employees. These comprise more than 52 percent of new members here and more than 65 percent in Chuyskii Rayon.

Party organizations should be vitally interested in the constant replenishment of their ranks with leading representatives of the working class and the peasantry. Therefore, we need regular and objective analyses of the reasons for the reduced acceptance of this category of persons into the party along with practical conclusions that take into account the concrete situation. A thoroughly considered and serious approach is also needed to problems of taking other social groups into account when augmenting party ranks and to the ethnic aspects of forming the ranks of the party.

[Correspondent] The draft party platform for the 28th Congress notes that many process of democratization are being held back by obsolete instructions and paragraphs of the Party Rules. Do you consider it possible, within the framework of the existing rights of the primary party organizations and their subunits, to completely realize the plans of party members prior to the party congress?

[Vasilenko] I think that, even with the situation that has developed in the republic, many primary party organizations are working effectively. Moreover, having today rejected arbitrary command methods of management in party work, we have presented greater independence to primary party organizations and have freed their leaders of the burden of bureaucratic paper-making in the form of numerous certifications and reports. For the secretary of the small primary organization, the shop organization, and the party group organization, the diary has become the basic document for self-management and reporting on its work—a kind of mirror of its activities. Moreover, I am convinced that the documents that will be approved at the 28th CPSU Congress directed toward democratization of intra-party life will create even greater possibilities for development of the independence and initiative of all party units.

[Correspondent] Mikhail Fedorovich, cases of Communists leaving the party have recently become more frequent. How to you evaluate these facts and what, in your view, is contributing to this tendency?

[Vasilenko] This problem greatly alarms us. Judge for yourself. While in 1987, 49 CPSU members and candidate members left the ranks of the party and in 1988 this figure was 145, then last year already 775 did this. Half of them were workers and kolkhoz workers and a fourth were retired persons. Almost half of those who gave up their party cards had been in the party for more than 20 years.

Analysis of the reasons for desertion from the party shows that 194 of them, or one out of four, declined to remain within the party without explaining their reasons, 136 referred to the state of their health and the impossibility of being of use to the party, 129 related it to departure from the USSR, and 109 gave as the motive for giving up their party cards a lack of desire to carry out party obligations, among them 90 persons who did not want to pay their party dues, 61 were dissatisfied with the course of perestroika, 62 considered it impossible to

remain in the ranks of the party in connection with increasing demands, and only 20 explained their departure from the party by a reduction in its authority.

During recent years, the process of purging party ranks of careerists, hangers-on, and morally unscrupulous people has been intensified. In 1987, 864 persons were excluded or quit the CPSU, in 1988—1073, and in 1989—1625. Although we lost in a quantitative regard, we won in a qualitative one. What we need today are fighters, ultimately devoted to the party of Lenin and convinced of our ideas.

At the same time, we should acknowledge in the spirit of self-criticism that a number of party organs and organizations have not given needed attention to Communists, to drawing them into active work, and have been little interested in their problems and in their everyday and working conditions. Everyone is talking about charity today, but certain party organizations are paying no attention to party members who have grown old or are sick. Such an attitude toward its own like-thinkers does not add to the authority of the party. And, most important, it alienates people from the party, produces dissatisfaction on their part with its bureaucratic style. We have forgotten about party comradeship, about elementary sensitivity and concern for one another. And without this there is no point in talking about and calling for solidarity of party ranks. Recognizing this, it is necessary to change the forms and content of organizational and political work. And this must be carried on openly, publicly, with the support of people's opinions and under the control of the party masses.

Masaliyev Pre-Election Speech on Party Platform, Kirghiz Unrest

90US0747A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 2

[Speech by A. M. Masaliyev: "On the Results of the Work of the CPSU Central Committee's February (1990) Plenum and Draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress: Speech of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee's First Secretary A. M. Masaliyev at a Frunze Workers Meeting"]

[Text] Comrades! We consider today's assembly very important. With respect to the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th Party Congress we need to speak candidly about the capital's real problems and how to solve them. The stormily developing times, the politicization of society, in which we are direct participants, demand this.

First of all, we need to reinforce and cultivate our achievements in economics and the social sphere, to perfect democracy and economic and political reform, while simultaneously guaranteeing conscious discipline and reinforcing law and order in the city and throughout the republic as a whole. This is a mandatory and decisive condition for our further progress.

The city of Frunze is the industrial, scientific, and cultural-administrative center of Kirghizstan. Its working class today numbers 188,000, more than 21 per cent of the total number of workers in the republic. Major machine-building complexes and enterprises of light, food, and other branches of industry are located here. Last year the city's inhabitants' industrial production came to nearly 2.1 billion rubles, or about a third of the total for the republic.

Concentrated in the city are our chief scientific and creative forces, which head up our secondary and post-secondary training institutions.

The city's laborers work hard. The 1989 plans for output of industrial production, consumer goods, and new housing were overfulfilled. 56 million rubles' worth of various goods were produced beyond our quota, and an additional 2 million rubles' worth of paid services were rendered to the population.

As you know from the announcements of the State Committees for Statistics of the USSR and the Kirghiz SSR, the republic as a whole also fulfilled the basic indicators of socioeconomic development, with the exception of its contractual responsibilities, the introduction of fixed funds, and the use of the maximum capital investments, although there was growth as against the preceding year.

Touching on the results of the CPSU Central Committee's February (1990) plenum, I'll say that this is a natural continuation of the Party's work in democratizing the processes going on in our country. The plenum's basic documents were the speech of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th Party Congress, and the speeches of the plenum's participants. The main platform's main idea is that the Party is proposing to reject decisively bureaucratic and command forms of work, to go to the masses, to elevate the role of primary party organizations, which is where the problems of socioeconomic development and the fate of political-education activities are decided.

The platform is the Communist Party's proposed strategy and tactics for our movement toward a humane and democratic socialism. The CPSU sees its goal in truly placing man at the center of social development.

Therefore, the Party's place in society must be determined by its actual merits, the quality of its political, ideological, and organizational work, the nature of intra-Party relations, its ability to express the needs of our development, the interests of the multinational Soviet people. It is from these positions, as well as with consideration for present-day conditions, that the question of a multi-party system must be considered.

The Party, as the draft platform notes, like other public-political organizations and mass movements, does not take upon itself governmental or authoritative powers. Its role is to be a democratically recognized political

leader acting through Communists but not trying to strengthen its special position in the USSR Constitution.

The Party's strength and vitality lies in its continuous political, ideological, and organizational development and revitalization. This revitalization must be based on real life, on the interests and requirements of the bottom-level cells, of all Communists. The CPSU's new charter must create conditions that will ensure dynamism, flexibility, and creative initiative in the Party's activities.

The Party is not a movement with fuzzy borders or political demands. It is an organization with a precise ideology, with a well thought out strategy and tactics, a precise structure, and firm discipline. The importance of these principles is confirmed by the Party's present-day status in society.

As was stressed at the Central Committee plenum, in developing Party democracy, we must not forget our chief strength—the principle of Party unity.

The CPSU's affirmation of the power of the Party masses must become the ultimate goal of the transformations going on in intra-Party relations. It is essential that conditions be created so that each Communist can exert real influence through his position on the elaboration of its policies, on the formation of all the Party's elective organs. The new procedure for selecting delegates to the CPSU's 28th congress is being worked out with this in mind.

Instead of a general secretary, the Central Committee is proposing instituting the posts of party chairman and deputy party chairman. The structure of the CPSU and apparatus of the party committees will change.

In order to unleash Communists' energy and initiative, to raise the effectiveness of all our political work, the rights of party organizations and committees will have to be broadened significantly. The union republic Communist parties are becoming increasingly independent.

In the Central Committee platform the basic elements of economic and social policy—the implementation of population, housing, medical, and ecological programs, the development of education, enlightenment, and culture—are closely linked with citizens' basic rights. In addition, we cannot forget that a person's rights and freedoms are inseparable from his civic responsibilities.

It is envisaged that the country will have a presidency, the necessity for which is explained in the draft platform.

The Party confirms its adherence to the socialist option and the ideas of October and its desire to harmonize interethnic relations and deems the idealization of the past and attempts to excise all the good in the country's history both equally dangerous.

The draft platform of the Central Committee opens up broad opportunities for all regions to organize independent, enterprising work, to achieve effective economic

and social development, and to define precise relationships between the center and the union republics.

In this connection I want to dwell on the atmosphere and matters in our republic, including the city of Frunze.

Overall, as you know, the situation is calm, businesslike. Thanks to this the years of this last five-year plan were marked for us by definite advances in all the basic aspects of the life of the Kirghiz.

Here are a few summary indicators. Over the past four years average annual volumes grew as follows in comparison with the eleventh five-year plan:

- industrial production, by 20 per cent;
- capital investments throughout the economy, by 24 per cent;
- new housing, by 28 per cent;
- twice as many new pre-schools, hospitals, clinics, general education schools, clubs, and houses of culture;
- retail sales, by 21 per cent.

In 1989 the output of consumer goods increased by a billion rubles, or 43 per cent, as compared with 1985, and 39 per cent if you include food items. The volumes of paid services to the population grew.

The population's income rose. The average monthly salary for workers and employees in the economy increased over the past four years by 35 rubles, or 21 per cent.

Slightly up was the per capita consumption of livestock production:

- meat and meat products from 40 kilograms in 1985 to 51 kilograms in 1989, or by 11 kilograms;
- milk and milk products, from 182 to 273, or by 91 kilograms;
- eggs, from 124 to 150 units, or by 26 units.

We have to say this, since certain unobjective and demagogically inclined people are trying to bring to naught the intensive and, I would stress, amicable work of the laborers of Soviet Kirghizstan, above all the agricultural workers. Naturally, these results do not satisfy us, and 20-25 kilograms of meat and meat products and 70-80 kilograms of milk and milk products does not bring us up to reasonable norms.

Our task is not to stop at what has been achieved but to move forward, to ensure the republic's stable economic and sociopolitical development. But for this we have to resolve whatever problems come up by means of dialogue, in a businesslike atmosphere, and be well forewarned of unwarranted tension in interethnic relations.

We know, since the well-known events in various regions of the country, that people are showing unease and caution. My point is that there it all started with small, inoffensive gatherings and meetings.

This is why the Kirghiz, especially residents of the capital, have looked on with alarm—and not unreasonably—at the unsanctioned meetings of young people, primarily from the core nationality, that have recently been held in the city. Information about this was reported in the press. Many questions were raised at them, many worthy of attention. No illegal acts were committed at these meetings. But the meetings themselves were illegal, and they gave rise to various rumors that disturbed citizens.

The leadership of the republic has met with the representatives of those who participated in the meetings, an in-depth conversation has taken place, and exhaustive answers have been given to the questions posed. At these meetings we saw our shortcomings and we shall draw—and are already drawing—conclusions.

What has come out of our meetings with the young people?

Above all, young people are obviously striving to make themselves heard, to demonstrate, to participate in perestroika, to raise problems. This is a normal phenomenon, nothing to condemn. While on the whole touching on necessary, critical issues, some of them were operating on certain conjectures. This, I think, is also understandable; they are easily persuaded by the various unhealthy arguments of extremist-oriented people.

We also sensed that young people are not well enough informed. On the other hand, we noted that the young people themselves do not study the materials published in the press all that deeply. I would say outright, guilty here too are the Komsomol and Party organizations, the soviet and trade union organs. The leaders of some plants, factories, associations, ministries, and departments are not doing a satisfactory job. In certain young workers' dormitories, for example, there are no radios, and the television scarcely works; also there are problems with residency permits and apartment assignments.

I want to talk separately about educational and academic institutions, where we have found many of the meetings' initiators and participants. It is absolutely inadmissible and criminal when our older comrades, starting out on an incorrect path, push the student youth to meetings. Students should study, acquire solid knowledge—tomorrow they're going to be working in the economy. If they're going to waste their time on various gatherings, what kind of specialists will they make? In order to advance the economy, the public sphere, culture, the history of our region, we need highly qualified, educated workers, true patriots and internationalists.

Everyone understands, of course, that issues are not resolved in the streets. At our meetings with the youth

representatives we agreed that any problems, suggestions, or criticisms that arise would be discussed regularly in the appropriate places and in a businesslike, comradely, open atmosphere.

In the name of the Party and soviet leadership of the republic I am authorized to announce that we are prepared for dialogue, any conversations, and honest, efficient solution of problems. We invite everyone who so desires to talk. We plan to hold these meetings in the Central Committee House of Political Education on the third Saturday of every month. We think this will be many times more productive than shouts and noise in the streets.

It is another matter when the organizers of meetings pursue anticonstitutional, far-reaching goals. There is no point hiding the fact that behind the generally correct slogans slithers an aspiration to destabilize the situation, to ignite ethnic strife, to incite riots. This we have also noticed. We do not support and do condemn unsanctioned meetings and illegal acts.

Someone, evidently, very much wants to make our republic into another hot spot. I am very certain that these are vain attempts, and amateurs at playing with fire will get a decisive rebuff. The working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the Communists, and the Komsomol will not allow tragic events analogous to what has gone on in other regions of the country to be repeated in Kirghizstan.

Comrades! Yesterday the press published an Appeal from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the country's workers, which was met in the republic with fervent approval. This document is filled with alarm and concern for the fate of our country and our people.

In analyzing the current situation, the Party's Central Committee firmly said no to those who are leading the attack against perestroika, who are pursuing their own mercenary interests and vainglorious ambitions and pushing the people toward civil confrontation, acting according to the principle "The worse the better."

We, it says in the Appeal, can not and should not reconcile ourselves to the antidemocratic, illegal actions of demagogues or intriguers, who kindle ethnic strife, who apply crude pressure and scare tactics, who attempt to demoralize the Party and soviet organs and their workers, and who impose enmity and brutality, fear and uncertainty, on society.

The CPSU Central Committee calls on Communists and non-Party members, on workers, peasants, and intellectuals, on trade unionists and Komsomol, on men and women, on young people and veterans everywhere to protect the law, the principles of democracy, to repulse anyone who pushes us toward chaos, who provokes conflict, strife, and enmity, or who tries to create social instability.

The country can be led out of the current complicated situation, put back on the track of economic growth, social health, and a decent life, only by combining responsibility and good sense, legality, discipline and democracy, and honest labor.

A little while ago the press published a Declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet in which it was pointed out that many social organizations and movements, including those coming out with divergent and at times contradictory positions, are calling for demonstrations and meetings on 25 February in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities of the Soviet Union.

Many Soviet people have expressed alarm at the idea that extremists and even criminal elements, pursuing goals that have nothing in common with creation and democracy, could join in on these mass meetings and marches.

The Supreme Soviet has charged the government of the USSR and local congresses of people's deputies to undertake all necessary measures in defense of law and order. Meetings and demonstrations can take place only if they are sanctioned and their location specifically set. All violations must be decisively curtailed.

While supporting the numerous statements of workers, war and labor veterans, and youth, the Presidium of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet has passed a decree "On responsibility for actions directed against the social order and citizens' safety." It opposes those who prepare and distribute materials, provocative false rumors, and fabrications. On the evening before last, the decree's meaning was well commented upon on television by the republic's public prosecutor, Gennadiy Ivanovich Ivantsov.

Special responsibility in these complicated times rests with Party organizations and their committees, with all Communists. They and our soviet organs are being called upon to demonstrate their adherence to principle and their militancy, to support perestroika in deed, to repulse extremist aspirations, meeting democracy amateurs.

The peacekeeping organs are obligated to ensure strictly that law and order is maintained, to curtail any anticonstitutional actions, and to protect the people.

Comrades, let us together do all we can to guarantee a normal, businesslike atmosphere in the capital and the republic, let us exercise wisdom and restraint and resolve problems dispassionately. Party, soviet, Komsomol, and economic activists as well as the people's elect—deputies of all levels—are obligated to do a great deal in this regard.

One example. Last week at the Pervomayskiy Raysovet's ispolkom, a group of the city residents, including USSR People's Deputy O. A. Igumnov, petitioned for permission to hold a meeting on the square in front of the building of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, asserting

that the people needed it to support perestroika. Having learned about this petition, at a session of the rayispolkom where the question was under examination, representatives of labor collectives came and posed the meeting's initiators the following question: "Who authorized you to speak in the name of the people?" But no coherent reply followed, and they were forced to take their petition back.

I also want to ask a question of the authors of "support for perestroika": Do you really think we are against perestroika? Don't you think our intensive work is directed to resolving problems in the republic? Don't you think we've made strides in economic and social development? Moreover, honored USSR people's deputies, I would say that the people have placed the highest trust in us, so why don't we justify that with honest, open work instead of playing at democracy? By the way, we are unaware of any work done by certain other USSR people's deputies.

Comrades! You and I are all participants in the complicated processes going on in the country. The tragic events in Fergana, Baku, and Dushanbe have left no one indifferent. Today we clearly see the lengths to which people can go when they are sucked into interethnic strife, we can see what comes of demonstrations calling for a clean ecology and plant shutdowns.

Early this year, the public of Armenia decided to close down the Nairit association plant, which manufactured glue for footwear production. This plant is the only one of its kind in the Soviet Union. As a result, many footwear enterprises in the country came to a halt, including Frunze's. While the hunt continues for a new supplier, hundreds of people are out of work, and none of the footwear the population needs so badly is reaching the shops.

In connection with this I would like to say something about the fact that the complexity of the situation, the increasingly frequent strikes, and the ethnic-based conflicts are having an effect on our business relations with foreign firms. If earlier their representatives proposed creating joint enterprises in certain republics of the country, then now they would like to have a business partner in the Kirghiz SSR. Foreign firms are letting it be known that we have a more stable atmosphere.

But today we have to say frankly that the recent unsanctioned meetings in Frunze have provoked a certain hesitation among foreign firms. And one American company sent a telegram in connection with this requesting a clarification of the situation and posing the following questions:

How many people were killed or wounded in the course of these events?

Did these disturbances go on only in Frunze or throughout Kirgizia?

Are these disturbances going to continue?

These examples testify yet again to how important it is for the resolution of our economic and social problems to maintain political stability.

In the last few days the press has published several articles on the role of meetings and their impact on the life of Soviet people. One of them, printed in PRAVDA on 21 February under the headline "Meetings: What Do They Add to Our Life? Who Needs Them?" says:

"My readers from the working milieu might give some thought to the fact that the shrill voices of speakers from hastily thrown together tribunals, the incendiary words hurled down on our heads, have a goal not of making life easier but of spoiling the masses' mood even more, of reinforcing the worker's temporary frustration, of igniting hatred and malice, of provoking other sinister feelings that historically have never yet led people to any good."

It seems to me that the author, the publicist Vasilii Parfenov, has expressed a very correct thought.

In the course of meetings and conversations with labor collectives from the V. I. Lenin Machine Tool Plant, Kirgizavtomash, and other enterprises, the position of the capital's working class toward the events that have taken place in various regions, as well as, let's be blunt, to the unsettled situation that has arisen of late in Frunze, has been precisely expressed. Workers announce forthrightly that we don't need meetings or strikes, just keep us in raw materials and supplies, i.e., work.

But people are still worried about the problems our society has run up against, they haven't lost interest in perestroika, with which they link their own fate and the country's future. Many workers are dissatisfied with the course of perestroika where they work and live. They are dissatisfied with the fact that in some places the leading cadres are working poorly and frankly tell us about this. People today cannot be reconciled when simple, everyday questions are not solved or are solved unsatisfactorily, when they witness harsh treatment, bureaucracy, and red tape.

Let us take the production association Kirgizavtomash. A good collective, it tries to resolve on major economic and technical tasks and is known for its achievements. At the same time in some shops the most elementary sanitary conditions for the workers' work and relaxation have not been created, and technical backwardness is notable. Problems are resolved much too slowly. Here and in many other enterprises of the city, not enough attention is paid to the development and recruitment of Kirghiz nationals as cadres. This is not a manifestation of nationalism but a real framing of a question, our life.

Comrades! Everything that is happening in the republic is taken greatly to heart by the creative intelligentsia, which lives the same thoughts as the people. We have high regard for the contribution of writers, scholars, playwrights, cinematographers, akyns, and artists to perestroika processes and shall rely henceforth on their

most effective participation in public-political life. From the tribune of our meeting I would like once more to address an appeal to everyone involved in literature and art to be genuine conduits of internationalism, active champions of the harmonization of interethnic relations.

Perestroika has brought science to the forefront of life today. Scientists are faced with the necessity of providing answers to complex questions. Unfortunately, they, especially the generalists, have been caught unawares by the processes of democratization and glasnost and have not addressed a wide audience. They have turned out not to have any serious treatments of topical problems, and there are practically no works read widely among the people. Meanwhile, there has been no lack of tongue-lashings, unfounded assertions that sometimes become the subject of political speculation and are exploited to incite unhealthy passions and moods.

We assign great significance to the work of the creative intelligentsia in the republic's public-political life and the education of our young people. In acute conflict situations, when direct dialogue with the people is wanted, their voice must have weight. I want to point out the exclusively useful work done by Chingiz Torekulovich Aytmatov, as well as some of our other writers and respected aksakals, who have appealed to our youth for calm. However, not all scientists and cultural and art figures are prepared for such discussions.

Our republic is multi-ethnic. Therefore ethnic policy must take into account reality, must proceed from the situations that arise, must correctly formulate a culture of interethnic relations, starting with the family, with children's institutions, the school. A special role in this must be played by the labor collectives.

Interethnic relations must entail a high level of principle, exactingness toward each member of the collective, regardless of ethnic identification, and mutual trust and respect. Unfortunately, many people lack adequate relationship culture.

Recently fights among young people, squabbles on trolleys and busses and in other public places, have become more frequent, and this gives rise to exaggerated rumors among the population and provokes citizens' fears for their own safety, makes them afraid to go outside, especially at night. And this is impossible not to notice.

The rise in crime, especially among young people, is also cause for alarm, comrades. If during the years of the cult of personality legal tyranny led to wholesale illegality, then now, owing to legal liberalism, people are suffering at the hands of hooligans, thieves, and speculators.

I think we need to bring Party, war, and labor veterans in on this complicated, involved situation, to work alongside the lawkeeping organs. They can do a great deal in this sphere, and they enjoy the respect of young people, who heed their voice. Henceforth we are going to rely on their active participation in ensuring normalcy in the capital.

We are sometimes accused of being opposed to any kind of informal organization or formation. So, they say, they are therefore being stifled on all sides. We cannot agree with such assertions. We are prepared not only to support but to help any social formation if its actions are directed toward improving the state of affairs in the economy, toward strengthening friendship among ethnic groups, toward hastening the resolution of our industrial program.

But how can we agree to the demand of the group of people who have propounded the idea of creating in the republic a so-called Voters Association of the Kirghiz SSR? The draft programs and statutes they have presented to the gorispolkom go far beyond the framework of those good intentions of which I have spoken.

It turns out that the documents had been brought in from Moscow; the program's preamble goes like this (I quote): "Administrative-bureaucratic socialism has led us to the brink of catastrophe. The Soviet individual is defenseless in the face of exclusive central power and is for all intents and purposes deprived of his civic rights and freedoms. The rule-of-law government has not been created. It must be determined what socialism is and how it is to be built." It goes on to define its tasks:

- to defend glasnost in all essential issues, to attain clarity of political thinking and cleanse the language of demagogic-propaganda vocabulary;
- we cannot agree with the position of the highest Party and administrative organs of the Kirghiz SSR with respect to the press and glasnost;
- to replace leaders with a double morality and obsessed with a mania for secrecy, leaders must come forward who can act openly and honestly, and so on.

Is this program directed toward the improvement of life for the peoples of Kirghizstan, toward consolidation? I don't think so. Any sound thinker will understand that these people are thinking about power. Power requires enormous responsibility, competence. The masses cannot be led by demagogic arguments and emotions.

We Kirghiz, as well as Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and others, have always been considered internationalists, hospitable people, loyal in friendship. So let us be loyal to the end to the traditions of our fathers and grandfathers.

Comrades! Tomorrow are the elections for people's deputies of the Kirghiz SSR and the local soviets of the republic. Over the last four months each of us has been not only a witness to but an active participant in the election campaign, which is indissolubly linked with the development of democratization and glasnost, the growth of self-awareness and initiative among the masses.

At meetings of labor collectives, military units, in public organizations, at places of residence, the population has nominated more than 27,000 candidates and registered

21,600, including, for the Supreme Soviet, an average of three candidates for each deputy mandate. In the city of Frunze, 166 people have been registered for the elections of people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR in 47 electoral districts.

Among the candidates for people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR, workers comprise 23.5 per cent, kolkhoz workers 8.7, and nationality representatives 25.

In analyzing the makeup of the body of candidates, one cannot help but notice that, in comparison with the last convocation, the number of workers and kolkhoz members, women and Komsomol members, has dropped. The reasons for this situation are various. But that is not the point. What is important is to preserve representation for this category of people among the new candidates. By raising our voices for them, we will prove that our declarations about the role of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, women, and youth in the life of society, about friendship among peoples, are not empty words. It is no less important that deputies of all levels broadly represent the peoples residing in our republic.

What the soviets are like and who becomes part of them depends on you and me, comrades. Power is shifting to the soviets, and we are correct in expecting them to stand firmly on the positions of perestroika, to work in the name of the individual, his interests, to ensure the preservation of calm, of law and order, the real improvement of peoples' lives. Our prosperity is in our own hands, so, for its sake, let us work amicably.

Niyazov Speech Calls for Party Unity, End to Nationalist Discord

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in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 1

[Turkmeninform report: "The Success of Perestroika Lies in Unity"]

[Text] S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, met with representatives of labor collectives and the city community at the Political Education Center in Ashkhabad on 17 February.

Addressing those gathered, S.A. Niyazov said that perestroika begun at the party's initiative in April 1985 has given powerful impetus to the society's spiritual and political emancipation and the freeing of socialism's potential. The main directions of party policy in the contemporary situation and its most important principles are reflected in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th congress, which has been submitted for general party and national discussion. This document, imbued with a great sense of responsibility for the fate of the party and the fate of the nation, will be the foundation of the CPSU Program and Charter, which will be refined and adopted at the forthcoming party forum, taking into account the changes

occurring in the renewal of the Soviet society's political, socioeconomic, moral and spiritual renewal. What fundamentally new things does the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee contain?

One of the most important issues facing our society today is whether the party is going to give up power. If you read the draft platform carefully, you can see that the party is not giving up power. It continues to be the society's guiding political force, determining the strategic directions of its political and socioeconomic development. The CPSU will implement its policy through Communists working in the soviets of people's deputies and other elective bodies and in the labor collectives.

As the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee demonstrates, however, the party does not consider this to be its monopoly. The CPSU recognizes the possibility of establishing new, alternative parties. It will take into account their opinions and the opinions of all public formations formed and functioning in the nation in accordance with the Constitution of the USSR.

This brings up the question of the formation of independent Communist parties in the Union republics. As you know, the February 1990 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee considered the matter of an independent Communist Party of Lithuania. The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee provides for full independence for the Communist parties of Union republics, which have the right to establish their own concepts and define the strategic directions for their work, but within the boundaries of the CPSU Program and Charter. I believe that this is the most correct position.

Today there is a lot of controversy about Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR, which pertains to the status of the CPSU and its place and role in the Soviet society. What has caused the controversy? Why are attacks being made on this article? The attacks are mainly designed to discredit the CPSU's entire past performance, which is depicted as a chain of errors, to defame the party apparatus and the CPSU's ability to direct societal processes and to belittle the role of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, even to the point of attempting to depict it as erroneous.

The party's real status in the society is the following. The restructuring and renewal in the Leninist sense has brought up a question as to the CPSU's place in the situation of major democratization of our political system. Naturally, this would also affect the constitutional norms which define the Communist Party's basic functions. Like all other norms in the Constitution of the USSR, its 6th Article is not something written in stone, once and for all. The question is a different one. It must be resolved, like those pertaining to all the other articles, within the framework of the normal constitutional process.

Both at the plenum and in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee, the discussion is therefore not about abolishing Article 6 but about changing it,

about a different interpretation. In the struggle for renewal, in which the party has been a pioneer, it simply does not have the right to surrender the initiative to any forces whatsoever. To undermine the party's role as the vanguard and its consolidating role right now would be an extremely powerful blow at our federation, since unity within the union of Soviet republics is provided not just by state-legal and economic ties but also to an enormous degree by the CPSU.

As you know, however, the issue was brought up at the plenum that the party should no longer perform functions not its own. Just what is the party supposed to do? Party workers, from the secretary of the Central Committee down to the secretary of the primary organization, should be familiar with the moral-political climate in each labor collective and with the aspirations of the people, demonstrate constant concern for them and exercise its influence upon the state of affairs in this or that branch through the Communists working in it. And no Communist, of course, regardless of his position, should have privileges not enjoyed by the rest of the workers.

Even today, S.A. Niyazov went on to say, there continues to exist the opinion that someone from the center imposes his decision with respect to how this or that republic is to develop, what kind of facilities it is to build. That is not so.

Under the new law which will soon be passed, agencies of state authority and control of the Union republic will independently decide where production and management facilities are to be located and provide for comprehensive socioeconomic and cultural development on its territory. With respect to satisfying the needs of the population, utilizing labor resources and protecting the environment, republic agencies will coordinate and control the activities of enterprises, establishments and organizations located on their territory but belonging to the USSR or other Union republics.

Another fundamentally new factor is the provision whereby a Union republic retains the right to enter into relations with foreign states. The foundation has already been laid for this in our republic. We are establishing contacts with a number of West European and Indian companies for the construction of joint enterprises. The authority of the USSR and the Union republics in the area of joint endeavors can therefore be redistributed by concluding treaties and agreements between them, taking into account the specific developmental features of the given republic.

There is also much debate about the secession of a Union republic from the USSR. It is occurring specifically in the Baltic republics. The question of leaving the USSR has never existed and does not exist for our republic. I believe that this is clear to everyone. Prior to the October Revolution Turkmenistan did not have statehood, and the Turkmen people practically did not exist as a single nation. I therefore want to stress once more the fact that

Turkmenia is made strong by its unity with the other peoples of our nation. There is simply no other path of development for our republic today.

Speaking of the current sociopolitical situation in the republic, S.A. Niyazov commented that it is generally stable, which contributes to a normal work pace. However, there have recently been rumors in Ashkhabad, Nebit-Dag and a number of other populated areas which allege that preparations are being made for riots against certain ethnic groups. I want to assure you that no one will be permitted to encroach upon the interests of people residing in our republic, to infringe upon their ethnic dignity. Officials in the law-enforcement agencies have been issued instructions to reveal and bring to criminal accountability those engaged in disseminating instigative rumors. We have such a law, and it needs to be observed! We are strong only when we are united, when we build our lives and our relations on a mutually benevolent foundation.

S.A. Niyazov called upon those present in the auditorium not to be indifferent to ethnic arrogance, to take decisive steps to nip in the bud attempts to heat up ethnic passions and sow discord among peoples.

The work of rayon party committees and primary organizations must focus on strengthening the friendship and fraternity of our peoples and the sense of internationalism and mutual respect. They must work vigorously to involve the elders and the fightingmen/internationalists in this work and be able to unite the efforts of the society's rational forces to preserve a peaceful and creative life for workers of the republic and the entire nation. The equal spiritual development of every nation and ethnic group and the enrichment of their culture and traditions are only possible with a wholesome moral and ethical foundation.

The participants in the meeting greeted with approval a report that criminal punishment has been increased for individuals taking part in actions designed to incite inter-ethnic discord.

D.Kh. Khudaynazarov, deputy (kazi) of Turkmenistan, Kh. Khanov, imam at the Ashkhabad Mosque, K. Tangrykulyev, people's writer of the republic, Kh. Gokiyev, student at Ashkhabad Vocational and Technical School No. 16, and others who spoke at the meeting stated that events in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Tajikistan were bound to evoke feelings of pain and sorrow for what had occurred and of alarm for the fate of our multinational state. They stressed the need to unite the efforts of all segments of the society, party and soviet organs and members of the clergy for determined counteraction against those who are attempting to incite inter-ethnic discord and sow distrust and suspicion among peoples of different ethnic origins, and expressed their support for steps to halt such actions.

Taking part in the meeting were Kh. Durdyev, S.M. Nesterenko, V.G. Otchertsov, V.N. Rebrik, B.M. Sakhatmuradov and V.S. Chertishev, members of the

Bureau of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, and Kh. Akhmedov, candidate member of the Bureau of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Turkmen SSR.

Turkmen Supreme Soviet Supports Changes to Presidency

90US0682B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 1 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by G. Matusov: "The Choice Has Been Made"]

[Text] **Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet from Turkmenistan resolutely supported the issue of presidential power**

Moscow, 28 February; by telephone from the *Turkmen-skaya Iskra* correspondent at the parliament: Yesterday's plenary sessions of both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at which a vote was cast in favor of establishing presidential power in the nation, were termed historic by the people's deputies. For 2 days there was intense debate for and against the new form of executive power, an extremely important political reform heralding further development of the restructuring processes in the nation.

Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet from Turkmenistan were among the determined proponents of establishing the position of president and making corresponding amendments to the Constitution of the USSR. Their opinions were expressed by People's Deputy M.B. Amanova, who spoke at the evening plenary session.

"The time has long since been ripe for establishing presidential power," Maral Bazarovna stated. "This is due to the exacerbation of the socioeconomic situation in the nation. People are losing faith in prospects for the society's development. They are very concerned about the absence of responsibility within the system of existing executive power and about its obvious weakness, a matter also discussed at our session."

M.B. Amanova made several comments which she considered essential on certain articles of the draft law on the establishment of a presidency. For example, she particularly stressed the importance and the advantage of a referendum as the most complete form of expression of the people's will in case of possible disagreements on the establishment of laws between the president and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Moving on to the composition of the presidential council, whose job is to work out measures for implementing the main areas of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and insuring the nation's security, M.B. Amanova suggested adding to it representatives of the Union republics (the chairman of the supreme soviets) as specified for the soviet of the federation.

In conclusion, M.B. Amanova expressed her disagreement with the baseless attempts by certain participants

in the debate to halt the establishment of a presidency in the nation and postpone the resolution of this extremely important matter.

"I believe that the draft law should be adopted as the basis and, after it is refined in accordance with the suggestions and comments put forth, should be submitted within the very near future for ratification by a special Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR."

Those members of the USSR Supreme Soviet with whom I had an opportunity to talk following the important session voted for the establishment of the post of president of the USSR. I was told this by people's deputies Kurbanova, Allayarov, Shaklycheva and Meleyev. In other words, they were in full agreement with the majority of those participating in the session, who supported the draft law on presidential power.

"As far as I know," Amangozel Kurbanova added, "the members of the Turkmen delegation were unanimous in the voice count. We are convinced of the advantage of this form of executive power and we pin great hopes on it."

The draft law was approved as the basis. After it is refined by permanent agencies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, it will be submitted to the special Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR scheduled for 12 March.

Niyazov Addresses Turkmen Council of Elders

90US0718A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 6 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Speech by S.A. Niyazov: "Comrade S.A. Niyazov's Speech"]

[Text] Respected elders: Slightly more than five years has passed since perestroika entered our life. Since 1985 we have come to view everything differently. After carefully studying all the negative occurrences in the republic during the years of stagnation and evaluating all of the deficiencies, the republic's Communist Party Central Committee set to work to rectify them. We have succeeded in resolving some of the problems; some of them, not yet. As you recall, we held the 23rd congress of the republic's Communist Party in January of 1986, and new leaders came to power. It turned out to be difficult to improve everything at once, however. The inertia of stagnation was too great. Violations of the law by republic leaders were a common practice. There were many such people both locally and in the oblast and rayon leadership. This is well known to everyone.

We began the renewal of the cadres with the Central Committee and the republic government. New people entered the oblast and rayon agencies of power. I want to tell you candidly, however, that we made mistakes also in this process. We did not know some of the people very well, and not all of them were prepared to meet the demands of today. They were therefore unable to accomplish all of the tasks assigned to them. And we have

enormous reserves in the republic, after all: first and foremost, its hard-working people. We have enough land, and we shall have no cause to complain of a shortage of water if we make thrifty use of it. The only thing we lacked were competent leaders with concern for their people.

Over a period of many years they did not look into the people's needs, particularly in remote rayons, even in the cities. I do not want to shift all of the blame onto others. We share it. At a recent meeting with the elders of Pakhta-Aul and Kirpichli, they complained about a lack of water, electricity and children's playgrounds. But that situation exists not just in Kizyl-Atrekskiy and Gusan-Kuliyskiy rayons. It is also found in the suburbs of Ashkhabad and even in the city itself. We discussed how we were going to correct the situation back at the 6th plenum of the Central Committee. Whenever one visits the sites and villages, however, one can see how slowly the situation is being rectified. So many decisions have been adopted on the allocation of plots for the population. And although more than 200,000 families have received them in recent years, we are not satisfied with this. Certain leaders are still finding a lot of excuses not to allocate plots. I want to say frankly that we do not need leaders who are unable to meet the needs of their people. I believe that we should commit the directors of the farms today to allocate a cow and calf for each family within the next 2-3 years. They could be sold or rented. It would also be a good thing to help them with feed. There is no question that this will improve the lives of the rural workers to some degree.

In the Central Committee we also concluded that in addition to policy and economics, we should deal more thoroughly with the culture and art of our people.

I would like to tell you about certain changes which have occurred in the republic in the past 4 years. During that time its national income has increased by 21.9 per cent; labor productivity, 14 per cent. We have earned 6.01 billion rubles in profits during these years. Never before has this occurred. We harvested 5,133,000 tons of cotton, with the plan calling for 5.1 million tons. A total of 141,000 tons of cotton was produced over and above the plan during the five-year period as a whole. It is our goal to increase the amount of cotton produced under contract to 75 per cent, which is within the range of a million tons. The nation's government has decided to procure the rest of the cotton from you for currency. We are pleased that the government met our request.

I have already stated in one of my recent speeches that we receive one percent of the income from the sale of gas and oil. Beginning this year, we shall receive 20 per cent, and the amount will increase to 40 per cent after next year. All of these funds will go to meet the people's needs.

A total of 1,250,000 hectares is planted to crops in the republic. Cotton is raised on the bulk of it. We have set ourselves the goal of reducing that amount by 80,000

hectares in order to plant alfalfa, corn and other feed crops. This will enable us to increase the total livestock herd. We recently received 7,000 milk cows from Leningrad Oblast and the Baltic republics. They were all sent to farms in Takhta BazarSKIY Rayon and to other areas in the republic. We are prepared to continue doing this in order to provide ourselves with meat and milk. With respect to grain, we produce 396,000 tons annually. The republic uses 700,000 tons. We therefore want to designate areas in the piedmont valley for raising grain. Incidentally, our great-grandfathers successfully cultivated that land. If it is a successful year, there will be grain, otherwise everything will be used as feed. And that is good.

We have produced 1,144,000 tons of vegetables in the past 4 years. This is 52,000 tons over and above the plan. A third of the vegetables are still spoiling. We are not able to harvest them in good time and do not know how to store them. We have built 22 new canning plants. Our goal, however, is to build processing plants at all the rayon centers and on the large kolkhozes. We have the funds for this. This will help us to provide the republic population with a year-round supply of vitamin-rich food. With respect to cucurbits, we produced more than a million tons this year. England, Italy and other nations are prepared to purchase them from us.

We have possibilities for increasing the production of grapes and cucurbits. This will make it possible not only to supply ourselves, but also to sell them at a profit. And now about meat, of which there has recently been a shortage. If there is not enough meat this year, we shall step up our demands of the government and the trade organizations. We consume 96,000-100,000 tons of meat annually, 43,000 tons of which we procure from the center. Beginning this year the amount of procured meat will be increased by 10,000 tons. Meat production in the republic has increased by 3,000 tons. This means that we have 105,000-107,000 tons. Why then is there a shortage of it in the stores? It should be available. We have adopted a decision not to export meat or oil out of the republic. There must be controls on it. There will be no shortage of food in Turkmenistan. We have enough tea, since we obtain it by barter from India and other nations. We also receive it from other republics in the nation. There is enough sugar and oil. Certain places are still experiencing a shortage of these products, however, due to violations of the rules by trade workers. I believe that the councils of elders are going to monitor this closely at the sites.

A total of 5.4 million square meters of housing has been built in the past 4 years. This is twice the amount built in other years. Schools with a capacity of 154,900 students have been built, with the plan calling for 133,000. The plan was fulfilled by 116 per cent. There are still not enough schools, however, and there is much to be done in this area.

I still want to underscore the fact that we have made advances, however. You can feel that yourselves. The

construction of preschool facilities has been doubled. Last year alone 10,245 people moved into new housing in the republic. We have 112,800 people on the waiting list for apartments or increased housing area. Those desiring to build their own housing may obtain land or plots not just in the settlements but in the cities as well. Within a year everyone desiring land in the oblasts and rayons are to receive it. Local agencies must help them not just with the land but also with construction. We have purchased 40 million tons of construction materials, 30 millions tons of which have been distributed among the oblasts. It will all be sold in stores or sent to kolkhozes for building hospitals, children's centers and schools. The remaining 10 million tons will be allocated to those wishing to build their own houses. Banks and other institutions must help with the resolution of this matter.

Providing people with drinking water and natural gas is one of the main problems in the republic. Each year we purchase 20,000 carloads of diesel fuel, coal and other fuel for sale to the population. All of this is not enough, of course. The recent session of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to provide all of the villages, settlements and cities in the republic with natural gas by 1995. This program of ours, I must say, has met with understanding at the center. The nation's government is working on the problem. A law must ultimately be passed on the provision of Turkmen villages and cities with natural gas. We shall at the same time be resolving the problem of providing drinking water. The nation's government has promised to help us with this as well.

We shall make every effort to resolve this matter. If we work at it seriously, every home will have natural gas by 1995. In order to achieve this, however, we need to increase discipline and hold those responsible strictly accountable. The chairman of the Council of Ministers must render a report each month to the Supreme Soviet on what has been accomplished. A special map will be compiled, designating the villages to be provided with gas. The people will be able to judge from it how the work is progressing. The ministers and the chairmen of the oblast and rayon ispolkoms are gathered here today. They should all become seriously involved in this work.

The situation with respect to drinking water also needs to be improved. Why is it that even the existing wells are being lost in Kazandzhikskiy and Gasan-Kuliyskiy rayons. Wherever possible, the wells should be dug to a depth of 40-50 meters. Within the next 2 years drinking water must be brought across the Bugdayly by canal. We also plan to complete construction of the Tuya-Muyun Canal this year. We shall also try to meet the needs of the residents of Serakhskiy, Kirovskiy, Tedzhenskiy and other rayons for drinking water within 1 or 2 years.

The problem of protecting the environment is closely linked to cotton cultivation. Because of this, many farms have begun using surface defoliation methods in the cotton fields. This will not fully resolve the problem.

however. We must reduce the area planted to cotton around Mary and other populated areas in the oblast, replacing it with alfalfa, corn and vegetables and turning them over to contract groups to look after. It will be best to plant cotton on the Khauzhan and Yulanyz tracts. The same should be done in Tashauz Oblast, in which cotton is planted around all of the rayon centers. It is not even possible to raise poultry there. Let us charge the leaders of the rayons and the oblasts with carefully reviewing this matter. It is still believed that we continue to use the labor of mothers and children in the cotton fields. In all fairness, it should be said that this is clearly an exaggeration. We have begun using machines more. This is confirmed by the fact that 74 per cent of the crop was harvested by machine last year. Even the farmers who operate under contract try to harvest the cotton by mechanical means, since this is far less expensive. Certain farms in Mary Oblast and particularly in Chardzhou Oblast, however, refuse to use machines in order to keep the people employed. That is wrong, comrades.

I am a long way from believing that everything is going well for us. There are a great many shortcomings in the areas of trade, public health and construction. We expect a lot of help from the elders in this matter. We have some problems we would like to discuss with you. First of all, we need to think about how to give greater independence to the local soviets. Previously the first secretary of the rayon oblast committee issued direct instructions at the sites, thereby diminishing the work of the soviets. Let us entrust all of this work to the settlement soviets and the deputies elected by the people. We shall also hold them accountable. The present soviets include members of all segments of the society. If we succeed in activating their potential for the good of the people, we shall feel that we have justified our political mission.

The second very important issue is the current political situation in Turkmenistan. Many people ask us why things are so quiet here, why there are no mass meetings on the streets, why our people are not raising a fuss. There are those among us, however, who feel that people are engaged in a real restructuring in the Baltic and Transcaucasus republics and certain other area. There are also those who feel that everything occurring in neighboring republics must also occur here. We need your help, elders, in order to prevent this. We too have people who became wealthy at one time and are now attempting to create an artificial shortage of manufactured goods in an attempt to evoke dissatisfaction in the people. You know that we recently adopted a decision to stiffen the punishment for various kinds of instigators and rumormongers. Thank God, as they say, we do not have many such people. We do have depraved people in our house, though. But they will never find support among our people. Two of them were recently driven out of a mosque. That is only right. Such people should not feel safe around us. From time immemorial our fathers and forefathers settled disputes through consultation. If even this does not help, they need to be brought to strict accountability.

If everyone honorable serves his people and correctly assesses his own actions, our republic will move forward. I am appealing to you elders. We have difficulties. One of them is feuding among clans and tribes. This is nothing new, but it does great harm to the republic. There are also other kinds of speculation on an inter-ethnic basis. They include questions pertaining to the language and the history of the Battle of Geok-Tepe. In short, everything which can cause one people to lose faith in another. These few people want to gain prestige from the exacerbation of these issues. If we succeed in ensuring equal, friendly relations among members of all peoples residing in Turkmenistan—and we have no other choice—we shall rid ourselves of the heavy burden of prejudices among clans and tribes. This will ensure that the republic will not be faced with insoluble problems. Our people, our land and our natural resources are our wealth. So let us develop our native republic. Let us preserve and add to our wealth. We need to do everything within our power to avoid experiencing things which others have had to experience. I want to cite these statistics for you. In 1970 Russians accounted for 19 per cent of the republic's population; Ukrainians, 6-7 per cent; Azerbaijanis, 4-5 per cent; Uzbeks, 12 per cent; Armenians, 4 per cent. The native population is presently increasing. Each family has an average of five children. The population is growing by 2.5-2.7 per cent annually. This is approximately 115,000-120,000 people. This is the growth of the Turkmen population. At the same time, the number of residents of other nationalities is decreasing. Russians presently account for slightly more than 8 per cent of the population; Armenians and Azerbaijanis, 1 per cent each; Ukrainians, 1.5 per cent; Uzbeks, 7 per cent. The natural conditions are thus developing for an increase in the size of the native population and for the use of the Turkmen language as the native language. This is a normal phenomenon and should not be artificially accelerated. We have people who inveigh for the universal use of the Turkmen language. This should not be done, because by doing so we are infringing upon other peoples.

You know that the draft Law on the Establishment of a State Language has been published. The Law on the State Language of the Turkmen SSR will be adopted at the next session, taking into account comments and suggestions received. The development of the Russian and other languages which function in the republic will also be discussed. It is our job to prevent infringement of the rights of any people residing in Turkmenistan. With respect to the native population and its natural desire for a more profound familiarity with its history and culture, it is important to listen with concern and sensitivity to its requests. I believe that it would be proper to have an entire television channel broadcasting in the Turkmen language. And it should include more Turkmen songs and music and broadcasts on the traditions and customs of the Turkmen, on everything of concern and interest to the people.

I have one more request to make of you, dear elders. Today, when we have a fairly good economic and socio-political situation in the republic, we must rebuff those who are attempting to disturb it. And your word will always carry special weight. We have shortcomings and we have difficulties. Certain things have not worked out. There is a shortage of certain things. There are instances in which we cannot achieve success. All of these questions can be resolved, however. The main thing is that we must preserve tranquility in the republic and protect its development against those who advocate restructuring only verbally but actually pursue selfish, egotistical interests.

I could discuss many more things with you, dear elders. I would also like to hear what you have to say, however, to learn your opinion on all of the problems. Let us continue our discussion. Let everyone who so desires speak his mind sincerely and candidly. I would like to hear your advice. We shall certainly heed it and take it into consideration. In short, we shall resolve all our problems together.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Summarizes 18 Feb Election Results

90H'S0700A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOK 1 in Russian
24 Feb 90 p 1

["Communique of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Results of Elections of Deputies to the Twenty-First Convocation of Uzbek SSR Local Soviets of Peoples Deputies"]

[Text] The elections held on 18 February 1990 of deputies to the twenty-first convocation of oblast, rayon, city, city-rayon, village and kishlak soviets of peoples deputies in the Uzbek SSR convincingly demonstrated the support by the workers of the republic for the course toward perestroika, renewal of all spheres of social life, and the triumph of democracy. The elections took place in an organized way under calm and businesslike circumstances, without excessive striving for outward effect. A desire to overcome problems that have accumulated in the social and economic development of the republic and each of its regions and to elect deputies capable of coping with this complicated task and of ensuring effective work by the soviets was noticed everywhere.

All measures connected with preparing for and conducting the elections were carried out in full accordance with the requirements of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of Deputies to Uzbek SSR Local Soviets of Peoples Deputies. The working people of the republic, participating actively in the election campaign, made wide use of the democratic mechanisms that are posited in new election legislation. In a number of election districts, a real elective alternatives were ensured when two or more candidates were nominated for a deputy's seat, many of them at assemblies of citizens by place of residence, by citizens' independent

activity groups, and by social organizations. Altogether, more than 86,600 candidates for deputy ran for office in the republic's local soviets.

In the conduct of these elections, 22,632 territorial and district electoral commissions were established, in which more than 192,600 representatives of social organizations, labor collectives and assemblies of citizens by place of residence took part. Of those comprising the commissions, 87,417 or 45.4 percent were workers and kolkhoz workers; 66,730 or 34.6 percent were members and candidate members of the CPSU; 74,896 or 38.9 percent were women, 49,754 or 25.8 percent were young people up to the age of 30 years, and 32,139 or 16.7 percent were members of the Komsomol.

Elections were held for 10 oblast, 148 rayon, 124 city, 17 city-rayon, 104 village, and 1,245 kishlak soviets of people's deputies. For purposes of holding the elections of deputies of Uzbek SSR local soviets of peoples deputies, 73,514 electoral districts were established, among them 2,370 for elections to oblast soviets, 11,948 for rayon soviets, 8,170 for city soviets, 1,543 for city-rayon soviets, 3,611 for village soviets, and 45,872 for kishlak soviets.

According to information received from the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the oblast soviet executive committees, and the Tashkent City soviet executive committee, 9,376,454 voters, or 93.4 percent of their total, took part in the elections of deputies to the republic's local soviets.

Soviets	Total Voters	Participating in Elections	Percentage
Oblast	8,243,611	7,824,355	94.9
Rayon	6,232,670	6,083,573	97.6
City	4,239,475	3,715,720	87.6
City-Rayon	1,641,990	1,349,055	82.2
Village	434,287	393,289	90.6
Kishlak	5,740,365	5,307,109	92.5

Based on the results of the balloting, 2,071 deputies were elected to oblast soviets, 11,549 to rayon soviets, 7,222 to city soviets, 1,321 to city-rayon soviets, 3,446 to village soviets, and 45,391 deputies to kishlak soviets.

In four electoral districts for elections to rayon soviets, in two districts for elections to city soviets, and in three districts for elections to kishlak soviets, electoral commissions proclaimed elections invalid because of violations of election laws that allowed to occur in the course of the elections or when tallying votes. Elections did not take place in 45 electoral districts in connection with the withdrawal of candidates. In 1,849 election districts where not more than two deputy candidates were running for election, neither of the candidates accumulated the number of votes necessary for election. In all these cases, repeat elections will be conducted within a period of two months.

In 138 electoral districts for oblast soviets in each of which three or more candidates for deputy were running for office, in 65 districts for rayon soviets, in 268 for city soviets, in 76 for city-rayon soviets, in 25 for village soviets, and in 38 districts for kishlak soviets, candidates did not receive more than half of the votes of the voters of the corresponding districts that took part in the elections and were not elected deputies. In each of these districts, runoff elections will be held within two weeks between the two candidates who received the largest number of votes from the voters on 18 February.

Altogether for the republic, 71,000 deputies to local soviets were elected, of whom 15,850 or 22.3 percent are workers and 14,906 or 21 percent are kolkhoz workers. Among the elected deputies, 38,802 or 54.7 percent are members and candidate members of the CPSU; 5,433 or 7.7 percent are members of the Komsomol; 17,546 or 24.7 percent are women; 9,108 or 12.8 percent are under thirty years of age; and 46,772 or 65.9 percent were elected for the first time.

The elections of deputies to the soviets of peoples deputies of the Uzbek SSR were one of the important stages in reform of the political system within the republic. The election campaign confirmed the democratic spirit that it is taking hold in our society, the aspiration of the working people of Uzbekistan to make their own contribution to accomplishment of the tasks of perestroika.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet Confirms Rayon Administrative Changes

90US0700B Tashkent Pravda VOSTOKA in Russian
29 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Series of five ukases issued by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, all signed by Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman M. Ibragimov and Supreme Soviet Secretary L. Bekkulbekova and dated 27 Feb 1990]

[Text] Ukase on Restoration of Certain Rayons Within the Uzbek SSR

The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To confirm the ukase of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on restoration of the Bozatau'skiy Rayon, which was abolished in 1988, with its center in the rural population point of Kazanketken, and the transfer to it of the auls [mountain villages] of Yerkindarya and Kazanketken in Kegeyliyskiy Rayon, Asplantay in Muynakskiy Rayon, and Koksui in Chimbayskiy Rayon.

2. To approve the petitions of the executive committees of the Bukhara, Kashka-Darya, Samarkand, and Syrdarya oblast soviets of peoples deputies to reestablish as a part of the Uzbek SSR the following rayons that were abolished in 1988:

for Bukhara Oblast:

—Navbakhorskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the rural population point of Beshrabad, having transferred to it the kishlaks of Alchin, Arabsaray, Gigant, Kyzyl-Oktyabr, Turkestan and Yangikurgan in Navoiyskiy Rayon.

for Kashka-Darya Oblast:

—Bakhoristanskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the rural population point of Pamuk, having transferred to it the kishlaks of Pamuk, Sovetabad, and Chamanzar in Usman-Yusupovskiy Rayon.

for Samarkand Oblast:

—Bolshevistskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the farm population point of Guzalkent, having transferred to it the kishlaks of Guzalkent, imeni Ilyich, imeni Kalinin and Chimbay Pastdagromskiy rayon.

for Syrdarya Oblast

—Zarbdarskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the rural population point of Zarbdar, having transferred to it the urban settlement of Bustan and the kishlaks of Leninyuly, Udarnik, and Yangikent in Zaaminskiy Rayon.

Komsomolskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the rural population point of Navruz, having transferred to it the kishlaks of Bakhor, Zolotaya Orda, Mekhnatabad, Mirzachul, Navbakhor, imeni Ordzhonikidze, and Sovetabad in Yangierskiy Rayon.

Mekhnatabadskiy Rayon, with its administrative center in the rural population point of Kakhraman, having transferred to it the kishlaks of Bakhoristan, Binakor, Zafarabad, Kakhraman, and Yullashabad in Yangierskiy Rayon.

To consider Yangierskiy Rayon abolished.

Ukase on the formation of Sokhskiy Rayon within Fergana Oblast

The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

—To approve the petition of the executive committee of the Fergana Oblast soviet of peoples deputies to form within Fergana Oblast a Sokhskiy Rayon, with its center in the rural population point of Ravan, having transferred to it the kishlaks imeni Akhunbabayev, Ravan, Sokh, and Khushyar in Rishtanskiy Rayon.

Ukase on Removal of the Territory of Leninskiy Rayon from Administrative Subordination to the Leninsk City Soviet of Peoples Deputies

The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

- To approve the petition of the executive committee of the Andizhan Oblast soviet of peoples deputies to remove the territory of Leninskiy Rayon from administrative subordination to the Leninsk city soviet of peoples deputies.

Ukase on Abolition of the City of Narimanov in Tashkent Oblast and the Transfer of its Territory to the City of Tashkent

The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To approve the petition of the executive committees of the Tashkent Oblast and City soviets of peoples

deputies to abolish the city of Narimanov in Tashkent Oblast, having transferred its territory to the city of Tashkent.

2. To introduce a partial change in the borders of the city of Tashkent in agreement with its description and graphic outline.

Ukase on the Formation of Bektemirskiy Rayon Within the City of Tashkent

The Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

- To approve the petition of the executive committee of the Tashkent city soviet of peoples deputies to form within the city of Tashkent a Bektemirskiy Rayon, having transferred to it the part of the territory of the city of Tashkent within the boundaries of the former city of Narimanov, which has been transferred from Tashkent Oblast.

Azerbaijan Education Ministry Reestablishes Authority in NKAO

90US07311 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian
1 Mar 90 p 2

[AZERINFORM report: "The Republic's Sovereign Rights are Restored"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the event in Nagorno-Karabakh, the organs of public education were in fact outside of subordination to the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Public Education. The orders, directions, and commissions of the ministry were ignored by the oblast department of public education, and consequently by the administration of public education and culture of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] committee of special administration. The normative acts of the Azerbaijan SSR organs of public education were not executed by educational institutions; the necessary statistical, planning, and financial reports were not presented. Unbearable conditions were created for the work of educational institutions with Azeri as the language of instruction. The students were not provided with textbooks, and the teachers were not provided with teaching methodology literature; they have not been paid their salary over the course of 2 years. In violation of the procedure established in 1989, students of general educational schools with Russian and Armenian as the languages of instruction were issued school-completion certificates by the Armenian SSR Ministry of Public Education.

These and other such cases elicit the protest of the republic's population, and aggravate the already complicated situation in the region.

For the purpose of restoring the legal mechanism of the joint subordination of the organs and structural subdivisions of the NKAO public education to the republic Ministry of Public Education, the activity of their leaders has been recognized as illegal by the order of the minister. The so-called "leasing" of the premises of the former Stepanakert Pedagogical Institute imeni 60-letiya Sovetskogo Azerbaidzhana by the Kirovakan Pedagogical Institute has been abolished. The leaders of the organs and structural subdivisions of NKAO public education are obligated to present to the ministry all types of reports on the status of public education in NKAO, proposals for improving the network of general educational schools, preschool, and extr-scholastic institutions, and the development of their material-technical base, for announcing the receipt of certificates, testimonials, and diplomas by graduates of NKAO general educational schools, technical schools, and professional-technical schools for the 1989-1990 academic year, and a number of other documents. The order was given to provide teachers, care providers, and other workers of public educational facilities with Azeri as the language of instruction with timely payment of salary. The need to adopt concrete measures for the implementation of academic programs was indicated.

The heads of the administrations and departments of the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Public Education were

entrusted to render comprehensive assistance to the NKAO organs of public education and academic institutions in the restructuring of the academic-indoctrinational process, the strengthening of the material-technical base of academic institutions, and the resolution of personnel issues.

The NKAO department of health has also been directly subordinated to the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Health. By the minister's order, the management of the NKAO department of health is obligated to present reports on the department's activity to the ministry. Previous status has been returned to the following subdivisions of associations located in NKAO: "Republic Center of Hygiene and Epidemiology," "Farmatsiya," and "Medtekhnik." The managers of these associations are entrusted with ensuring the execution of the order.

Azerbaijan Resolutions on Ethnic Issues

90US08301 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian
5 Apr 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Excerpt] As a result of the extreme aggravation of interethnic relations brought about by events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and its environs, a significant number of citizens of Azeri nationality were forced to abandon their permanent places of abode in the oblast and have now been displaced to other cities and regions of the republic. At the same time, some of the citizens of Azeri and other nationalities residing today in NKAO territory do not have the opportunity to work under normal conditions and receive remuneration for their labor.

A resolution was adopted "On Payment of a Lump-Sum Allowance to Citizens of Azeri Nationality Required to Abandon Their Place of Permanent Abode and Their Work in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]." In this manner, the resolution of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers No. 399 of 4 October 1989, "On Payment of a Lump-Sum Allowance to Citizens of Azeri Nationality Required to Abandon Their Place of Permanent Abode and Their Work," was extended to apply to citizens of Azeri nationality who had earlier resided in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijan SSR but were forced to abandon their place of permanent abode and move to new dwelling places within the borders of the republic. Citizens of Azeri and other nationalities who were required to terminate their work at enterprises and organizations located in NKAO territory, but who did not abandon their place of permanent residence, are authorized the allowance for the entire period of work interruption in 1988 and 1989. In accordance with approved procedure, it is recommended that enterprises (associations), institutions, and organizations issue payment from wage and material incentive

funds. When necessary, allocations will be made for these purposes from the centralized funds of ministries, departments, and associations.

The resolution was adopted "On the Inadmissibility of Forming in Azerbaijan SSR Territory Electoral Districts and Electoral Precincts for Elections of People's Deputies to Soviets of People's Deputies of Another Union Republic." Adoption of this document was occasioned by the illegal actions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and Central Electoral Commission for Election of Armenian SSR People's Deputies manifest in the establishment of electoral districts in the NKAO territory of the Azerbaijan SSR for election of people's deputies to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. These actions violate Article 76 of the USSR Constitution, according to which a union republic exercises state authority only over its own territory. The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared illegal these actions of the Central Electoral Commission for Election of Armenian SSR People's Deputies. By order of the state of emergency regional military commander, local soviet organs were prohibited from opening electoral precincts and campaign centers.

This resolution condemns incidents of unlawful action and the continuing hopeless path of confrontation pursued by the Armenian SSR. It is recommended that the Republic Organizational Committee for the NKAO take measures to ensure strict observance of the USSR Constitution and Azerbaijan SSR Constitution in the territory of the oblast, and to avert attempts at violating the sovereignty of the republic through the establishment of electoral districts in its territory for elections of people's deputies to soviets of people's deputies of another union republic, as well as through the conduct of elections to local soviets in accordance with the legislation of another union republic. The Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and Committee for State Security have been charged, jointly with other law enforcement organs, with identifying and warning individuals who call for the conduct of anti-constitutional elections.

The leaders of soviet and management organs in the oblast have been warned regarding their personal responsibility for allowing illegal activity to take place. [passage omitted]

Georgian Pro-Stalinists Hold Rally

90US0811A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
3 Apr 90 p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Aleksishvili: "Stalinists Are Forever Young at Heart"]

[Text] No, they are not growing old. On the contrary, they have begun to feel an unprecedented influx of energy and selfless love for the "father of all nations and peoples" which during the years of stagnation was hidden in the most remote corners of their hearts. But now, during the age of glasnost, there is no need for them to conceal their true feelings.

And therefore the "Stalin" society decided to declare for the entire Gori square bearing the name of their idol their loyal feelings for the person whose name they associate with socialism...

The Gori city newspaper GAMARDZHVEBA informed its readers of the forthcoming sanctioned rally two days in advance in the issue for 29 March. The president of the society was also introduced (in another case for some reason it was called an organization)—Lieutenant General Retired Irakliy Dzordzhadze. Incidentally, getting ahead of myself, I will note that the lieutenant general himself named another person to this post—an engineer from Batumi Revaz Chkhaidze, and one of the speakers at the rally said that Irakliy Dzordzhadze is the chairman of the Tbilisi section of the society. In a word, there has been a certain mix-up in the personnel question. But initially everything organizational seemed to be in order. In any case the rally began precisely on the planned day and hour. Several veterans of war and labor placed wreaths and flowers on the monument to I.V. Stalin. They took their places on the granite platform and started from time to time to shout slogans glorifying Iosif Vissarionovich. Those gathered there held two placards: "Glory to the great Stalin!" and "We demand resumption of the work on Stalin's home-museum."

But the people were waiting for speeches and there were none. The pause lasted a long time. And then it was suggested that the participants in the rally (and there were more than 1,500 of them) set out for the home-museum. But many people on the platform did not support this idea. The argument continued for several minutes before the eyes of the surprised public. The idea won out...

From an improvised platform constructed on the balcony of the house where the "leader and teacher" was born one could hear an appeal to the Georgian government. It said, in particular, that it must be indicated to the mass media that it is inadmissible to falsify Stalin's role in the construction of socialism in our country.

...They made a demand to open a Stalin museum and a museum of battle glory, to create a scholarly center for studying the work of I.V. Stalin, and so forth and so on.

By the end of the rally there were only about 200 people left in front of the home-museum. In thinning ranks they returned to Stalin Square and again an appeal could be heard from the platform: To remember and love the leader, and to cherish his great legacy.

Such was the sanctioned rally in Gori.

Georgian Procurator on Crime Caused by Interethnic Conflict

90US0665A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Vakhtang Razmadze, Georgian procurator, by Irina Inovel: "Under the Sign of Legality"]

[Text] [Inovel] Judging from the appeals to the editors, people are most concerned now by criminal actions

deriving from the complicating of interethnic relations. Some 7 months have already passed since the well-known events in Abkhazia in the course of which people were killed or wounded. What is the state of the investigation of these crimes?

[Razmadze] Without going into detail on the July events in Abkhazia, I would say that they were in no way spontaneous, but rather had an organized, preplanned nature. The Abkhazian extremists, unable to secure the separating of the autonomous republic from Georgia by their appeals to the Union party and soviet bodies, changed their tactics and in the middle of last year decided to resort to more energetic actions. The result of this was the attack on 15 July of last year against unarmed Georgians by the building of the Sakhumi 1st Secondary School and in the Park imeni Rustaveli. In the following days, outbursts of interethnic conflict spread throughout Abkhazia and these were accompanied by murders, violence, the seizing of firearms and other crimes. For all these instances of illegal actions, some 160 criminal cases were initiated and these have been and are being investigated by a special investigation group which has been sent by the Georgian Procuracy into the autonomous republic and which incidentally is international in its membership, numbering up to 90 skilled specialists.

Some 138 persons have had criminal proceedings instituted against them, including 74 taken into custody and the court bodies have already received 60 cases involving 70 persons and a majority of these have been condemned to various prison sentences. Some 16 workers from the internal affairs bodies have also had criminal cases instituted against them. It should be pointed out that among the persons involved in criminal cases, along with Abkhazians, there are also Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, Russians and others. I intentionally emphasize the nationality of these persons in order to say that in our work of investigating the facts of the committed crimes, we have been guided solely by the demands of the law and not by any other considerations for which at times the co-workers of the investigatory brigade without any merit have been accused.

[Inoveli] You have said that the July action was prepared ahead of time and planned. Have its initiators been brought to justice?

[Razmadze] The organizers and instigators have been established and have had criminal proceedings instituted against them as well as the active participants in the pogrom of the Sakhumi 1st Secondary School, the attack on the Georgians in the city park and the seizure of firearms and ammunition in Ochamchirskiy, Gudautskiy and other rayons. In addition, the investigation possesses data on the criminal negligence of certain officials and their involvement in fanning interethnic strife. No one should doubt that all persons who overstep the law will be discovered and punished, regardless of the position held, the social status or nationality.

[Inoveli] Already rather a lot of time has passed since the clashes on an interethnic basis in Kvermo Kartli. How is the investigation of this group of crimes going?

[Razmadze] Yes, it is already more than 7 months since the events in Marneulskiy, Bolnisskiy and Dmanisskiy Rayons, when a portion of the Azerbaijani population, in being driven by nationalistic motives, began intentionally to spread provocative, unfounded rumors about supposedly occurring encroachments on their interests. Individual, extremist elements from among the Azeris living in these rayons, in taking advantage of the private disputes over domestic issues, began to attack Georgians, demanding they be moved out of the homeland and the establishing of an autonomous region here with a center in Rustavi. There were instances of murders, attempts at murder, the causing of severe bodily injury, malicious hooliganism, explosions and other illegal actions based on interethnic problems. More than 40 criminal cases have been initiated, including on the grounds of fanning interethnic hostility. At present, 23 cases involving 32 persons have been turned over to the court bodies and 21 persons have already been condemned.

[Inoveli] As is known, from the end of November last year until approximately mid-January of the current year, South Ossetia was a hot spot in the republic, and here as well a conflict arose on an interethnic basis.

[Razmadze] The conflict in South Ossetia was a continuation of the Abkhazian events and was provoked by forces desiring to exacerbate the ethnic crisis in our republic. According to the illegal actions on an interethnic basis recorded in this region, we have initiated 71 criminal cases, including 3 over instances of fanning interethnic hostility. In truth, not all the crimes have as yet been exposed, but the work on them has not been halted. A number of cases has already been sent to the court. For the rape and attempted murder of M.A., several persons suspected of committing this severe crime have been charged and taken into custody. Intense investigation is underway of the cases involving the murder of the 9-month-old Paaty Nikorashvili, for the murders of V. Tutarashvili and T. Tigiyev and the preliminary investigation of the case of murder of Sh. Sikhashvili is in the concluding stage.

[Inoveli] Up to now, we have been speaking about crimes based on interethnic relations. But the republic community cannot help but be alarmed by the general increase in crime, both as a whole in the nation and particularly in our republic. What can you say about this?

[Razmadze] Last year, crime in Georgia rose by 1,064 units, or by 6.4 percent, including murders by 52 units or 33.5 percent. There has been no improvement in the operational situation in January of the current year, when 220 more crimes were recorded than in the same period of last year. The increase in just premeditated murders was 13 units. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the solving rate of the committed crimes is very low. Without mentioning other crimes, we might point out that last year 58 intentional murders remained unsolved.

It must be admitted that the increased crime rate is a result of failures in the activities of the law enforcement bodies on the spot, the absence of a proper, effective

struggle against infractions, the lack of coordination in their activities, the at times lifelessness and ineffectiveness of warning and preventive measures being carried out, the lack of the necessary ties with the public, the underestimating of the importance of analyzing the situation and so forth.

[Inoveli] For 4 months now in Tbilisi, by the building of the Museum of Modern Georgian Art, a protest action is continuing by mothers whose children were the victims of murders which have remained unsolved. The mothers are demanding just retribution....

[Razmadze] Yes, actually, involved in this extended protest action are several-score women who are dissatisfied with the decisions of the investigatory and court bodies. Among the protesters there are those (Grdzeli, Yakobashvili) who actually do have grounds for complaints against the law enforcement bodies, although the investigation made every effort to solve the crimes as a result of which they lost close ones. However, a predominant majority of the participants in the months-long action is comprised of persons under whose complaints and with their participation the appropriate criminal cases have been repeatedly studied both by the Georgian Procuracy and Supreme Court as well as by the USSR Procuracy and Supreme Court. These questions have also been taken up by an authoritative commission of the CPSU Central Committee with the involvement of workers from the Union law enforcement bodies. Regardless of the fact that the complainants have repeatedly been given both verbal explanations as well as detailed and complete written replies, it has not yet been possible to convince them of the legality of the decisions taken on these cases. Even during the period of the protest action, we have repeatedly invited its participants to the procuracy, including through the republic press, in order to reexamine their complaints, but these invitations were not accepted.

I should say frankly that the continuation of this protest action has been aided by the passive stance assumed by those officials in the party and soviet bodies who instead of patiently explaining to the complainants all the unsubstantialness of their demands, on the contrary, promise them an unrealistic review of the cases and decisions of interest to them. The procuracy bodies will never resort to bringing charges against persons who are not guilty of a crime or against persons for whom we do not possess sufficient evidence of their guilt.

[Inoveli] There are rumors that in some places attempts are being made to infringe the legal right of citizens of nonindigenous nationality in the sphere of civil legislation....

[Razmadze] This is completely inadmissible. I want to emphasize that in resolving housing disputes, in drawing up sale and purchase papers, legacies, exchanging apartments or houses, the law enforcement bodies are obliged to strictly follow the requirements of housing legislation; any other approach to these questions and the resolving

of them depending upon nationality of one or another person are a flagrant violation and are punishable by the criminal law.

[Inoveli] A last question. On the building of the republic procuracy office, there is the inscription: "USSR Procuracy. Georgian Procuracy." How should this be understood?

[Razmadze] According to the USSR Constitution, the USSR General Procurator is appointed by the nation's congress of people's deputies. As for the procurators of the Union republics, they are appointed by the General Procurator. We are his representatives on the spot and act on behalf of and under the instructions of the USSR General Procurator.

In conclusion I would like to say that until democratic changes have occurred in all spheres of public life without exception, it will be difficult to create a true state under the law. Precisely because we need complete democracy, I strongly support the idea of a multiparty system outlined in the draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress.

Teaching of Old Uzbek Language in Arabic Script Begins

90P50012A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Apr 90 p 3

The first graduating class has finished courses at the Namangan oblast Institute for the Qualification of Teachers, where they have begun preparations for teaching the old Uzbek language in Arabic script.

According to the law on the state language of the Uzbek SSR, it is proposed to introduce this discipline into the national schools in the following school year. The Institute for the Qualification of Teachers should prepare at least 450 teachers for its introduction. The acquisition of textbooks and methodical supplies remains an unsolved problem.

Lithuanian, Latvian Attitudes on Interethnic Relations Compared

90UN1372A Riga KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVI in Russian No 2, Feb 90 (signed to press
24 Jan 90) pp 63- 71

[Article by O. Peypinya, graduate student at the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law: "Nations and Ethnoses: Problems of Association"]

[Text] The resolution of the nationalities question, which has acquired exceptional urgency lately, is of great significance for the fortunes of restructuring and the future of our country and republic. Among other things, questions of the theory of the nation developed by the classic thinkers of Marxism-Leninism require new interpretation. Take, for example, one of their main theses—the one which holds that the main difference between a

nation and other communities of people lies in its social origin and the role that it is called on to play in society. While acknowledging the great importance of economic, historical and social factors in the nation's formation and development, we must not forget that each nation also has its own specific ethnic, psychological, cultural and linguistic characteristics. However, lately in the analysis of national processes people have started to forget that in the life of a nation (both large and small), its fruitful development and the improvement of its relations with other nations, these are the characteristics that play an important role, although even they are not predetermined biologically but are also the product of social development.

In this connection, for a fuller understanding of the complex processes that take place in the life of various national communities, it would be a good idea to turn once again to the theory of the ethnos. According to the Academician Yu. Bromley's definition, "an ethnos (in the narrow definition) is a stable community, historically established on a certain territory, of people who possess common and relatively stable characteristics of language and culture, as well as a consciousness of their unity and difference from other such formations (self-awareness), which is fixed in the name they call themselves (ethnonym)" (Bromley, Yu. V., "O metodologii izucheniya etnicheskoy problematiki" [On the Methodology for the Study of Ethnic Problems], Moscow, 1986, p. 186).

Whereas the unity of the territory settled by it has extremely great importance for the emergence of an ethnos, established ethnos frequently possess common features even when all parts of them do not share a unified territory, that is, when they lack economic and political integrity. And in this case one of the defining features according to which one ethnos differs from another becomes precisely ethnic self-awareness—awareness of the unity of all the representatives of a given ethnos and their difference from other such formations. Although a no less important role is played by commonality of language as the symbol of ethnic affiliation and the specific characteristics of psychological makeup, ethnic self-awareness nonetheless remains a fundamental distinguishing feature for people of the same ethnos, even those living outside the territory on which it was formed. Ignoring this aspect of the problem may result in unforeseen complications.

Take, for example, two ethnos: the Lithuanian and the Latvian. Their formation took place on the common territories of present-day Lithuania and Latvia. But for historical, social and demographic reasons, individual groups of those ethnos have found themselves outside their ethnic territory. There are 3.2 million Lithuanians and 1.6 million Latvians throughout the world as a whole, of which 90 percent of the Lithuanians and more than 95 percent of the Latvians live within the USSR.

Table 1 gives a picture of their settlement in the country (as of the 1989 census):

Table 1		
Place of Residence	Nationality (thousands of persons)	
	Lithuanians	Latvians
Own Republic	2,712 (95%)	1,388 (95%)
RSSSR	67	47
Latvia (and Lithuania, respectively)	38	47
Kazakhstan, Estonia, Ukraine, Belorussia	32	16

Abroad the most numerous groups of Latvians and Lithuanians live in the United States, Canada, Australia and Sweden; altogether there are about 300,000 Lithuanians and more than 100,000 Latvians outside the USSR.

Naturally, the question arises: "Is it possible to consider groups of Latvians and Lithuanians living outside their republic part of the same nation?" In our view, it is not, since one of the main distinctive features of a nation is commonality of territory and economic life. Therefore, only that part of an ethnos that lives on its own historically original territory can be considered a nation, and it is customary to call the rest of its groups national minorities. And in relations between representatives of national minorities and the representatives of the nation in whose midst they live, very complex processes occur.

Of course, groups of ethnos living on other ethnic territories preserve some of the characteristics of the psychological makeup and traits of the national character, in part language and national traditions. And such a trait as national self-awareness may manifest itself even more vividly and expressively. But the objective process is nonetheless such that the aforementioned distinctive features in those national groups located outside of their original territorial formations are gradually leveled, and each successive generation of the same Lithuanians and Latvians living outside their principal area of settlement assimilates the national features not so much of the preceding generations as of the ethnos in whose midst they live. A natural ethnic assimilation occurs—a process of the dissolving of relatively small groups or individual representatives of one ethnos in the milieu of another, that is, their partial or complete loss of the original ethnic qualities and assimilation of new ones.

But all ethnic processes, including those of assimilation, are characterized by a dialectical combination of the general and the specific. This regularity manifests itself in the existence of two interconnected tendencies: integration and differentiation. For example, in our republic a natural process of the assimilation of Poles, Belorussians, Ukrainians and people of other nationalities is

taking place. And the history of the assimilation of the Vidzeme and Kurzeme Livonians has been going on now not just for decades but for centuries. The Livonian language no longer functions in either oral or written discourse and has been preserved only in oral folk art and certain written sources. In analyzing the languages of the Finno-Ugric group, until recently scholars concerned with the problems of the history of modern languages and their functioning still singled it out among the world's languages belonging to that group. Thus, in describing the so-called Baltic-Finnish group in his book "Sotsiolingvistiicheskiye problemy yazykov narodov SSSR" [Sociolinguistic Problems of the Languages of the USSR's Peoples] (1980), the well-known Soviet scholar M. Isayev, who studies these problems, includes the Livonian language in that group. But in analyzing the distinguishing characteristics of the Finno-Ugric group and their distribution in the Soviet Union in his book "Sto tridsat ravnopravnykh" [One Hundred and Thirty Equals] (1982), he no longer mentions the existence of the Livonian language. And finally, in the Belorussian scholars' book "Obshchestvo-yazyk-politika" [Society-Language-Politics] (1988), we do not find Livonian in the description of the Finno-Ugric group, either. Don't these facts indicate that the distribution and use of the Livonian language have declined to such an extent that one must stretch a point considerably to consider it the language of a numerous group of people? But since bearers of that language still exist, and there are certain written and oral sources, it is possible that it could be revived (but, for the time being, with extremely limited functions).

Complex ethnic processes of reciprocal influence and interaction take place not only between the indigenous nation and national minorities, but also among the latter. According to the 1989 census, the republic has seven large groups of representatives of national minorities numbering more than 20,000 persons. The most numerous of them are representatives of the Russian nationality (34 percent of Latvia's entire population). The influence of that community on the ethnic groups of Belorussians, Ukrainians and Poles living primarily in Latgale, but also in Riga, has resulted in a situation in which part of them have merged with the Russian ethnic group, adopted its language and customs, and lost their own specific traits as an ethnos.

On the other hand, the Germans, Lithuanians, Estonians and Jews, who live primarily in Kurzeme and Vidzeme, have for the most part been subjected to the stronger influence of the Latvian ethnos, acquiring from it features of its way of life and material and spiritual culture, including language. Among representatives of these nationalities, the features of their own national groups have come to be gradually eroded, and the functions of their native languages have been restricted to the sphere of family and everyday life, but even in their everyday life the Germans and Jews, for example, no longer use their own native languages, but use Latvian or Russian.

But there is also another side to this process—a natural urge to preserve and develop the distinctive features of one's own ethnos, especially one's national culture and native language. A confirmation of this is the formation in the republic of national cultural societies and corresponding cultural centers, whose chief goal is to consolidate people of the same nationality around them and revive the cultural and ethnic features of their nation that have been partially or even fully lost in the midst of a different nationality. These societies' cultural educational work and their promotion of their national culture and national traditions and customs are what serves as the consolidating principle, which is followed by a revival of national awareness and the restoration and preservation of the distinctive features of national minorities living in the midst of a different indigenous nation. At present about 20 national cultural societies whose chief objective is cultural educational work have been formed in Latvia. The largest of them is the Baltic Slavic Society, which brings together representatives of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Polish and other Slavic cultures. The society has undertaken extensive activities to restore monuments of Slavic culture and history, protect the environment, and collect documents and photographic materials on the victims of Stalin's repressions in Latvia. At the very outset of its activities it established two groups for the study of the Latvian language. One of its important initiatives has been a project for establishing a Riga Humanities Institute. The society has performed a great service by restoring the tradition of celebrating Russian Culture Day in Latvia (the last time that holiday was celebrated was 1939).

The Latvian Jewish Culture Society (LOYeK) has undertaken extensive activities. It has organized an amateur studio theater and a children's and youth choir. Its greatest service has been the opening of the first Jewish school in the union (378 pupils) on 1 September 1989. In it the teaching of the basic subjects is conducted in Russian, but the children also study modern Jewish and the ancient Jewish language (Hebrew).

The primary concern and one of the most important problems for all the national cultural societies have become the problem of teaching the native language—the opening of groups, classes and schools (including Sunday schools) that provide conditions for the practical mastery of one's national language (in addition to the aforementioned Jewish school, there are already Estonian, Armenian and Azerbaijani Sunday schools in operation, plans exist to open such a school for the study of conversational Tatar, and Polish classes and classes in Livonian have been set up).

Thus, we see that at present a process is under way of strengthening the tendency to preserve and develop the nationally specific and the ethnic. Even though social homogeneity grows with the development of society, ethnic differences remain. And nationalities policy must not fail to take into account the fact that national self-awareness is not only a matter of people's identifying themselves or assigning themselves to a certain nationality. It is, L. Drobizheva

writes, a complex structural formation that includes national ideas of territory, culture, language and the historical past. It is an attitude toward one's people's cultural and historical values, and it is national interests (VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 9, 1988, p 19).

Ignoring the urge to preserve and develop national distinctiveness and excessively forcing integration processes in the area of internationality relations have produced negative consequences and an aggravation of internationality relations. A great deal has already been said about the causes that resulted in the infringement of the Latvian nation's rights and interests in the economic sphere and in the area of state development, culture, education and science. The situation in which national minorities have found themselves as a result of that policy has been less fully analyzed. Therefore, it is very important at present to conduct an unbiased, objective analysis of the nationality processes taking place in the development of various social and ethnic communities of people, and of relationships among them.

In 1988, under the direction of a group of sociologists from the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, we conducted a comparative public-opinion survey of two occupationally similar collectives in Limbzhskiy Rayon of the Latvian SSR and Panevezhskiy Rayon of the Lithuanian

SSR, concerning problems of the culture of internationality relations. The research program contained several groups of questions:

- a) the influence of a multinational or nationally homogeneous collective on relations between people of different nationalities;
- b) opinion on the need to know the language of one's republic as a native and second language, as well as the knowledge of Russian as the language of internationality communication;
- c) opinion on the state of internationality relations in the republic and rayon in the past 10-20 years, at present, and in the next 10-20 years;
- d) opinion on people's attitude toward the representatives of another nationality.

Before the survey was begun, the social and occupational groups of the respondents were determined: the collectives of the Panevezhskiy and Limbzhskiy Selkhoztekhnika [Farm Machinery] Production Associations and two kolkhozes. These groups correspond most closely to the two rayons' social-class structure. In each collective chosen for the survey, 100 persons, chosen by random sampling, were interviewed. The overall social and demographic data on the respondents are cited in Table 2 (in percentages).

Table 2

Nationality	Rayon		Selkhoztekhnika		Kolkhoz	
	Panevezhskiy	Limbzhskiy	Panevezhskiy	Limbzhskiy	Smilgyay	Draudziba
Lithuanians	97.7	0.7	95.7	2.9	98.0	—
Latvians	0.03	80.8	—	57.0	—	94.8
Russians	1.6	13.0	2.1	28.6	2.0	2.6
Ukrainians	1.0	1.7	1.0	6.3	—	1.3
Belorussians	1.5	1.3	1.0	4.3	—	1.3
Poles	0.04	1.3	—	1.4	—	—
Others	0.06	1.3	—	—	—	1.3

As we can see from the table, the collectives in Panevezhskiy Rayon are more homogeneous and include primarily people of the indigenous nationality. In Limbzhskiy Rayon, on the other hand, one collective is multinational, with almost half of it made up of workers of nonindigenous nationality. For this reason, the survey's results are also of interest for the fact that views on

internationality relations were expressed by representatives of both the indigenous nationality and national minorities.

And what was the respondents' opinion on internationality relations in their rayons and republics in the past, present and future? It is expressed in Table 3.

Table 3

Respondents' opinion	Selkhoztekhnika				Kolkhoz			
	Panevezhskiy		Limbazhskiy		Smilgyay		Draudziba	
Assessment of Internationality Relations at Present Time								
	in rayon	in republic	in rayon	in republic	in rayon	in republic	in rayon	in republic
Good relations	47	43	20	13	39	28	32	28
Not entirely bad relations	44	50	35	33	55	64	35	39
Bad relations	2	2	4	11	2	5	6	13
Cannot judge	6	4	39	40	3	1	13	25
No response	1	1	2	2	1	2	3	3
Assessment of Internationality Relations in Past 10-20 Years								
Relations improved	33	34	4	2	37	39	6	6
Relations unchanged	31	28	29	22	34	25	35	33
Relations worsened	4	6	24	40	6	14	20	30
Cannot judge	31	31	40	33	22	19	33	28
No response	1	1	2	2	1	3	3	6
Assessment of Internationality Relations in Next 10-20 Years								
Will improve	45	44	35	35	54	55	28	30
Will change	22	17	32	28	26	26	36	31
Will worsen	10	14	9	10	7	8	4	7
Cannot judge	22	26	23	26	12	10	29	29
No response	1	—	1	1	1	1	3	3

In analyzing this table, one should first of all note the large number of indifferent persons in Limbazhskiy rayon—from 25 to 44 percent of the respondents there refused to assess the state of internationality relations. That can be attributed to the fact that complex processes in the life of national groups were kept quiet in our country for years, and many people did not reflect on them. This is also the reason for the unwillingness to look into and analyze the reasons for the complications that have arisen here. It is also the source of the mistrust in any sort of measures taken to normalize those relations, and consequently, of people's unwillingness to make any effort themselves.

A complication in internationality relations was indicated by an absolute majority of those questioned in Limbazhskiy Rayon, and only about six percent expressed the view that those relations had improved, but these were mainly representatives of the nonindigenous nationality. Whereas they have recently felt relatively comfortable among inhabitants of the indigenous nationality, among the overwhelming majority of Latvians one already felt the growth of strong discomfort and accompanying tension in relations among the various nationalities. That is why the inhabitants of Limbazhskiy Rayon do not look as optimistically as those in Panevezhskiy Rayon on any sort of improvement in

internationality relations in the future: such "optimists" amounted to only 36 percent, and the rest of the respondents either gave a negative reply or refrained from any assessment of them, in general.

The aggravated problems of relations between the republic and union departments in the areas of the economy and environmental protection, the unfavorable demographic situation in the republic associated with the processes of mechanical population increase because of migration, and finally, ways of solving the problems of national-Russian bilingualism that have not always been consistent—all that has created mistrust in the possibility of great positive changes in the near future among a large segment of the people of indigenous nationality in Limbazhskiy Rayon. Although throughout the rayon as a whole internationality relations receive a higher assessment than they do in the republic (and in that respect, the views of Latvian and Lithuanian respondents for the most part coincided).

The study also showed that a majority of those surveyed believed that knowledge of the language of the indigenous nationality is mandatory for all persons residing permanently on its territory. But 10 percent of the respondents, mainly Russians and Belorussians, believed that for communication in the Soviet Union it is sufficient to know only Russian. Given an increased level of

national awareness, such an attitude toward the language of the indigenous nation is already strongly offending national feelings and by no means contributing to normal labor relations in collectives. About 16 percent of the respondents of non-Latvian nationality and approximately the same percentage of Latvians said that not knowing another language and not wanting to learn it were creating an uncomfortable atmosphere in their labor collectives that threatened to turn into a conflict situation. Their opinion was unequivocal: in a multinational collective the poor knowledge of Latvian among representatives of other nationalities, and poor knowledge of Russian among Latvians interfere with their normal communication. Therefore, in order to create a favorable psychological microclimate within the collective and facilitate the fastest possible adaptation in it of persons of the nonindigenous nationality, it is necessary to help them psychologically join the circle of people of indigenous nationality and start learning the language and familiarizing themselves with the distinctive features of the people's culture, traditions and customs.

The lack of sufficient information about nationality and demographic processes in their rayon among the inhabitants of Limbzhskiy Rayon, the lack of knowledge of Latvian among some of the people of different nationalities who have come there to take up permanent residence, and the desire of both Latvians and non-Latvians to shut themselves off and remain isolated in their own circles—all this has contributed to the fact that some of the rayon's residents have developed an incorrect notion about the number of persons of a given nationality living in their rayon. Only half of those surveyed in Selkhoztekhnik and 66 percent of those surveyed on the Draudziba Kolkhoz knew that Latvians made up more than half of the rayon's residents. The rest believed that the rayon had only 50 percent, or even fewer, Latvians. Those who gave such an answer could hardly have any idea of even the approximate percentages of persons of various nationalities. Evidently this amounts to a kind of protest on the Latvians' part.

However, despite all the complexities and contradictions in internationality relations, nearly all the respondents expressed the desire to reside permanently only in Latvia or Lithuania; only about 3 percent of those questioned, mainly persons of nonindigenous nationality, would like to settle in other republics. Although established notions about the higher level of economic, social and spiritual life in foreign countries influenced the respondents' opinions, nonetheless most of them remained patriots of their country. Thus, 28 percent expressed a desire to live temporarily in a capitalist country, and 41 percent expressed a desire to do so in another socialist country. This tendency was more clearly expressed among the inhabitants of Panevezhskiy Rayon, where six percent of those questioned expressed a desire to take up permanent residence abroad.

A natural consequence of the fact that economic and cultural ties among peoples in our country have been in strengthened in every way possible, and of intensive

migration processes is a steady increase in the number of internationality marriages. In a mixed family the bearers of different national cultures, ways of everyday life, and national psychologies come together, and complex and even painful processes of changing established national stereotypes take place. The established opinion of such families as free of conflicts in nationality relations is not entirely confirmed by the respondents' answers to the following questions: (a) how do you assess mixed marriages? (b) how do the distinctive features of national psychology affect relations in mixed families? and (c) how is the language problem solved in them?

As indicated by the replies of the respondents who themselves or whose relatives were married to the representatives of another nationality, the most stable and conflict-free relations existed in families having great experience with internationality intercourse both in the collectives and in everyday life. Four percent of those questioned in the Limbzhskiy Rayon Selkhoztekhnik replied that there were no conflicts over nationality relations in their mixed families or the mixed families of their relatives. Only 1.4 percent of such families had serious conflicts that in some cases even resulted in the breakup of marriages.

A different situation existed in nationally homogeneous collectives in both rayons. On the Draudziba Kolkhoz only one-fourth of those questioned were acquainted with the experience of living in mixed families, and among them, four percent of such families had serious conflicts, and three percent of the families had broken up because of them. In collectives in Panevezhskiy Rayon only 13 percent of the respondents had a direct relation to a mixed marriage, and nearly all of them said that there were numerous conflicts in those families; among two-thirds of the families, relations had eventually straightened out, while among four percent of the families, mutual misunderstanding and conflicts had resulted in divorce.

Although the majority of respondents expressed the view that theoretically the nationality of one's spouse was of no great decisive importance in marriage, in reality about 90 percent of the representatives of Lithuanian and Latvian nationalities approved marriages only with people of their own nationalities.

Thus, the survey of public opinion in two rayons of the neighboring republics showed that the most characteristic tendency in internationality relations has become the tendency toward increased attention to what is nationally specific, and the desire to protect national interests and requirements and preserve and develop specific national features. And that is natural and understandable. It is important only not to forget that the two historical tendencies in the nationality question pointed out by V. I. Lenin are still operative under present-day conditions, although in different form: "The first: the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the establishment of national states. The second: the development

and increasing frequency of all sorts of relations among nations, the breaking down of nationality barriers, and the establishment of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 24, p 124). The moral and psychological basis for the normative coexistence of peoples consists of attention to and respect for the distinguishing characteristics of other nationalities. Therefore, a necessary condition for the resolution of contradictions existing in the area of inter-nationality relations is the harmonious combination of general and specific features in the life of each people; the realization of love for the native land, history,

culture, language, customs and traditions of one's own people, and of devotion to one's fatherland; and the consideration and satisfaction of the interests of all nations and nationalities.

The unity of nations lies in national diversity, not national similarity; therefore it is necessary to create conditions for their normal activities and interaction, and not to resolve a single question without considering the nationality factor.

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Negative Aspects of Gdlyan's Character Examined

90UN1479A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by Sergey Kredov: "The Gdlyan Syndrome: A Particular View of the State Under the Law"]

[Text] There are few who would speak calmly about Telman Gdlyan. This article is an attempt to reflect calmly on the populist phenomenon which presently concerns many, leaving aside as much as possible the criminal aspect of the matter.

Over the last year I have been at the different poles of the attitude toward Gdlyan. And during all this time I tried to spot what he is in reality, outside the legend created about him? The task is not an easy one.

Is Gdlyan a supporter of legality? Yes, he more than anyone else convinced us of the monstrosity of the telephone law. But he also is one of the creators of the meeting law which is adapted no worse for terror against the individual.

He seems to be a consummate politician when he engagingly, with artistic details describes the intrigues in the higher levels of power. But when (and often) he tries out the role of political scientist or historian, he appears at least naive. His judgments about the command-administrative system, the "partocracy" have been belabored again and again in the radical press...even back in 1986.

How has he been as a people's deputy? On the one hand, the pressure of Gdlyan's personality (reinforced by actions "on the street") on the decisions being taken in the Kremlin is rather noticeable. But on the other, it is literally as if he were not a deputy at all. He ignores the parliamentary committees and commissions and all his trips to the microphone come down, as a rule, to the theme of the "collapse of the Uzbek affair."

Gdlyan is a fighter against the Mafia.... Here seemingly there could be no difference of opinion. The confiscations of valuables are unprecedented and the positions of those condemned are dizzying. But no, here there are also skeptics. Since the time of Ilf and Petrov we have known that the spring of a corrupt system is more often not the highly-placed nomenklatura worker but rather a humble soviet worker. Hypnotized by the ranks of those condemned, we all too easily, in following the investigators, have "forgiven" those who offered fantastic gifts to the Usmankhodzhayevs and Churbanovs. The press has already attempted to show that the Mafia nests have remained uncensored.

Of Gdlyan's human traits, only two seem indisputable to me. The first works for his public image: he is romantically bold with the reckless boldness of a man who has freed himself from the fear of personal death. The second has repulsed many intellectual supporters (in exchange for legions of followers with different merits). In Gdlyan there is a lack of inner culture. He, as they say, has "no

brakes." I would point out for the sake of justice that in terms of this trait Telman Khorenovich does not differ so much from a long series of other deputies about whom at times one wants to use the words of Gogol: "He himself expresses himself so awkwardly and coarsely that more than by the truth itself he stings by those very arrogant words with which he voices his truth, with passionate words which disclose the untidiness of his confused soul and later himself is amazed and indignant that no one has accepted or heard the truth from him!"

I have been a good ten times at speeches by Gdlyan. I have spent more than an hour at sessions of the parliamentary commission on his "affair," and at the Collegium of the USSR Procurator's Office. There have also been confidential conversations with colleagues of Telman Khorenovich. And I have noticed that the more soundly I gather facts, the more quickly the true Gdlyan, a living man of flesh and blood, slips from my understanding. It is literally like you were hunting wild fowl. Just as you grab it, you are left with a bunch of different color feathers in your hand.

Two comments not about the "real Gdlyan," a completely sympathetic person with expressive sad eyes. I am not concerned with his inner self. I will speak about the image created by mass awareness, the symbol to which he more or less conforms.

Many of his opponents have been convinced that the real Gdlyan somehow does not exist at all. The criticism of him in the press is at times depressingly useless. And even the best reasoned rebukes cause a flood of letters to the newspapers: "Hands Off the Fighter Against the Mafia." More than one sincere opponent of Telman Khorenovich has shrugged his shoulders helplessly:

"If you shoot an arrow at a stone, you lose the arrow!"

Mass consciousness with amazing ease separates out everything which runs contrary to the image of the domestic Cattani.

We have encountered before the phenomenon of the invulnerability of one or another idol. Up to now we have been amazed at the striking viability of a person who is much more common (certainly not similar to our hero).... So a radical grabs a Stalinist by the neck and sets to asking:

"Certainly you know that Stalin slaughtered millions of people? He resettled entire peoples?"

"I have read it."

"Then why do you still love him?"

"And why not: I love everything," says the Stalinist to amaze the questioner and hurries to light the flame before the leader's icon.

A superficial person may assume that any Stalinist is inevitably an obscurantist, a degenerate, a butcher fed by the hand of the "Kremlin mountainman." That is not

the case at all! Very often this is a simple and honest person who has gone through the war, who has never tortured anyone and has not accumulated any wealth. Incidentally, he loves not the mustached Caucasian with the pipe but rather the idea of a solidly united state which Stalin, in his view, embodied.

Telman Gdlyan is the personalization of the old dream of millions about the honest and harsh avenger who in the mass mind will visit this world during its fatal moments and carry out retribution. No, not against the command system. Rather against the personalities of this system.

Telman Gdlyan, Telman Gdlyan.... It sounds like a fragment from an Italian heroic-romantic opera. Nature could not choose a more successful designation for the Dream (as for the sake of brevity I will call the dream of the avenger).

The milieu where such a Dream is capable of assuming enormous sway over the people has long been described in principle. These are the humiliated and insulted who have nothing to lose except...well, and so forth. There are many today. And this most worthy category of citizens has, as a minimum, one shortcoming and that is an inclination to create idols for themselves. If a "flawed" idol is overthrown, it is merely to put a new one in its place.

The Dream has a pure base beneath it. The supporters of Telman Khorenovich at present probably are the most unselfish persons in the nation for they want not happiness but rather justice (as they understand it). But here lies the danger. People who have desired justice "at any price" in history have already been the cause of numerous disasters. And if they have no legal knowledge? And what about human culture? Or if their notions of good and evil contradict the views of other people?

Let us not avoid the risky attempt to sketch a portrait of the "average statistical" supporter of Gdlyan. No, this is no sober individual who can see the merits and shortcomings of Telman Khorenovich. Rather it is an old parishoner of his church.

What comes to mind is the overfilled auditorium of the House of Culture of Zelenograd. Here they had invited as guests five members from the parliamentary commission on the "Gdlyan case." It would be interesting for the persons present to hear the arguments of the visitors but they could not restrain themselves. Literally each phrase of the deputies was interrupted. The organizers had to appeal: "Comrades, let them have their say and then we can say what we feel," but without success. It was not hard to assume that the visitors would not evoke sympathy among Gdlyan's voters. But that the anger would so blind their eyes, or require uncultured attacks and insults? I took a look and could see that these were ordinary people. Undoubtedly, many had seen injustice in their days. They were reliable and, I do not doubt, honest. But...with a cult mind.

Suddenly, there was a storm of applause. Taking over the floor was T. Koryagina (she would subsequently be elected to the Russian Soviets from Zelenograd). She made an angry speech against the co-chairmen of the parliamentary commission. There was an ovation and flowers.... And then on the face of the speaker appeared the smile of a much-praised school girl. Again, there was the alternating of anger...applause...a smile. Anger—smile, anger—smile. The surprise of this transition from an anger which seemingly would consume the speaker to a smile evoked very confused feelings in me. Sincerity with bows is a mysterious phenomenon in the age of perestroika and glasnost.

At the end of the "meeting" the visitors were approached by certain Zelenograd residents who excused themselves for the rashness of their compatriots. But they came up somewhat stealthily as if fearing to draw attention to themselves. The prototype of a future democracy somehow could not be seen.

Honest, unselfish, trustworthy Zelenograd at present is a "idologenic" (excuse the awkwardness of the word) zone. It canonizes persons with strong and weak points as knights without fear and rebuke. "Long live Koryagina!" and "Hands off Deputy Sorokin!" And already Koryagina and Sorokin are hostages of their images which they, don't you understand, were either the creators or the creation.... Can they doubt the purity of the image of the "number one idol"? Would they suddenly see the impurities, the cracks in the piece of steel from which it was forged? Forgive me, but I doubt it. If this did happen, then the images of both idols would cease to exist. They gleam in the reflected light of Gdlyan.

Something else which I think in recalling that meeting in Zelenograd. Why did those assembled—and completely so—show no interest in those facts of the violating of legality which the deputies who had recently arrived from Uzbekistan wanted to inform them of? They could have either agreed or not.... But possibly they were afraid that the violations would be so serious that it would shake the pedestal of their idol? Possibly, their sympathy had become selective? Gdlyan was "ours" and become indignant with any attacks which can be made against him. But the deputies are "not ours" and they can be insulted, they can be caused pain. And it is even possible to telephone them at home making threats.... If this is the case, then somehow I do not like such a "state under the law" in the interpretation of Telman Khorenovich when this is based on fear of the truth, that is, on lies. And so I was even more interested in the information from the parliamentary commission on the abuses in Uzbekistan and which has appeared recently.

Just what are we doing when we decide to fight for justice "at any price"? For power?

The parishoners of the Gdlyan church smile ironically in hearing that the confiscating of even a million from the heir is still no reason for immediate condemnation

without the assembling of evidence. What does this position mean? Ah yes: steal the stolen!

If someone were to speak up in the "Gdlyan audience," he should be ready to ask the question:

"Do you personally have a dacha (a car, a separate apartment...)"

And here is yet another image of the widespread logic. Politician X during the period of stagnation was a bribe-taker because...at present he is a conservative. But politician Y is now a progressive and for this reason he is pure as gold. At the same time, during the period of stagnation X and Y worked side by side, they got on well with one another and consequently they must share the sins of the past evenly.

The Dream about a domestic Cattani began with a thirst for justice. Now it is more and more fed by hate. This is also a pattern in the development of any idea at the center of which stands an idol. In living in a world of growing hate, one does not experience great reassurance from an awareness that many people and phenomena fully merit this feeling.

Like any "real" idol, Gdlyan fosters in his followers illusions and utopias possibly without being aware of this himself. For instance, he sees the main evil of modern times in the "partocracy." Does he really assume that the unsympathetic bureaucracy descended on us by parachute? No, it evolved out of its own material. Our fathers and grandfathers must not be considered evil-doers. Let us look at ourselves. And we will see that should a different current fanatic servant of the Dream come to power, it would be able to propose nothing but some other new "ocracy."

And here is another utopia: hold liable or "simply" institute criminal proceedings against all who yesterday stood at the helm of power. But tell me where is it more important now to have a good investigator: at the apartment of some "has-been" (or one who will become such tomorrow naturally, with the introduction of a multiparty system?) or would it be in Sumgait, Fergana?

In reflecting on the destructiveness of this illusion, I recall the profound parable of F. Iskander which provides a great deal for understanding the current day. An unhappy slave sat in chains for many years, at the mercy of his bloody enemy. But he was finally able to saw through the chain. Do you think that the poor man ran off to liberty? No. He waited for the return of his torturer and perished with him in a fatal clash. The writer's conclusion is wise: a slave does not want liberty, rather he wishes to revenge the one who has enslaved him.

At present, virtually each of us is in the position of this freed slave. And even a fragment of the tether on the neck is seemingly still hanging there.... It is essential to decide whether we will turn all our energies into revenge and destruction? And if we do so, will we not fall in this clash?

...The command system against which Gdlyan is waging war out of inertia has kept many features of its deformity. But with each passing month, day and hour they are becoming less and less. In overemphasizing the vestiges of these deformities, Gdlyan and his supporters actually are standing on the path of those tectonic shifts which have already commenced in society.

The dispute over the rightness or wrongness of Gdlyan is the eternal dispute of ends and means.

What is the future of the "phenomenon?" This depends largely upon the awareness of millions of the true value of that idea which Gdlyan serves. For now in the mind of the masses he has been fused with this idea and here lie the advantages of his position.

One must not be particularly surprised at the invulnerability of the "real" Gdlyan. Over the period of 70 years we have created idol after idol. And so we have produced a man with a mythological awareness. To some degree he has lost the eternal moral criteria and now judges his heroes, true and false, from that idea which they represent. Why not lie, why not break the law and commit a crime, if a fine, noble idea demands this?

I wish all the best to the real Telman Gdlyan, a completely sympathetic persons with sad eyes. Albeit because I do not know him.

For Gdlyan's utopia I wish rapid unmasking since I consider it extremely dangerous. If we again entrust our fate to the hands of idols, they will again bring new tyranny and new violence into our lives. And then we will follow the well-known path of hero—idol—dictator....

MVD 1989 Press Center Crime Report

90UN13544 Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON
in Russian No 2, Feb 90 pp 21-24

[Article by Internal Service Colonel B. Mikhaylov, candidate of juridical sciences: "The USSR MVD Press Center Comments"]

[Text] In ten months last year Internal Affairs and procuracy authorities recorded 1,998,881 crimes, which is 34.1 percent greater than during the same period last year.

As before, there has been an increase in crimes against personal, state and social property, and encroachments on the citizens' health and lives. These crimes comprised 57.8 percent of the total.

In all, 1,732,189 crimes were recorded in the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR and Kazakhstan, or 87.1 percent of all crimes in the country. And a most unfavorable crime situation has taken shape in Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Tuva ASSR, the Maritime Kray and Tyumen Oblast.

The situation remains complex on the streets and in squares, parks and public gardens in the Estonian, Lithuanian and Kazakh SSR; in Mary ASSR; in Rostov and Ulyanovsk Oblasts; and in Moscow.

Along with the increase in crimes of various kinds, there are other alarming trends in its dynamic as well. Thus, the number of crimes recorded in the sphere of economics continues to decline. Practical experience in the battle with crime confirms that such a decline is a result of reduced activity by Internal Affairs organs.

The **increase in serious crimes** is especially disturbing: The growth rate of serious crime continues to outstrip the growth rate in crime as a whole; out of 254,126 crimes recorded last October, 15 percent were serious. And there was significant increase in the number of thefts (80.5 percent) and robbery-assault cases (77.9 percent).

The growth of **property crimes** has put us on our guard. Their share in the overall crime rate amounts to 57.8 percent; last year the growth rate was 53.6 percent. The highest growth rates for crimes in this group are noted in the Estonian, Lithuanian, Turkmen and Kirghiz SSR; in the Karelian ASSR; and in Gorkiy, Rostov and Kemerovo Oblasts.

So-called **economic crime** occupies a special place in the overall crime picture. Analysis shows that of the total number of crimes in the given group, embezzlement of state or social property committed by means of misappropriation, waste or misuse of one's official position comprises 32.1 percent; speculation, 17.7 percent; embezzlement of state or social property committed by means of larceny, 8.1 percent; and minor embezzlement of state and social property—5.0 percent.

Last year, as a result of conducting search operations, BKhSS [Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] authorities exposed organized groups of plunderers which committed embezzlement in the agro-industrial complex of the Azerbaijan, Armenian and Tajik SSR and in Dagestan ASSR and Belgorod Oblast; in construction and in the automotive industry of the Lithuanian and Uzbek SSR, the Yakut ASSR, and Kuybyshev Oblast; and in light industry and domestic services to the populace in Turkmen and Latvian SSR and Rostov Oblast, and in a number of other regions.

The struggle with speculation has been stepped up. This year, BKhSS agents have cut off 36,000 attempts at criminally-punishable speculation.

The amount of theft of state and social property committed by officials at enterprises, organizations and institutions has grown by 15.4 percent

Street crime is a cause of serious anxiety among the citizens. The number of crimes committed on the streets and in squares, parks and public gardens amounts to 12 percent of all recorded crime.

Theft of state-owned means of transport has increased markedly (158 percent).

The growth rate remains high for personal property theft (88.5 percent), robberies (99 percent) and assault on citizens by robbers. According to data of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Crime Investigation, every eighth homicide, every fourth severe physical assault, every other theft, and every third robbery—still takes place on the street.

Of all street crimes, 77.3 percent were committed on the territory of the RSFSR and the Ukraine.

This year **crime in transportation** has declined somewhat. In spite of an increase in the absolute number of crimes committed in transportation, their proportion in the overall crime picture has declined by 0.6 percent, and amounted to 3.9 percent.

Very frequently transportation crimes are committed by persons directly associated with making up the shipments and transporting economic goods.

For ten months in 1989, Internal Affairs authorities exposed 1,013,509 persons committing crimes. Of these, 15 percent were—women. People 14-15 years old comprised 4.5 percent, and the 16-17 age group was responsible for 11.1 percent; 22.9 percent had committed crimes before.

At the time they committed crimes, 336,158 persons were in a state of **alcoholic intoxication**, which accounted for 33.2 percent of all those apprehended. Of the total number of people committing crimes, 607,477 persons (59.9 percent) were held criminally liable, while 406,032 were not prosecuted in connection with remanding them to a comrades' court on bail and for other reasons. All of society's efforts are needed in the battle with crime. Therefore, it was not by chance that the question of the struggle with organized crime was discussed at the Second Congress of People's Deputies. We will be examining that problem in our next commentary.

Internal Affairs authorities, in conjunction with the KGB, the procuracy and organs of justice bear the principal burden in the struggle with crime. The USSR MVD is taking decisive measures to improve the service's activities. A great deal of attention is being devoted to the police **precinct inspector service**. Precinct [uchastkovyy] police inspectors are an important component in the preventive service which was established in the system of Internal Affairs organs in February 1989. Nearly six million citizens are within their sphere of influence; which means 70-80 people per precinct-inspector are subject to preventive influence. This includes 1.5 million people released from places of incarceration or removed from the rolls of the special [police] superintendent; 612,000 convicted persons whose punishment does not involve incarceration; 2.2 million who have abused alcoholic beverages; 120,000 narcotics addicts; 104,000 parasites; 920,000 troubled

juveniles; and 203,000 mentally ill persons with aggressive tendencies. Additionally, a precinct inspector must systematically mix with the active public, with the so-called law-abiding citizens whose rights and interests he is sworn to protect. A precinct inspector can cope with such a colossal workload only by means of optimal organization of his work, continuous posting to the precinct he serves, and concentrating efforts on preventive work with individuals.

In according with existing normative acts, the basic tasks of a precinct police inspector include participating in preserving law and order on the territory he serves (and in rural areas, its organization as well); and preventing and exposing crimes (in rural areas, basically carrying out these tasks independently).

Recently a great deal of attention has been devoted to measures for further improving the work of precinct police inspectors and in improving their material support—there has been noticeably increased attention to this category of Internal Affairs official. Their numbers have increased by 13.4 percent. At the present time they amount to 67,000 persons. The qualitative make-up of precinct inspectors has improved as well. Among them 23.6 percent are specialists with higher education; 61.5 percent are lawyers; and 43 percent are CPSU members. The professional nucleus has become stronger: 38 percent have five or more years of service. Positive achievements have been made in creating the necessary working and living conditions for the precinct inspectors. In 1988 they were allocated 4,600 apartments and separate houses, 5,800 offices, and almost 3,400 vehicles, including 2,400 at the expense of agro-industrial facilities. The service norms according to population figures per precinct inspector have been reduced: in urban areas—up to 5,000 people, and in the rural areas—up to 4,000 people.

Certain positive results have been achieved in the practical affairs of these officials. In 3,600 precincts there have been no crimes along the lines of criminal investigation; and in 12,456, the crime growth-rate has stopped, or a reduction has been noted.

Precinct inspectors are enjoying increased prestige among the populace. This year for example, Precinct Inspector F.I. Yegorov of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon Internal Affairs Department was transferred to another precinct in connection with his appointment to the post of senior precinct inspector. A few days later, the Oblast Internal Affairs Administration received a collective statement from residents of his previous precinct, with a request to send Yegorov back. At the same time they pointed out that, "This is the best precinct inspector in the last 20 years, and the kind that the people want to see."

However, many problems have accumulated in the work of precinct inspectors. Here are only the most basic ones:

Individual preventive work is not given priority as the principal task of a precinct inspector on the territory he serves.

The qualitative make-up of precinct inspector cadres has not been established in accordance with current requirements and conditions of service. Nearly 40 percent of them do not have a legal education; almost 11 percent have only general secondary education; more than 43 percent have less than three years' experience; and cadre turnover is over 6.0 percent of the total number.

Supply of technical equipment to precinct inspectors remains poor, especially for those working in rural areas. Housing has been provided for 83 percent, which means that 12,500 precinct inspectors have none; only half of the precinct inspectors have a home telephone; not more than 14 percent of the precinct inspectors have official motor transportation; the requirement for snow vehicles (where that is appropriate) is only one-third satisfied; and the requirement for radio stations—by 16 percent.

The volume and nature of the tasks carried out by precinct inspectors do not coincide with their official authority. A precinct inspector, for example, in questions of applying administrative law which he encounters every day in the course of his official obligations, is not even given the rights that a GAI [State Automobile Inspectorate] policeman on highway patrol service has (a fine or a warning ticket).

Of course, the aforementioned and certain other unregulated questions have a negative effect on the precinct inspectors' work results, and above all along the lines of individual preventive work, and on the state of socialist legality in their activities. While there has been a certain reduction in violations of the law on the part of precinct inspectors, in nine months last year their overall number remains significant—1,043. The number of crimes concealed from the record and illegal establishment of administrative surveillance has grown (by 5.9 percent). And a large number of violations (655) of the norms of criminal-procedure legislation has occurred.

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Commentary on USSR MVD Crime Report

90UN1675A Moscow CHELOVEK I ZAKON
in Russian No 4, Apr 90 pp 20-22

[Article by Colonel of Internal Service B. Mikhaylov, candidate of legal sciences: "USSR MVD Press Center Comments"]

[Text] The 2nd Session of the Congress of People's Deputies specially considered the question of intensifying the fight against organized crime, after listening to reports given by V. Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs, and USSR General Procurator A. Sukharev.

The Congress adopted a corresponding decree that defined the organizational and legal measures to intensify the fight against that negative phenomenon. **Today we are commenting on the statistical data that characterizes the role played by the BKHS [Combatting the**

Embezzlement of Social Property and Speculation] subdivisions and the investigative apparatus, and their contribution to locating and exposing organized criminal groups.

It is well known that one of the most important aspects of the fight against organized crime is the buildup of efforts to stop crimes in the economic sphere. Every year the law-enforcement agencies locate 260,000-280,000 such crimes, expose up to 300,000 persons who have committed them, and the total amount of established losses exceeds 250 million rubles. Practically every more or less large-scale theft or official or economic crime contains elements indicating its connection with organized crime.

The crimes that have become most widespread among the economic crimes are **thefts of state and social property**, which are committed by means of misappropriation, embezzlement, or malfeasance. Their share in the structure of economic crime is as much as 30-35 percent.

Last year law-enforcement agencies stopped large-scale camouflaged thefts in the agricultural complex, construction, the automotive and light industry, trade, everyday services, and other branches of the national economy in practically all regions of the country.

There has been an alarming rise in the level of organization among the thieves, and their use of interregional ties for criminal purposes. Every fifth person engaged in thefts as a member of criminal groups.

Large-scale thefts are accompanied by instances of bribery. For example, in Kazakhstan law-enforcement agencies exposed a group of official and materially responsible persons who had engaged in thefts for a number of years. They had falsified documents pertaining to the harvesting of raw cotton and the turning over of it for processing. The total amount of thefts and bribes constituted approximately 3 million rubles.

A problem that is becoming increasingly acute is the problem of fighting speculation. Under conditions of the increasingly unsatisfactory state of consumer demand, the scope of speculation is taking on a threatening nature. Despite the changes in legislation, in conformity with which almost one-third of the exposed instances of speculation have been put into the category of administrative violations, the number of criminal acts of this type has remained practically unchanged. More than 40,000 such instances have been registered, which is only 0.9 percent less than in 1988.

The level of organization among the speculators has been rising. There has been a division of the spheres of their operation. Any flaws in the distribution mechanism are actively used to extract profit. Dangerous organized groupings of speculators engaging in the resale of large-scale consignments of food products and manufactured commodities have been exposed in Moscow, the Baltic republics, the trans-Caucasus, the Ukraine, Stavropol Kray, and Omsk, Kemerovo, and other oblasts of

RSFSR. Eight thousand persons, from whom commodities and valuables with a total value of more than 15 million rubles were confiscated, were brought to criminal responsibility for having committed major speculative transactions.

The steps being taken in conformity with the 4 August 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet decree have made it possible to increase the activity rate of the BKhSS apparatus in fighting manifestations of organized crime. During August-November 1989, as compared with a similar period in 1988, the number of exposed thefts in large-scale or especially large-scale amounts increased by 23.5 percent, and instances of bribery by 4.4 percent.

At the same time the concentration of the basic forces of the BKhSS service in these areas, a concentration accompanied by the assignment of some of the workers to take part in measures to maintain public law and order during mass rallies, demonstrations, and interethnic conflicts, made it impossible to guarantee an offensive along the entire front of the fight against economic crime. The total number of crimes discovered in the economic sphere dropped somewhat.

The effectiveness of the struggle is being held back by the existence of other causes also. They include the complicated variations in the practice of application of the law, the imperfection of the criminal and criminal-trial legislation, and the poor rate at which the operational services are being technically supplied. There is also a need to improve the practical activities of the BKhSS apparatus.

The investigation of criminal cases that are linked with organized crime is becoming one of the priority areas in the activities of the MVD investigative apparatus. In June 1989 specialization in investigating such cases was introduced. V. Bakatin's report at the Congress mentioned the number of investigators (1700) who specialize in investigating the most complicated crimes committed by organized groups. The department of USSR MVD GSU [State Investigation Administration] that was created in conformity with that decree, working jointly with the Administration to Fight Organized Crime, located a broadly extended group of "wheeler and dealer" thieves in various cooperatives and pseudo-cooperatives (Tellur, Tayfun-2, and a number of others). That matter was also mentioned at the Congress, inasmuch as it is typical of the present situation. By using the Law Governing the Cooperative System in the USSR, which authorizes cooperative members to make settlements in cash without any limitation of the total amount of payments, the "wheelers and dealers" in the shady economy, with the aid of bribing bank workers, pump noncash funds (including bank credit) into cash funds. This practice creates favorable conditions for various abuses and undermines the foundations of the country's financial and credit system.

It is not accidental that the Congress' resolution concerning N. Ryzhkov's report mentions among the very important measures to improve the financial situation

and to stabilize monetary circulation the need to stop the flow of money from noncash circulation into cash circulation.

This department, jointly with the Administration to Fight Organized Crime, is investigating a case of theft of cognac in especially large-scale amounts at two plants in Azerbaijan and its sale in Saratov Oblast.

The activities of specialized investigational operations groups are being extended in the outlying areas. The Investigative Administration of Kirghiz SSR MVD, in close interaction with the department to fight organized crime, investigated and brought to court a criminal case accusing Ismailov of counterfeiting; he had previously been sentenced several times as a dangerous repeat offender, and had been working prior to his arrest in the restoration shops of the republic's ministry of culture. Counterfeit 250-ruble denominations were confiscated from him, together with plates, inks, paper, instruments, and devices for making them.

During the investigation of an interregional case involving the theft of allocatable construction materials, the Investigative Administration of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of the Tashkent City Ispolkom established that stolen property is being sold under cover of the cooperatives. The state has suffered damages totaling 114,000 rubles.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is taking additional steps to increase the professional competency of its employees and to develop modern means and methods of locating and investigating organized crimes and new tactical forms and types of interaction among the investigative agencies, operational apparatuses, and the subdivisions of experts in criminal matters.

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KGB on Civil Disturbances in Tajikistan

90US0723A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 1

[Open letter by the KGB of the Tajik SSR: "Open Letter from the Members of the KGB of the Tajik SSR to Labor Collectives, Public Organizations, and All Workers of the Republic"]

[Text] Dear Comrades! Members of the Committee for State Security of Tajikistan express serious concern regarding the political situation that has taken shape in the republic. We share the feelings of pain and grief concerning the tragic events that took place in Dushanbe on 12-14 February of this year, when blood was shed and considerable economic and moral damage was inflicted. This led to a further increase in social and interethnic tension. Many thousands of people lost peace of mind and confidence in tomorrow and succumbed to panic.

The preliminary investigation being conducted by the procuracy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the republic on a number of criminal cases makes it possible to state that the bloody drama that was played out on the streets of the city was undoubtedly provoked by individuals using mock-perestroika slogans as a cover and who used the far-fetched problem of "Armenian refugees" in this game. Corrupted and criminal elements acting in union with a number of nationalistically inclined leaders and individuals skillfully speculating on the religious feelings of the believers in the republic.

From the very first moment we were directly involved in stabilizing the situation. In close cooperation with agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the procuracy, KGB members are exposing the inspirers, organizers, and participants in the mass disorders, who tried to use the crowd element to seize power. Not a single one of them should escape just retribution, regardless of the position held! This is our firm and unanimous position.

Soberly assessing the situation that is taking shape, we are accentuating the public's attention on the danger that comes from the increase in anti-socialist, religious-extremist, and nationalistic moods. The situation is exacerbated by the subversive activities of the armed Afghan opposition, trying, on assignment of the enemy's special agencies, to initiate hostile manifestations among the inhabitants of the republic.

The members of the KGB emphasize that we can effectively carry out the tasks of protecting the interests of the people, security of the state, and perestroika only in close cooperation with and with the support of all citizens, labor collectives, and public organizations. New relations are being established with the population. We thank you for the assistance given and for the joint work of the republic's patriots: the soberminded portion of the intelligentsia, the working class, and soldier-internationalists who actively took part in forming self-defense detachments, among whose ranks representatives of various nationalities joined. It is together with these forces and soldiers of the Soviet Army that a rebuff was given to the pogrom-makers and the criminal elements. As a result, the population of Dushanbe felt its protection and confidence in its forces.

We decisively reject recent attempts to discredit the Soviet Army, KGB organs, and other law enforcement institutions. Hidden behind the attacks on law enforcement bodies is the desire to stop perestroika.

The elections of people's deputies of Tajikistan that took place showed that there now really exists in the republic a considerable potential for healthy forces. It is around them that everyone should unite and carry out creative activities. We support the decision of the extraordinary plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee of Tajikistan; however, we urge the leadership to display more decisiveness in putting order and consistency in resolving urgent social and economic problems.

Members of the KGB are acting and will act in the interests of the people, recognizing only the supremacy of the law. We firmly assure working people that we see our duty to the homeland to be activities under the leadership of the supreme bodies of Soviet power—the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of the Tajik SSR. In the future we will continue the relentless fight against anti-socialist and other destructive elements.

Tajik Provisional Crime Committee on Local Militia Experiment

90US0723B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 1

[TadzhikTA report: "Meeting of the Provisional Committee"]

[Text] A meeting of the republic's Provisional Crime Committee was held on 28 February. In conditions of the state of emergency and curfew in Dushanbe, it examined a very important and topical question: on creating a local militia in the republic's capital as an experiment.

Reports on this issue were given at the committee meeting by M.M. Ikramov, chairman of the executive committee [ispolkom] of the Dushanbe City Soviet of People's Deputies, and A. Rakhmonov, chief of the Dushanbe City Internal Affairs Administration.

It was noted in particular that the ispolkom of the City Soviet of People's Deputies and internal affairs agencies of the city have done a considerable amount of preparatory work to create a local militia under the ispolkom of the Dushanbe City Soviet. Financing sources have already been identified—enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the capital. The first deductions for the newly created local militia have already begun coming in. Internal affairs agencies are selecting personnel. They basically will be young people under the age of 30 and primarily residents of Dushanbe.

The following people took part in the discussions: N.Kh. Khuvaydullayev, chairman of the Draft Bills Commission of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; A. Khaydarov, chairman of the Dushanbe City Soviet of People's Deputies; R.N. Nurov, head of the Legal Department of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; N.M. Shentsev, first deputy minister of internal affairs of the Tajik SSR; and T.N. Babayev, department chief of the Tajik SSR Procuracy.

The republic Interim Crime Commission took into consideration the reports by M.M. Ikramov, chairman of the ispolkom of the Dushanbe City Soviet of People's Deputies, and A. Rakhmonov, chief of the city Internal Affairs Administration, and proposed accelerating the creation of the first local militia detachments so they could begin performing patrol and sentry duty in early April.

G.P. Pallayev, chairman of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, conducted the meeting.

Deputy Procurator on Uzbekistan's Battle with Organized Crime

90US0676A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Ibragim Chitakov, acting deputy republic procurator and senior judicial advisor, by correspondent Yevgeniy Lamikhovoy: "Cheap Justice Costs Us Dearly"; date and place not given]

[Text] Organized crime and the struggle with it is the topic of our conversation with Acting Deputy Republic Procurator, Senior Judicial Advisor Ibragim Chitakov, and our correspondent Yevgeniy Lamikhovoy.

[Correspondent] For ten years now, crime has been on the rise in the republic. And it is becoming more and more organized. How did it happen that such a situation has come to pass in our republic?

[Chitakov] Organized crime made itself known on the territory of the republic as early as the late 1970's. Even then, periodically, bandit formations were being "caught", the machinations of sharp operators were being exposed, and bribe-takers were being convicted. But in the early 1980's organized crime began to take on new and extremely dangerous qualities.

Consolidation of the criminal element took place on an inter-regional and inter-branch basis; and corruption flourished, which allowed criminals to take advantage of the apparatus of power and administration for their own ends, and to "get their hands on" the law-enforcement organs. The increasingly negative trends in the economy, especially in cotton farming, and the general atmosphere of mismanagement, red tape, and abuse of power provided the nourishing medium for organized crime.

[Correspondent] Specialists affirm that the "budget" of criminal organizations amounts to fabulous sums, and that the "godfathers" of local Mafias themselves possess fortunes of almost a million. Where do the criminal organizations get such amounts?

[Chitakov] You are absolutely right. As noted recently at the Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum, 45 percent of the populace in the republic lives below the poverty line; at the same time, organized crime possesses funds amounting to tens of millions. The basic source of their income is—the shadow economy. In the recent past, representatives of criminal gangs had taken control of underground shops. Of late they have been skillfully taking advantage of the cooperative movement. Analysis of the state of affairs in the cooperatives, and study of cases show that along with the honest workers in cooperative trade there are numerous ex-convicts who have maintained their ties with criminal groups. Following their trade in the cooperative field, they strive to legalize their incomes. According to certain data, over 100

underground millionaires and more than 500 "professionals" in Uzbekistan are doing everything they can to legalize their underground business and to "launder" the money.

[Correspondent] Who are the members of these criminal clans? How do they form relationships within the criminal groups?

[Chitakov] I'll cite some of the most typical examples. The chiefs of the criminal groups come from representatives of the criminal elite, who organize the illegal activities but do not as a rule themselves take part in commission of specific crimes. The groups' income accumulates from the profits of the shadow economy and dealings associated with narcotics, games of chance, rackets, prostitution, theft, swindling and so on. There are many ex-convicts among the members of the criminal groups. Last year republic law-enforcement organs exposed 1,640 criminal groups, including two bands and 140 organized groupings. They brought together a cast of more than 5,000, including three "criminals in the law," more than 30 criminal "authorities," 137 criminals-on-tour, and many well-trained "battlers." One in five persons taking part in these groups had been previously convicted.

Relations within a criminal group are dictated by "thieves' laws." A strict hierarchy and discipline reign within the group. Members of the group receive wages only "for business," that is, for committing a crime. An "obshchak," a thieves' bank, is formed from the money acquired by illegal means. Funds are withdrawn from this bank for the support of people in places of deprivation of freedom, for payments to their families, and for bribing certain responsible officials.

[Correspondent] The picture is not just depressing; it's shocking. It's hard to believe one can resist such a ponderous machine. What measures are republic law-enforcement officials taking to struggle with organized crime?

[Chitakov] In order for you to understand the scope of the phenomenon of which we are speaking, I'll cite a few more figures. Last year crime in the republic grew by 20 percent, and in certain oblasts it has taken on threatening dimensions. In Fergana Oblast, for example, 1.5 times more crimes were recorded than the year-before-last. There has been a significant increase in the number of crimes committed in Samarkand, Kashka-Darya and Tashkent Oblasts, and in the city of Tashkent. And there has been an increase in the most severe types of crimes. Moreover, a significant part of them are attributed to organized criminal groups.

According to data from Uzbek SSR MVD, there are several dozen criminal clans operating on republic territory now, each of which unites several organized criminal groups. The very largest of them are operating in the capital and in the capital oblast, in the Fergana Valley, and in the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara. Over the

last three years republic law-enforcement organs neutralized 20 bandit formations, and cut off the activity of 800 organized criminal groups. They were accountable for over 7,200 crimes—murders, rapes, robberies...

All this is the result of the operation of quite a well-tuned mechanism, which was set up in the republic to counter organized crime. Unlike internal affairs officials from other regions, our employees, and especially those from the Uzbekistan MVD, have a certain amount of experience in the struggle with this evil.

[Correspondent] What form of organized crime is most widespread?

[Chitakov] Beyond a doubt, the rackets. The best of the Criminal Investigation Forces has been rushed into the struggle with them. Recently, state security organs have been rendering significant assistance as well.

Recently a group of "touring" racketeers was exposed in Tashkent Oblast. Leader of the group is Citizen Ordzhonikidze. It consisted of dozens of trained young people (among whom there were Masters of Sport), armed with sawed-off firearms. The group had its own informants and would carry out assaults on living quarters, accumulating valuables worth tens and hundreds of thousands of rubles. During their arrest the criminals put up an armed struggle, and fatally wounded V. Shestak, deputy chief of the Chirchik Internal Affairs Department.

[Correspondent] Law enforcement organs have to deal with powerful, well-armed criminal gangs. And what kind of technical equipment do the internal affairs units have, with which to resist the criminals?

[Chitakov] You have raised a painful question. Alas, neither the number of people nor the assets allocated for the struggle with organized crime correspond to the scale of the phenomenon with which we must struggle. The staff of a special subdivision for the struggle with organized crime recently set up at the Criminal Investigation Administration does not have all that many employees. There are not enough vehicles with such "minor details" as communications equipment. Vehicles dispatched on operational calls are allocated a miserly amount of gasoline. And just look at what the investigators have to deal with—judge for yourselves: last year 40 firearms and 88 knives were confiscated from criminal groups, as well as 42 automobiles. Communications monitoring devices, computer equipment, and other devices figure in their affairs in the form of evidence. I will tell you as a professional who has worked for the law-enforcement organs for over 15 years: Cheap justice costs us too much.

The problem of technical equipage of special MVD subunits has another aspect as well—a legal one. To this day the question has not been resolved on the use as evidence in legal-investigative practice of data acquired by operational means (film and video tapes, photographs, and recordings of telephone conversations made

with the aid of eavesdropping equipment, and so on). Please understand me correctly: I am not in favor of violating the law; but I am in favor of such measures which would promote strengthening the struggle with organized crime.

[Correspondent] Ibragim Romanovich, is it a coincidence that people turn up in the criminal groups who have served out their sentences in the colonies? Would it not be proper to re-examine the system for keeping the convicts in the ITU [Corrective Labor Administration]?

[Chitakov] Of course, it is no coincidence. The ITU system is now being subjected to justifiable criticism. If one examines it from the point of view of putting a halt to "recruitment" of prisoners into criminal groups, then one must resort to decisive restructuring. In my view, persons not amenable to correction should be strictly isolated from those convicts capable of returning to a normal life. The time has come to organize colonies for persons who have not taken the path to correction. A number of European countries already have such experience with respect to especially dangerous criminals.

One must also not forget about the fact that another "nourishing medium" for criminal groups are people who lead a parasitic lifestyle—bums, drug addicts, drunkards and prostitutes. Society can protect itself from these people drawing them into criminal acts by one means—establishing conditions for their social rehabilitation. At the state level, we must resolve questions associated with their ability to work, with treatment, with furnishing them housing, and construction of homes for the elderly.

[Correspondent] It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that the state services and society as a whole are to blame for the flourishing of many kinds of criminal activity.

[Chitakov] Of course. Let's take for example a type of "home industry" as auto theft. All the major cities in the republic are literally overwhelmed with this calamity. The pattern of the crime is like this: Someone's personal auto is stolen. After a few days, the doorbell rings at the owner's house, and the owner is given a proposition, to receive his car back in exchange for certain recompense (5-6,000 rubles). Since the price for a vehicle on the "black market" is several times higher, the owner as a rule agrees to the deal. Investigation of such crimes requires significant forces and means. This industry can be undermined in one way—by expanding the construction of garages, and guarded parking places. But the local authorities are in no hurry to take up this bothersome matter.

One could say the very same thing about the institutions at which weapons and ammunition are stored. Military units, military academic institutions and DOSAAF detachments are becoming objects of especially rapt attention by criminals. Until such time as we are assured control over storage of weapons, criminal elements will take advantage of this source of arms.

[Correspondent] At which academic institutions are officials of law-enforcement organs trained to take up the struggle with organized crime?

[Chitakov] Unfortunately, neither the legal faculty nor the militia schools are devoting proper attention to training such specialists. To this day, in certain rayons of the republic one encounters unprofessionalism and incompetence in officials of the criminal investigation branch, investigators and procurators.

It seems to me that special courses should be established republic-wide to raise the professional level of the officials whose activities are associated with protecting the rights and legal interests of the citizens.

[Correspondent] Republic law-enforcement organs are faced with an extremely complex problem—withstanding well-organized criminal groups. One would like to think that the force would be with you.

Tasks for Expanding Function of Courts Examined

90UN1344A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA
in Russian No 4, Feb 90 (signed to press 5 Feb 90) pp 2-4

[Article by Yu. Severin, RSFSR first deputy minister of justice: "Organizational Guarantees of the Courts' Activities Must Be Raised to the Level Required by the Juridical-Legal System!"]

[Text] The concept of restructuring the courts which was formulated during the course of perestroika has placed at the center of attention the task of guaranteeing their genuine independence, as well as enhancing their role and prestige within the system of state organs. A court which is independent—one which possesses high authority and the necessary powers—is the most important condition or prerequisite for constructing a state based on the rule of law; such a state grants each citizen and the society as a whole a genuine juridical protection of their rights and interests. During the course of implementing the juridical-legal reform the serious foundations have been laid for imparting these qualities to our system of justice. As a result of the changes which have been made in the USSR Constitution and the adoption of the Law on the Status of Judges, a new procedure for electing judges has been introduced, the social importance of the judicial profession has been elevated, and such attributes of the judicial system as independence, collegiality, and other guarantees of legality have been strengthened.

The most important link in the reform being carried out is the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Basic Legislation on the Judicial System, which contains the solution to the cardinal problems of enhancing the court's role and importance in society. It renovates the tasks of the juridical system, provides for the possibility

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of creating a court of jurors, examines certain specific categories of cases within an expanded body of people's assessors, and introduces the institution of judges concerned with administrative and executive procedures. This Basic Legislation seriously expands the guarantees of protection or defense at a preliminary investigation; they also equalize the rights of participants in a trial at a court session.

Disputes have taken place over a number of years concerning the organizational direction or guidance of the courts by the Ministry of Justice. With the adoption of the new legislative act, this important problem has also obtained its own solution. The duties of providing organizational guarantees for the courts' activities in accordance with Art. 22 of the Basic Legislation on the Judicial System have been assigned to the USSR Ministry of Justice, the justice ministries of the union-level and autonomous republics, and the justice organs in the localities. The principal idea and intent of this construct, as confirmed by the new law, is that exercising broad, organizational functions has been assigned to the extrajudicial apparatus, whereas the courts have been focused on procedural activities—trying cases and monitoring the correctness of the verdicts rendered in them.

Such an approach stems from a dual task—to upgrade the effectiveness of organizational guarantees for the judicial system and, at the same time, to consistently observe the principle of the courts' independence. One of the additional guarantees of their independence is that the courts have been freed from powers and tasks inappropriate for them and unconnected with the exercise of justice. In turn, the organizational guarantees of the courts' activities by the justice organs enables the courts to specialize in this important sector, as well as to concentrate their attention and efforts upon it. Moreover, the powers of the justice organs pertain solely to the organizational, non-procedural work in the courts, and do not affect the courts' activities with regard to the actual trying of criminal or civil cases, nor do they affect the trend of judicial practice. The Basic Legislation on the Judicial System establishes that the organs of justice must assist the courts in carrying out their tasks, while strictly observing the principle of independence. This means non-interference in the essence of specific verdicts rendered by the courts, in procedural activities exercised by them, as well as in formulating judicial practice.

The range of non-procedural, organizational activities guaranteeing the exercise of judicial functions is extremely broad. This concept includes virtually everything not directly connected with trying criminal or civil cases, sentencing or rendering verdicts, but which is supposed to guarantee justice by organizational means. These activities encompass solving problems of creating and setting up courts and the personnel staffs of judges in connection with the regularly occurring changes in the administrative-territorial structure and the variations in the load, multi-faceted personnel work—selection of candidates for judicial posts, participation in organizing

the elections of judges and people's assessors, and conducting training. They include organizing receiving the public, examining statements and complaints, which are often the bases for trying criminal or civil cases, guaranteeing the timely handling of cases, office work, and keeping legal materials and informational data in the proper order. Dependent on organizing cases in the courts are: whether appeals will be timely regarding sentences of persons convicted, fines assessed, confiscation of property, restitution of damages caused by crimes, return to work of an honest worker wrongly imprisoned, and allotting an apartment to a citizen illegally deprived of living space.

During just a year the RSFSR Ministry of Justice examined about 20,000 complaints of various omissions in the courts' non-procedural activities, including violations of the procedure for receiving the public, refusal without cause to try civil cases, red tape in court trials, improper execution of court verdicts. A considerable number of these complaints were well-founded. For example, as a result of poor work organization in the Kislovodsk People's Court and the Stavropolskiy Kray Court, a certain civil case was not correctly decided for six years, and R. Bazenkova could not implement her right to housing. While still a minor, she was forced out of her deceased father's apartment by her stepmother, and for many years she had to seek shelter with distant relatives under crowded conditions. She could not study and, as a result, was unable to secure a job. The reason was that the case had been assigned to judges who were untrained to try this type of material; preparation of the case for trial was incomplete; its progress was not monitored, and, as a result it lay dormant rather than being tried. None of these circumstances are encompassed by the procedural legislation, and it is completely natural that they remained outside the attention of the higher courts, which checked out this case on more than one occasion. Work on checking out "non-procedural" complaints and eliminating the causes which give rise to them are handled, as a rule, in an unorganized manner, one which is insufficiently responsible for the case assigned; this work requires more effort and persistence.

The courts are extremely busy with carrying out the following non-trial activities: organizing traveling court sessions and performing partial determinations, conducting court statistics, summarizing court practice and utilizing it for the purpose of improving its own work and preventing violations of the law, propagandizing the law, rendering aid to comrades' courts, training people's assessors, and coordinating matters with other law-enforcement organs. Likewise of no small importance is the matter of improving the courts' material-and-technical working conditions, as well as introducing present-day equipment into their activities.

In each court the work concerned with exercising a wide range of organizational duties is directed by the presidents of the courts, whereas in the higher courts this is also done by the presidiums. The presidents and presidiums of the courts carry out this work not as judges or as

judicial instances, but rather as officials and collegial organs engaged in directing the organization of work within their own institutions. And neither the organizational activity itself nor its direction nor the direction of any kind of monitoring procedures are encompassed or directed by any higher courts. But this work cannot be conducted in a decentralized manner. There can be no vacuum here. And, therefore, just as before, it has been assigned to those organs of justice which specialize in solving the organizational-legal problems of our life.

The entrance of the juridical-legal reform upon the decisive phase and the adoption by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Basic Legislation on the Judicial System dictate the need for serious changes in the organizational guarantees of justice, measuring up to the requirements of the times. It is important to overcome pro forms, bureaucratic phenomena in organizational activity, to reorient it with a very detailed supervision of the courts and making an inventory of the shortcomings in carrying out measures aimed at attaining genuine results, ones which would help to restructure the judicial system. The path to this goal has been opened up, in particular, by the new legal statutes, which provide for the performance of several organizational functions with a reliance on the principle of the courts' self-government—conferences and qualifications collegiums of judges. Likewise important are other measures with regard to democratizing the operating methods of the justice organs with regard to the organizational guaranteeing of the courts' activities, eliminating bureaucratic raids from this matter, strengthening the support for judicial staff personnel, the presidents of the courts and the presidiums of the oblast courts, kray courts and Supreme Courts of the autonomous republics.

The forms and methods of the activities of the justice organs must be strictly dependent upon what specific functions they are performing. If, for example, it is a matter of organizing the courts or conducting elections, then proposals are worked out for solution in the Soviets of People's Deputies; if it concerns diverse matters of organizing the work of the courts, then what is employed is the familiarization, dissemination of positive or favorable experience, the conduct of various forms of training and collective critiques; if it is a matter pertaining to organizing the work of the judicial executives, then use is made of the entire complex of measures of direction, including checkups and direct, authoritative directives. Such a detailed regulation of operating forms and methods is nothing short of a finely drawn borderline, ensuring a strict dosing out of the powers to be used with regard to organizationally guaranteeing the work of the courts, depending upon the section of judicial activity to be affected. In the final analysis, this is one of the important guarantees which is supposed to exclude the interference of the justice organs in the exercise of justice.

In connection with the adoption of the Basic Legislation on the Judicial System, several officials have stated the

opinion that this legislative act has substantially narrowed down the competency of the justice organs in relation to the courts. Those who adhere to this point of view consider that, except for the execution of judicial decisions, the handling of statistics, developing and implementing measures aimed at strengthening the independence of judges, all the other duties which previously fell under the organizational competency of the courts have not been supposedly taken away from them. This is based upon the fact that other operational trends are not enumerated in the Basic Legislation.

It seems to me that such a point of view has no grounds in this law. Previously, the justice organs used to engage in all the lines of organizational activity, including the determination of the general line with regard to planning the work in the courts, organizing the reception of the public, examining non-procedural complaints, matters of office work, overall crime-prevention, and coordinating operations with other organs. But even at that time all these sections of activity were not indicated in the law. And in the new law they are not excluded, but, as was the case previously, they are not indicated. They are all encompassed by the general concept of "organizational support for the activity of the courts." It should also be borne in mind that the previously existing law allowed the combining of functions with the methods of carrying them out. It used to make the selection, although not complete, of the organizational means: checkups and summings-up of judicial practice. The new law does not exclude the functions but rather the indications of the methods for carrying them out. But as to the functions, they have remained as before.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the law has eliminated the duty of the justice organs to sum up judicial practice, inasmuch as the processing of such materials through surveys and the decisions of the collegiums was frequently masked by the form of instructing the courts with regard to applying the legislation. But here it is a matter of the contents, the substantive aspects of the matter—the object of study, rather than the operational method. Therefore, the justice organs are not only not forbidden but even must study court cases in order to discover and eliminate shortcomings in the organization of judicial activities (revealing the reasons for red tape with the trying of cases and the execution of verdicts rendered, etc.), for conclusions regarding the developing cases and trials with crime and other violations of the law, as well as working out suggestions for combatting them. If we were to sum all this up, we would have to state that the law has not narrowed down or restricted the powers of the justice organs in relation to the courts, but has seriously altered their formal aspect and added to them.

The changes being made in the country and the carrying out of decisions regarding the juridical-legal reform have dictated the need for aiming measures regarding organizational guarantees of the courts' activities at solving the problematical questions of improving justice, restructuring it, and enhancing its quality. The work being

conducted within the framework of organizationally guaranteeing the courts' activities must be aimed at solving the problems which are important components for enhancing the effectiveness of the justice system and, above all, at strengthening legality in trying cases. The principal accent here must be placed on discovering and disseminating positive experience in organizing the work of the courts. Particular attention must be paid to enhancing the role played by people's assessors, providing genuine opportunities for them to participate actively in trying court cases. The most important problem is to create the conditions for fully and consistently implementing the fundamental principles of justice, such as electability, collegiality, independence, glasnost, the equality of citizens before the court, etc.

For a lengthy period of time the justice organs have been decisively and consistently opposed to interference in the exercise of justice, and they have supported those judges who have been subjected to persecution for standing by their principles and who have been unwavering in their defense of the constitutional principles of court procedures. During the last three years the RSFSR Ministry of Justice has checked out approximately 30 reports of interference in the trying of court cases and other violations of the principles of judges' independence. These matters were examined in a collegium, the guilty persons were held responsible, and the rights of the judges were defended. In accordance with the new legislation, which has emphasized the importance of this operational trend, it must be developed even further.

One of the definitive tasks is to strengthen the judicial personnel, to recruit and fill the courts' staffs with specialists capable of carrying out highly responsible judicial duties. What is also required are special measures aimed at elevating the sense of principle among judges, their capacity to making decisions based on an unwavering following of the law and their judicial convictions. The necessity of this is to be explained by the violations of the law which still take place in the courts. Studies which have been conducted show that approximately 60 percent of the judicial errors connected with wrongly convicted citizens, as revealed in the Russian Federation, were caused by an uncritical attitude of the judges toward the materials of the preliminary investigation. Likewise important are measures to formulate among the judicial personnel an up-to-date awareness of the law, based on mastering the essence of the economic, social, and democratic changes now occurring in the country, and, connected with them, the new approaches to solving the problems of strengthening legality.

The transition to present-day forms of work has advanced to a new level the requirement of outfitting the court system and the justice organs with the necessary material-and-technical means, computers, and copiers, as well as other organizational equipment, persistent measures to provide the courts with rooms measuring up to their lofty mission and the requirements of "judicial technology."

As has already been noted, the question of a principled approach to the mechanism of an organizational guarantee for the courts' activities has been decided by legislation. Despite this, however, in order to gain a more profound understanding of the point of view taken by a legislator, it would be feasible to examine what was stated in the periodical press as another variant of the decision—a proposal to turn this function over to the higher courts.

Such a model line for organizing the work of the courts was tested in our country over the course of a lengthy period of time, and nowadays it can be judged exhaustively. At first glance, it seems more attractive to allocate the organizational functions of the higher courts by the following formula, which would seem to be natural: the courts themselves should concern themselves with the work of the courts. In its external advantages such a system is outstanding for its seeming simplicity and greater democratism. In this connection, however, a number of essential shortcomings are revealed which cancel out its seeming advantages. What we are talking about is the combination of the functions of justice and organizational activities. Combining the monitoring of legality and the justification of judicial decrees, which is the main thing for the higher courts, with the responsibility for organizing the work of the lower court units could not help but push the monitoring court instances toward lowering their sense of principle, towards utilizing the procedural possibilities as a means for artificially achieving quality indicators. From the viewpoint of the legality of justice, this has the most ruinous consequences.

Even at the present time the extremely close ties of the cassation collegiums of oblast-level courts with the people's courts monitored by them exert a negative influence on the objectivity of justice. As is known, the work of many cassation instances is constructed in accordance with the zonal principle. And although the personnel staffs of the cassation instances have not been assigned the responsibility for the status of the judicial activities in the monitoring courts, nevertheless, the desire to "look better" brings about a striving to "elevate" the work results in the courts of their own zone, and this often leads to an insufficiently critical evaluation of the "slightly wrong" judicial errors. As a result, almost half of such violations are not corrected in a timely manner, i.e., immediately after the sentences have been meted out, and they only come to light during the subsequent checkups on the cases by way of supervision.

Nor can we fail to take into account the fact that the principal attention of the higher courts and their leading officials, by virtue of their dominant duty of exercising justice, is directed primarily at deciding cases on their merits or essence and is limited to purely procedural technology. Their professional ideas revolve, for the most part, around this aspect of the matter, which objectively pushes the problems of organizationally guaranteeing judicial activity into the background. It was precisely for this reason that the higher courts were in an

extremely difficult position in performing the functions of organizing the work of the courts during the 1960's, when this duty was imposed on them in connection with the abolition of the justice organs, and they engaged in this important matter as a secondary task or on an ad hoc basis.

There is also another aspect of this matter. The oblast-level, kray-level, and Supreme Courts of the ASSR's and the union republics are extremely over-loaded with their direct and immediate activity—trying cases. Under these conditions to impose upon them organizational functions which really do not pertain to them—functions relating to the lower courts—would be inappropriate and out of place even if this did not exert a negative influence on the independence and principled nature of the courts. Distracting the attention of the higher courts onto supplementary tasks would be a substantial hindrance to them in performing their immediate tasks of trying cases and directing judicial practice.

It is important to see that the above-indicated duties are not being performed effectively enough. A substantial defect of the courts at the oblast level is that their activity has been concentrated on discovering and eliminating certain specific judicial errors and too little aimed at preventing instances of an incorrect application of the law. As a result, there is a multiple repetition of the same judicial errors. There is still a direct disorientation or misguidance of the courts of the first instance. For every one out of twelve criminal cases from among those reviewed by the monitoring judicial instances the legal and justified sentences are abrogated.

There are also quite a few unsolved problems along the lines of judicial practice by means of published, guiding explanations by the Plenums of the Supreme Courts. Many of the explanations are of the "for show" type; they repeat each other; they are very much over-loaded with commonly known positions or statutes; they reproduce the texts of the law or boil down to calls for observing it. Some of the data in past explanations diverge from newly adopted laws and the requirements of life; they have not been changed for a long time. At the same time, many questions which arise in practice do

not find a solution for a long time. For example, despite the difficulties with trying urgent cases connected with leasing relations and the cooperative movement, there have been no guiding explanations or commentaries with regard to these problems for a long time.

It can be stated, therefore, that assigning the duties of improving the organization of the work of the courts to the higher courts would not separate justice from the administrative organs any more than proper, nor would it be motivated by the above-indicated proposals. But, on the contrary, it would lead to a weakening of the principles and independence of the judicial links from each other, as well as diverting their forces and attention from the performance of their immediate and direct judicial functions.

It is precisely, therefore, the new Basic Legislation on the Judicial System which marks more clearly than before a watershed in the activities of the higher courts and the justice organs. The list of powers of the ASSR Supreme Courts, the kray- and oblast-level Supreme Courts of the Union republics, and the USSR Supreme Court does not contain the organizational tasks, and their structures do not provide for sub-divisions aimed at performing the organizational functions relating to the courts to be monitored by them. The law clearly promulgates the position that the competency of the court includes everything that is regulated by the procedural legislation, whereas the non-procedural activities pertain to the Ministry of Justice and its organs.

Therefore, the justice organs have no grounds for any sort of curtailment of work regarding the organizational guarantee of judicial activity, nor to work in the old way. The replacement of the very concept of the function of "directing the organization of the courts' work" by the "organizational guarantee of judicial activity" is not an editorial clarification. Such a new trend in the law demands new approaches to organizational work, its keying on a multi-faceted aid to the courts in performing their responsible mission, the importance of which has increased under the conditions of the emergence of the Soviet state based on the rule of law.

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Komsomol First Secretary Interviewed

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[Interview with Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee, by Aleksandra Lugovskaya, SOYUZ special correspondent: "Polemic Conversation: Turning Point"]

[Text] On 11 April the 21st VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol] Congress will begin its work. The gigantic Komsomol, with its many millions of members and its continuing monopoly status, is undergoing a crisis: its authority among the youth, and in society as a whole, has been falling. This is a typical process for many political, state, and public structures. The young delegates will have to analyze everything: the causes and roots of the crisis, what is currently occurring in and around the Komsomol, and what will have to be done in the future. On the eve of the congress, SOYUZ special correspondent Aleksandra Lugovskaya had a conversation with Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee.

[Correspondent] Viktor Ivanovich, what do you think are the fundamental decisions that can be made at the VLKSM congress?

[V. Mironenko] I would not attempt to link my forecasts directly with the congress decisions, but an analysis of the processes that have occurred in the Komsomol during the past three or four years indicates that we actually do need fundamental changes, and they have been isolated. What are they? We can expect recommendations that a change be made in the name of the VLKSM itself and that its members be newly registered, or even that the union be split up into independent organizations... I am convinced that it is not wise to make such decisions hastily. But this is my feeling, while the youth organization...

[Correspondent] What has caused your doubts?

[V. Mironenko] A sense of responsibility. Take, for example, the simplest thing: let us rename the VLKSM, calling it, say, the Democratic Youth Federation. You can see immediately what will happen: the overwhelming majority of the outwardly "indifferent" individuals, those who mercilessly criticize the Komsomol today for its bureaucratic methods, its indecision, and everything else, will come crashing down on you with accusations that you have waived something dear and substantial in our history—for all the costs that were incurred. There are tens of millions of these people, who also have passed through the Komsomol. The reorientation will occur instantaneously. What will happen in that situation?

[Correspondent] What is happening. So let it occur.

[V. Mironenko] I would not want to allow this, because my first and main interest is youth. What will it be like when it emerges from these turbulent times? And how will it emerge? The Komsomol, unfortunately, is so far

the only youth organization that has the opportunity to influence anything: policy as a whole, social policy, and spiritual life. I am opposed to poorly thought-out steps and actions.

[Correspondent] Do you allow the possibility of proving to be the last secretary to head the VLKSM Central Committee?

[V. Mironenko] That's not the crux of the matter. It is natural, that in the course of the changes that I mentioned, it is not only the name and the position that will change, but also the very structure of the League—the principles that will form its basis will be the federative principles of development, with an accent on universal human values and the individuality of the young person, but under all conditions the Komsomol will preserve its definite political face. I am convinced that the idea of a youth movement, and, consequently, of the organization, has always existed, exists now, and will always exist. The forms might change, but the essence will remain.

[Correspondent] What have you experienced here, at VLKSM Central Committee, during the past three and a half years?

[V. Mironenko] This was the most difficult period in my life. And also the happiest.

[Correspondent] Did you succeed in realizing all your potentiality as a leader? When you came here, did you feel that the Komsomol was a "lost cause"?

[V. Mironenko] No. Those were completely different times. At that time I did not know a lot. I did not understand much. I was not completely aware of the depth of the process that was beginning.

[Correspondent] But you did see that it was beginning, didn't you?

[V. Mironenko] Of course. As early as 1986 I was elected as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, and therefore I was a witness to the development of events in the party. Later I became a USSR people's deputy, participated in the work of the 1st Congress and subsequently congresses, and at the same time passed through all the stages of the parliamentary struggle. That forced me to interpret what was occurring, and every day to answer more questions than I probably would have to answer in my entire lifetime in any other situation. I began to understand in a different way the peculiarities of the times in which we are living. I thought a lot and analyzed what had occurred in VLKSM and why everything had occurred in that specific way. And I thought about what the VLKSM is objectively as of today. And then, how can we preserve for its future life our nation's genetic fund—its youth? Because by the time that our esteemed Supreme Soviet adopts a bundle of laws that give freedom to political life, economic creativity, and entrepreneurship, the most complicated situation will

arise: there will be a need for people who are capable of living in that situation, of leading society to its flourishing.

[Correspondent] I would like to ask you a nonparliamentary question, although it does pertain specifically to that political structure. Doesn't it seem to you that the Komsomol, having achieved a quota, closed the road to there for other youth organizations?

[V. Mironenko] Which organizations specifically?

[Correspondent] The informal organizations. Because, after all, they do exist, don't they?

[V. Mironenko] Well, yes and no. They exist as informal organizations. You are apparently not in the know, but two years ago we officially and publicly announced that the Komsomol does not lay claim to any monopoly in the youth movement. And anyone who does not want to be in its ranks can freely leave the league. Today only 50 percent of the country's young people are members of the league. Moreover, we demanded the adoption of the Law Governing Public Organizations, so that other youth organizations could form. But feeling that, like the more serious political forces, we would be unsuccessful, we took yet another step—we developed the draft governing the youth policy, which contains an entire section devoted to this question. We submitted that draft twice for consideration by a session of the Supreme Soviet, and twice it was removed from the agenda. Then we took another path—we made the Youth Organizations Committee independent, allocated approximately 2 million rubles of our own funds, and say: come on, everyone, and form up! This will be your roof until the law is enacted. But they have been coming with extreme caution.

[Correspondent] Are they afraid that you will exert pressure on them?

[V. Mironenko] Excuse me, but if you are planning to enter politics, there is no need to be afraid. We do have the experience of the timid—the Komsomol was afraid for 70 years. And if you are timid, then don't shout from all the newspaper pages, "We are r-r-revolutionaries. We will turn the whole world upside down. We will make youth happy." We have heard more than enough shouting. As for the right to a quota, at that time there were from ten to 15 members in each of the informal association—to whom was it necessary to give that quota? I am opposed to a quota, but in this instance objectively? Currently we have 75 deputies—jurists, economists, engineers—and there would be only five or six.

And the students would not be relieved of service in the Armed Forces or our alternative economic offers. There would be no concept of any strong state youth policy. And there would be no governmental decision concerning economic activity. Consequently, we would not

have the hundreds of thousands of youth centers, cooperatives, cost-accountable associations, or NTTM [scientific-technical creativity of youth] system, where several million young people are working and making complete use of their talents... There would not be 35,000 families that received housing at MZhK. But our esteemed press does not want to comment point-blank on what is being done in the Komsomol.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the fact that the youth cooperatives and cost-accountable associations, after receiving a governmental benefit—release from taxes—are stuffing their own pockets and are light-fingered? Because the "business" itself is immoral—those pornographic films at video clubs...

[V. Mironenko] A swindler should be put in jail, whether he is a Komsomol member, a member of an informal organization, or an enterprise director. Crooks exist among the Komsomol workers too. Yes, there are indeed video clubs where pornographic films are shown, where violence is propagandized... And there is a lot of everything else that does not have the right to exist. But at the same time I can give you the name of dozens of video clubs that are operating in conformity with the law, that are completely unaffected. But the violation of the law is no reason to annul it. There is a simple way out: it is necessary for the monitoring agencies to introduce order in this system. Not for the Komsomol to do so.

But the system of benefits for youth organizations—and, I emphasize, not only the Komsomol organizations—is needed, is necessary. First, that system creates the ground for the appearance of small-scale enterprises in the small economy, which is popular in the developed countries of Europe. Secondly, it compensates for the stinginess of our state and helps to implement the youth programs. And, thirdly, it trains the future socialist entrepreneurs who will have to live in the new conditions.

Our country is the only one in the world that does not allocate subsidies to the youth movement. Neither for a political or intellectual movement, or for any other kind. We pay more than modest benefits to schoolchildren, students, and youth organizations, but even those funds are being consistently cut off. Another unique situation is that for 40 years the Komsomol has been living on its own funds, without receiving a single kopeck from the government. This does not happen anywhere else. What are we supposed to do? There is just one way out—we must earn the money ourselves.

[Correspondent] Is the Komsomol still what it used to be—the party's assistant?

[V. Mironenko] The most recent plenum did not leave any doubts about the fact that there is currently a rather acute struggle, including an ideological and political struggle, within the party. And so, stating today anything about the support of the party in general is stating nothing. In the Komsomol we have a completely firm and rather unified opinion that, in this struggle, we will

support those forces that are in favor of the democratization of the party and of fundamental democratic reforms in society.

[Correspondent] Could you give some examples of how the Komsomol has already carried out this political course?

[V. Mironenko] I would be happy to. The mandate to the deputies from the Komsomol stated a program for democratic reforms that is no less radical than the program of the interregional group. Using our deputy as our spokesman, we stated at the Congress that we are in favor of annulling Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution and are opposed to the monopoly on political power. And what else? We made a declaration with regard to the 25 February rally. Actually it was our summons to begin the dialogue and to recognize the realities of life. In the name of civil peace throughout the country. Please believe me when I say that politically, for an organization that is firmly linked with the party, that was a rather serious step. And what about the series of so-called "small revolutions" in the outlying areas? For example, in Volgograd. It was begun by the Komsomol organizations, rather than by the informal organizations. Please remember that. Although I am no proponent of extreme measures, of the impassioned political activities of the youth league. There are other important matters.

[Correspondent] However, Viktor Ivanovich, the political position of the VLKSM in society is not visible.

[V. Mironenko] I do not agree with that. Society does not want to see it—that is another way of posing the question. The Komsomol has developed a definite image, which I would categorize as a stereotype. It sits there in a state of consciousness—and no arguments are able to shake it. Although currently, I think, it has been considerably shaken. At least in the minds of thinking persons.

[Correspondent] You took an unflattering view of the press as a result of their tendentious illumination of youth problems.

[V. Mironenko] As recently as 1986, everyone sang in chorus, "Hosannah!": "Oh, how remarkable the Komsomol is!" But then it was as though cut off. The gates in the publications open in only one direction: "Down with them! Carthage must be destroyed! Get rid of the young profaners with Lenin's profile on their jacket lapels! The fastidious bureaucrats..."—that is the tone of the materials written about the VLKSM.

So let's finish off the Komsomol! Then there will be no one to do for young people even the few things that it manages to do for them. That's not much? Well, then, should people attack it for that reason? I respect criticism. Well, we ourselves have criticized the Komsomol—everyone should be able to do that. But will those people who worked for 5-10 years in the Komsomol press, or who passed through the structure of that organization, have a clear conscience when now they curse it,

spit on it, and revile it only because it is fashionable to do so? I never have respected these people and I do not respect them now.

[Correspondent] But how would you explain this paradoxical phenomenon: the Komsomol's popularity is decreasing, but the printing run of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is increasing.

[V. Mironenko] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is the organ of the VLKSM Central Committee, and its position is our position. I cannot explain why you do not see the connection here. The contradiction is not between them—it is in the public awareness.

[Correspondent] All right. Do you mean, then, that, by analogy, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA magazine reflects the position of the VLKSM Central Committee?

[V. Mironenko] That is a special item. Unfortunately, there are a number of publications that are headed by people who are by no means of a youthful age. People keep urging us to get rid of people, to renew the entire editorial board. I have a somewhat different opinion: it is necessary, after replacing the leader, to begin gradually to bring in new, fresh forces.

[Correspondent] But aren't you afraid that until the change of generations occurs their ideas will become solidified in the readers' young minds?

[V. Mironenko] No, I'm not afraid. Moreover, I am even convinced that they sometimes are performing beneficial work. Because good ideals are formed not only from the positive, but also from the opposite view. That is my point of view. But I want to ask you a counterquestion: aren't you afraid that, after the editorial board of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA has been removed, it is very easy to go even farther than that? For example, to remove the editorial board of KOMSOMOLKA? Why not?

[Correspondent] Yes, I am frightened by that. But people say that the VLKSM Central Committee does not want very much to keep its current editor in chief solidly in place.

[V. Mironenko] That's news to me. Once again it confirms that public opinion does not know what is actually happening in this organization or what interrelationships we have with you. For a year I have been defending KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA at CPSU Central Committee Plenums against direct, indirect, and other attacks.

[Correspondent] Thank you for this opportunity to get an inside look at today's Komsomol. But I have several more questions. Something that causes confusion is why, for example, in Lithuania the republic league has disbanded itself, while in RSFSR this obsolete structure is being re-created.

[V. Mironenko] Let me explain that. In Lithuania the Komsomol did not disband itself, but restored its previous name. As for RSFSR, we are dealing not with an obsolete structure, but a completely new one. A structure that will be considered at the 21st VLKSM Congress. So this is a small step forward. From the rigid, conservative, hierarchical structure of the Komsomol, we are proceeding toward the federative principle that stipulates the freedom of conscience, discussions, and organizations. We assume that the Central Committee will include representatives not only of the federative agencies, but also the subjects of the federation—the Komsomol of the union republics. In addition, corporative organizations of schoolchildren, students, etc. may appear. Even now, within the republic leagues, one observes the active formation of youth centers, cost-accountable associations, political clubs, and the most diverse movements—and all of this is not only on a production basis, but also a territorial basis. Unity in diversity, with the rejection of directive methods of administration. It is a complicated period, but we must live through it, without destroying everything that is beneficial.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, doesn't it seem to you that the RSFSR Komsomol is an artificial structure?

[V. Mironenko] On the contrary. Until recently the VLKSM Central Committee looked like this: representatives of 14 union republics constituted 47 percent, and the others were representatives of various territories of a Russia that has its own autonomous republics. It is an awkward, overgrown structure, the existence of which can be explained historically, but not logically. It is not a federation, it is not a league, and in general no one knows what it is. I recommended waiting until the congress, but the guys did not want to reconcile themselves to that state of affairs. In addition, they felt that Russia was being paid only a little attention, so, by decision of a VLKSM Central Committee plenum, the RSFSR youth league was founded. So now the Central Committee consists of fully empowered representatives, and it is not I who commands them, but they who command me.

[Correspondent] Will the raykoms and obkoms—the basic objects of public displeasure—be preserved?

[V. Mironenko] I think that the organizations themselves—the primary or base ones—will decide this. But why do you think that people take this attitude to them? Is it sufficient for you to imagine just what a raykom is? I have in mind not the model when 10-15 people are forced to represent themselves as young people to the next stage. They are leaving although the score has not yet been settled with them...

[Correspondent] I would add another line: to the lower level, the primary organization, these are people who are forcing their will...

[V. Mironenko] I do not agree with you. Unfortunately, like our older comrades, many of us played a very unpleasant role as priests in a religion that we ourselves

did not understand. The way out is not in abolishing that link. And I feel that at the present time the organizations themselves must decide whether or not some kind of coordinating agency is necessary. Today's raykom is not a staff of functionaries, but a collection of the fully empowered representatives of those organizations.

I do not know what to do with Komsomolphobia, but I know solidly that the league can no longer exist in its previous form. This is the fruit of my three years of work, observations, and reflections. Everything must change radically! But I am categorically opposed to beginning each time with a clean sheet of paper. If we create something and immediately break and destroy it, and then begin again, then we will never arrive anywhere. So we will remain—pardon the expression—"Papuans." Churchill used to say that democracy is the foulest form of state structure if one does not keep in mind what can replace it.

[Correspondent] An analysis indicates that in the interethnic conflicts the adolescents act as the striking force. Who is directing them? And why isn't the Komsomol exerting an influence?

[V. Mironenko] It is obvious why it doesn't exert an influence. In answering your question, I will immediately divide it into two parts. One is the fact that the Komsomol itself, having rejected the old means of exerting an influence (the performance appraisal, exclusion from "the ranks"), has not established any new ones for itself, has not learned how to use them. And the second is the image that is being created around the Komsomol.

[Correspondent] But doesn't the Komsomol intervene?

[V. Mironenko] Of course. During the demonstrations in Dushanbe and in other areas our entire aktiv, all our forces, were in the streets and squares. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, the Komsomol organizations are rather influential. But they themselves are at times strongly drawn into that conflict, and then, to put it frankly, in addition to elements of national rebirth one also sees signs of national intolerance.

[Correspondent] Could you mention, say, by the various regions, the reasons for the manifestation of adolescent extremism?

[V. Mironenko] If one takes Central Asia, more than a million young people there cannot find a job for themselves. Unemployment... Their moods are obviously destructive, and at times extremist. This is already a definite environment. Secondly, in such actions there is an element of risk for young people, the possibility of showing themselves—in one way or another. The factors that are the basic ones here are both the social conditions and the transitional period, when the old institutions of power are rather discredited—sometimes deservedly and sometimes without reason—but the new ones are not yet

formed. It is everything altogether that creates a situation when a young person proves to be "without a tsar in his head, and without a God in his belly."

[Correspondent] But what about the assault troops in the Baltic republics?

[V. Mironenko] In the Baltic republics the situation is quite special. The young fellows are called in, as a rule, to protect the rallies and various measures against any possible extremist actions on the part of other groups. Frequently they have anticommunist, antisocialist, and nationalistic moods. The Soviet authority was established there in the 1940's and that is only the blink of an eye, two generations. But there are not too many convinced individuals among them. Or among those who, for example, sell underground-press newspapers. But, nevertheless, the state agencies, rather than independent groupings, must engage in that protection. Otherwise things might go too far.

The Ukraine is a large and varied area. In the West Ukraine there is one situation, and in the industrial eastern region there is another. In Kiev there is a third... And the trans-Caucasus? There has always been a tangle of contradictions there—both of a national and a religious nature. I think that, with the establishment of normal democratic institutions, political and state, with the reinforcement of authority and independence, and with the increase in culture, these questions will be removed.

[Correspondent] But today it is difficult for a young person to become the "tsar" in his own head. What is he supposed to do?

[V. Mironenko] How contradictory you are in your judgments! Because you have tried to convince me that the Komsomol is a monopolist, and a monopoly is bad, and, instead, we need a large number of youth organizations. But now we have come to the terminology used in "those times"—and is the Komsomol exerting a real influence? Yes, it does exert a real influence, but on a limited number of young people. And the smaller that number—which, I feel, is something that many people want—the smaller the circle of people on which it will exert an influence—both positive and negative.

[Correspondent] Who, then, are those "tsars" who are manipulating the adolescents so skillfully?

[V. Mironenko] So far there is no definite force. The dominant factor, in my opinion, is the national one. But if we speak about the basis of the processes themselves, then this is a tough knot made up of the intertwining of the Mafia, the shady economy, the corrupted elements of the party and state apparatus, and a segment of the intelligentsia—that also has been corrupted or is nationalistically minded. And this octopus puts up savage resistance, because for it democratization, glasnost, and the improvement of the economy are death. Although it operates in a veiled manner, by secret methods, and, as

a rule, using the hands of young people with unstable convictions, who are socially poorly provided for.

But there is also another dominant chord—the objective contradiction between the rates of formation and consolidation among the youth of the new democratic awareness and the considerably lagging rates of the real changes—in the economy, politics, and life.

[Correspondent] What can you say about the tremendous rates at which the criminal world is being augmented by young people?

[V. Mironenko] This is a process that is occurring all around the world. It is linked with the fact that, in the country as a whole, there has been a decrease in order. The authority of power, the internal affairs agencies, and the school system has fallen. Plus the worsening of people's socioeconomic position, and the uncontrollable inflation. As for the specific augmenting of the criminal world by young people, this is natural—all social groups are augmented by young people.

[Correspondent] Viktor Ivanovich, you are a historian. Could you possibly return to your previous profession now?

[V. Mironenko] The word "historian" has a fine sound to it. I could not become one because I have already spent 15 years in Komsomol work. I am a history teacher. I could not return directly, because I would need a minimum of a year or a year and a half to become "rehabilitated" as a specialist.

[Correspondent] Could you make a major change and teach within the confines of the school curriculum?

[V. Mironenko] If we are speaking about the history of Russia in the pre-October period, we already have Solovyev, Klyuchevskiy, and Karamzin. One lifetime is not enough to understand and reinterpret everything, to draw from that bottomless well of knowledge. As for the post-October period, I would teach history in the way that I understand it.

[Correspondent] Would you be allowed to do that?

[V. Mironenko] I do not know... I don't know that... At least when you asked me whether I am a happy or an unhappy person, I am happy in that, during the entire three and a half years in this office, I have never once had to say something with which I disagree. Putting it more simply, I have never had to lie. I could make an honest mistake by virtue of my lack of knowledge concerning a question or an insufficient understanding of it, but I never had to violate my own convictions. And that is happiness. At the present time, however, I sense an intellectual vacuum. I hope that in three or four years I can recover.

[Correspondent] How do you intend to do that?

[V. Mironenko] Very simply. I am thinking of putting up my candidacy at the VI KSM congress.

[Correspondent] You want to leave the "field of combat"? Or are there other reasons?

[V. Mironenko] There are a lot of reasons. When I came here in 1986, I set down a plan for myself. It was extremely simple. Realizing that the Komsomol had difficult times awaiting it, we began to create mechanisms for protecting the interests of youth when the league would no longer be able to execute those functions. A deputy quota was formed, and currently a youth group is in operation in the parliament. A Committee for Youth Affairs has been created, as have youth structures in the parliament. For the time being, they are working poorly, but the machine has been started up and it will operate. The second component of the plan was the development of a mechanism to "legalize" the informal youth associations. Today they have that opportunity. And, third, it was necessary to get the Komsomol off of dead center, and to begin the reorganization of the VLKSM. That process is already underway. It would be desirable if that process were controllable. So that the Komsomol would not swept away. And, practically speaking, my plan ended there. It would have been possible to begin a new one, but...

The role that was assigned to me during that period was not one of the most pleasant ones. By virtue of circumstances, I was a centrist. In the CPSU Central Committee almost a Yeltsin, but in the youth environment almost a Ligachev. Realizing that the Komsomol could be razed in two days, as happened in Prague, Berlin, and Bucharest, I attempted to preserve everything that the Komsomol has, to prevent its being pulled to pieces, to carry it through the reforms, and to preserve it. But at the same time I also had to take into consideration the big policy. True, it was easier for me because I take a respectful attitude toward M. S. Gorbachev and until recently I felt that our thoughts were "in synch." If anyone else had been in his place, I would probably have been unable to work. All these years I followed that middle line, and therefore I turned out to be bad for many people. At some moment you begin to realize that politically you can be consumed by it. And the last thing is age. Believe me that when I show up somewhere with a Komsomol badge, I feel awkward: I'm 37 years old. But my life isn't ending here. A new stage is beginning.

[Correspondent] Will life outside of politics be interesting for you?

[V. Mironenko] I don't intend to leave politics, but I have mixed feelings about the politics that have currently become fashionable. It is difficult, for example, for me to speak at the Congress of People's Deputies.

In general I do not understand many things. Why, for example, is it necessary to present a constitutional bill for nationwide discussion? If we do that, then why not also Newton's binomial theorem or Einstein's theory of relativity... Or, how is it possible, in an auditorium where 2500 people are sitting, to adopt a bill? Why is it

necessary to elect a plant director, rather than hire her, as is done throughout the world?

I don't understand what is happening in the party. On the one hand, I don't understand the conservatives, or, on the other hand, the "Democratic Platform." Or do I understand very well? And how is it possible to hold a party election by election okrugs? Once again we invent certain improbable moves that pop up in God knows whose head, but the most fearful thing is that they are immediately implemented. I don't understand the endless improvisations, when decisions are made that are economically not completely thought out. And there are a lot of other things. For example, why on a certain day we must fight to the last ditch against a nation's right to self-determination, make "rounded-off" formulations, and then, two months later, recognize that? Or, having withstood a mortal fight for Article 6 of the Constitution at the Plenum, soon announce it to be "de facto." Probably this is present-day politics. Compromises, and also other things... But, to put it honestly, I do not have any special desire to participate in them. They are unattractive to me. And, if I may speak with the utmost frankness, it's boring to speak about what you do not know thoroughly. In our society a leader does not have the right to say, "I don't know!"

[Correspondent] What kind of conversation, Viktor Ivanovich, would you want to see our conversation as?

[V. Mironenko] I won't rack my brain. To tell you the honest truth, I don't envy you. The discussion was broad and interesting. But that's your job, as a professional. I would like the conversation to be frank.

[Correspondent] Thank you. And the best of luck in everything you do.

Armenian Official on Medical Care for Refugees, NKAO Residents

90US0677A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
18 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with Chief of Main Administration for Medical Treatment and Preventive Medicine A. Atabekyan, by G. Sarmakeshan: "The Difficult Post of a Physician"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Not so long ago this would have been unbelievable: a blockade, refugees, wounded, military action. These events—the wretched companions of severe trials, unexpectedly intruded into our peaceful lives, and one way or another touched the fate of every one of us, and affected all spheres of activity in the republic. How is the health-care system operating in these conditions, and to what extent is it coping with its new and complex task, were the subjects of an interview with A. Atabekyan, chief of the Main Administration for Medical Treatment and Preventive Medicine and member of the collegium of the Armenian SSR Health Ministry, by our correspondent G. Sarmakeshan.

[Correspondent] Has the situation that has come to pass caused an increase in the number of people requiring medical assistance?

[Atabekyan] Of course. There was a sharp increase in the number of people requiring treatment. The latest tragic events in Baku have caused a new flow of refugees. On the whole these are elderly, helpless people, who became victims of the inhuman terror and horrible acts of cruelty. Naturally, all that they experienced inevitably had an affect on the mental and physical state of even those who were not direct victims of the violence. In addition, a significant number of people are arriving with injuries that require hospitalization. As of today, in the republic's medical institutions alone, about 280 refugees have come for treatment, and eight have died. Of course, the numbers cited do not give the total picture of the scale of the evil deeds in Azerbaijan, since a significant number of those who suffered in Baku have been evacuated to other republics as well, and they are located in clinics at their destinations. In all probability, many of them will subsequently be sent to Armenia, where they will be rendered further medical assistance as required, and will undergo rehabilitation.

In addition to those suffering in Azerbaijan, there has been an increase in the number of patients of the republic's indigenous population. The enormous nervous tension under which the people of Armenia have been living for more than two years has naturally had its negative effects. And stress—is the starting mechanism for illness. It inevitably leads to aggravation of chronic illnesses, and leads to an increase in the number of cardio-vascular, endocrine, nervous and mental disorders.

[Correspondent] How is medical aid to the suffering refugees organized?

[Atabekyan] A special medical station for receiving refugees has been set up at Zvartnots Airport, at which there is a permanent staff of physicians, including surgeons, pediatric surgeons, therapists and pediatricians. Ambulance teams are located right on the flight line, in order to render first aid and hospitalization to patients with severe injuries. Victims are received by the Erebuni Hospital, by First Aid, by Medical-Sanitary Unit No 1, by the Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics, and by other medical institutions.

Every day a significant number of refugees requiring treatment come to us at the Health Ministry. They are given aid immediately. The other day, administrators of medical and general health institutions, on their own authority issued instructions on organizing specific measures to improve medical aid to the refugees, and to carry

out a mandatory general, comprehensive physical examination. In the villages and places where they temporarily live, new medical stations are being set up and existing ones beefed up, and the necessary medical equipment supplies and medicines are being sent there.

Speaking of refugees, I would like to touch upon yet another question. It was not only the Armenians who were forced to flee the "most international republic" because of the excesses and terrorist acts in Azerbaijan. Evacuated families of military servicemen are in an extremely critical situation today. Among them are quite a few women and children with injuries requiring medical assistance. That bitter word—refugee—is not just a word to the Armenian people. We know full well the fate of the wanderer, those forced by tragic circumstances of fate to flee their places of habitation. At present our republic is in an extremely critical situation. And at the same time I can in all candor declare that the Health Ministry of Armenia is prepared to render every assistance, including medical assistance, to the suffering families of the military servicemen, and receives them with all warmth and good will.

The distorted information from the TV program Vremya and a number of the central newspapers, on the allegedly unfriendly attitude toward military servicemen by citizens of our republic, is absolutely groundless.

[Correspondent] What effect is the blockade having on the state of health care in the republic?

[Atabekyan] Naturally, even under exceptionally complex conditions health care is always granted most favored status, and everything possible is sent to provide maximal conditions out of concern for the people's lives and health. But the blockade of the republic's highways and railroads, after it survived a catastrophic earthquake and received thousands of refugees, is yet another instance of inhumanity and moral degradation.

The blockade has prevented acquisition of many necessary medications and medical equipment, and has had an especially severe effect on the shortage of fuel and lubricants for ambulances and med-evac flights.

The population of Yerevan and other cities and towns in the republic has increased sharply. The state of extreme tension, military action, and a significant number of victims has increased the number of calls for ambulances, and flying ambulance operations have increased manifold. Under these conditions the shortage of gasoline and aviation fuel has caused serious difficulties in rendering assistance.

[Correspondent] How exactly is health care and assistance conveyed to Artsakh and the Armenian villages in Azerbaijan?

[Atabekyan] It is well-known that health care to Artsakh and the Armenian villages of Azerbaijan has been in very unsatisfactory condition. This is primarily seen in the shortage of medications, medical equipment and the

most basic supplies. The Armenian SSR Health Ministry has taken up the concern for the medical institutions located there.

We believe that one of the most important achievements is the establishment of a diagnostic center in Stepanakert, staffed with skilled specialists and the most modern equipment. This has allowed raising health care in the oblast to a principally new level. To the extent possible we are offering to Artsakh and the Armenian villages of Azerbaijan all necessary medications and medical equipment. The patients arriving from these regions, are given top priority treatment and consultation without a certificate and without delay.

A great deal of attention is devoted to increasing the skills of the physicians working there. Duty teams are working continuously in Getashen and other villages located in Azerbaijan, to which pharmacological preparations, one-time syringes, and blood-transfusion systems were sent. Control over the sanitary and epidemiological situation in these regions has been stepped up.

[Correspondent] How was medical assistance delivered during the attack on the border regions?

[Atabekyan] Within a half-hour of the beginning of military actions, a group of skilled physicians consisting of various kinds of surgeons and anaesthesiologists flew off to Yeraskh. First aid teams were sent for evacuation and rendering assistance. Four irregular soldiers were killed and nearly 20 wounded, and several operations were carried out right on the spot, including operations on people with puncture wounds in the rib cage; and 16 people were hospitalized in clinics and scientific research institutes in the city of Yerevan, the central regional hospitals of Artashat and Veda, and the medical-sanitary unit at Ararat. Aid was given to wounded soldiers also. During the course of the week, teams of doctors in Yeraskh were continually replaced.

[Correspondent] How do you rate the work of health care in the republic in the new complex conditions?

[Atabekyan] I think that the work of our medics and the overall organization of their activity today should be rated positively. The severe trials that have fallen to the lot of Armenia have activated feelings of patriotism and humanity in the people; they have raised their consciousness and stimulated their aspirations to raise their professional skills.

The tragedy of the earthquake has given our medical personnel priceless experience in operating under extreme conditions. Complex teams have been set up in the republic to render first aid, and are prepared to work in the localities and in the field at a moment's notice. I can say with all candor that health care in the republic is prepared to carry out the most complex tasks.

Turkmen SSR Educational Institutions Examined

90US0681A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 3 Mar 90 p 2

[Report by N. Osipova, correspondent, on conference of republic aktiv of public education personnel: "The Schools Are Seeking a New Road"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] A report on "The Results of the Work of Academic Institutions and Public Education Agencies in the Republic in 1989 and Objectives for the More Intensive Perestroika of Secondary and Higher Education" was presented by Turkmen SSR Minister of Public Education M. Aliyeva. The minister and other speakers analyzed the performance of academic institutions on all levels and suggested ways of improving their work.

Readers of UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA were recently asked to respond to an 11-part questionnaire to reveal the factors impeding perestroika in public education. They were asked to choose the five factors representing the weakest links in the educational system. All of the problems listed applied to our republic: from insufficient government concern for public education to the weak financial foundation of perestroika and the unwillingness of schools to accept new operating procedures.

As a matter of fact, what do educators discuss at their conferences each year? They discuss the weak material and technical base, the loss of interest in education, the low prestige of the teaching profession, and so on and so forth. The problems are not new, and they are difficult to solve because the renewal of education is impossible without changes in the society.

Many speakers at the conference expressed this opinion. Rector B. Ovezov of the Turkmen State Pedagogical Institute began his speech with this:

"Why are we lagging behind not only the Western states, where the prestige of education has traditionally been high, but also behind many countries in East Asia? Simply because we do not place a high value on knowledge. We keep our schools on a starvation diet as far as finances are concerned, but the quality of specialist training depends primarily on the conditions of their 'cultivation'—i.e., on the material and technical base. This is not a new issue, and it has been brought up so many times that no one takes it seriously anymore. How much can we demand from the schools while giving them nothing? The objectives set for them are global, but their material substructure leaves much to be desired."

Today more than 200 schools for 50,000 students and pre-school establishments for 49,500 children in the republic are housed in dilapidated buildings which should be demolished. The minister cited these figures in her report. Although, as she reported, much has been done in recent years to open new educational facilities, this has not solved the problem. She cited impressive figures: Last year's plan for school construction was fulfilled by 106 percent and the plan for the construction

of pre-school establishments was fulfilled by 111 percent. During the last five-year plan and the first 4 years of this five-year plan, schools for more than 151,000 students and pre-school facilities for 33,000 children began operating in the republic. The educational sphere has been neglected for so long, however, that despite the higher rate of school construction, the new facilities can only replace part of the substandard buildings and can eliminate the need for educational work in two or three shifts in only part of the schools.

Many people are firmly convinced that the problems of the schools can wait. Otherwise, how can we explain the fact that the projects included in long-range and annual plans for capital construction by the ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies are mainly projects convenient for contractors? Educational facilities are not among the prestigious projects, and this is why they are postponed each year. Is it possible that this attitude is the reason for the feelings of uncertainty and of dependence on the powers that be? The minister also reported that the heads of many public education departments have chosen not to take part in drawing up the plans for capital construction, do not communicate with the managers of contracted organizations, and do not care about the efficient distribution of capital investments. The worst vice is the lack of principle which causes them to accede to builders' wishes at the expense of school interests. Facilities with major flaws and defective technological equipment and visual teaching aids are frequently approved with the connivance of oblast and rayon public education agencies.

Privately funded construction is one way of solving the problems of the schools. It is practiced in Tashauz and Chardzhou oblasts with kolkhoz and sovkhoz funds. This is causing some problems, however. As a rule, the facilities erected on this basis are small structures without running water or indoor plumbing, and the quality of construction work is unsatisfactory. At the end of the year, local authorities frequently include these facilities among the projects financed by state capital investments. This is how they conceal the failure to carry out school construction programs.

What did speakers at the republic conference suggest? A state program for the restructuring of the material and technical base could bring it up to the level meeting current requirements. The program should be specific enough to define sources of financing. Otherwise, the lag will grow more pronounced.

Are public education personnel ready and willing to work under the new conditions? A categorical answer would be difficult. Despite all of the justified complaints about their work, we must admit that they have recently come up with many new and interesting ideas warranting consideration. The main thing is that a strategy has been defined: The provisional research team formed last May elaborated a theory of public secondary education for the Turkmen SSR. The process of instruction has been democratized and humanized. Schools are striving for

heightened relevance. New experience has been accumulated. Here are just a few of the innovations. The first republic procedural festival was held. Bilingual education is being introduced, and more schools and classes are being specialized for intensive instruction. The Turkmen State University, the Turkmen Institute of the National Economy, and the Ashkhabad Pedagogical Institute are offering majors in Russian language and literature. An experimental center for the aesthetic training of pre-schoolers has been established in Children's Center No 12 in Ashkhabad, and experiments in teaching youngsters a foreign language are being conducted in Children's Centers 8, 46, and 68 in the capital. The republic's first boarding school for young physicists and mathematicians has been opened in Tashauz, and a technical lyceum has been established in Ashkhabad. Specialized Vocational and Technical Institute No 16. Incidentally, it is the first institution of its kind specializing in construction engineering in the country. The school received authorization to conduct research and experiments and is closer to the scientists and the educators. Nevertheless, it was severely criticized by many speakers.

Who is teaching our children and preparing our youth for life and work? More than 120,000 people work in our republic's public education system. Many are creative individuals who love their work and employ the methods of the country's innovative educators, but an analysis also reveals that we have many mediocre teachers with inadequate professional training. This is why only 93 of the 170 medal winners from republic schools were admitted to VUZ's. Only 103 of the 308 eighth-graders who graduated with honors received positive performance evaluations when they enrolled in secondary specialized academic institutions. All of this testifies that teachers are grading too high, and this includes the grades given to students who are awarded the gold medal.

The situation is particularly disturbing in rural schools. Thousands of their graduates lack the proper training. This is why the 1989/90 academic year has been declared the year of the rural school in the republic. A program was drawn up to lay a good foundation for the academic, cultural, and vocational training of the rural laborer. The teacher is the main protagonist in this program.

Where do all of the mediocre teachers and incompetent specialists come from? They are the products of the same educational system. This was pointed out by many members of the aktiv.

More and more people are suggesting the elimination of entrance examinations for pedagogical VUZ's. Why should the recommendation of the school not serve as the basis for admissions? After all, the school knows its pupils and the level of their knowledge and abilities best. Furthermore, most young specialists should return to their own schools after graduation. In other words, the schools would get back the people they trained. This is a controversial idea, but there is some logic in it: It will diminish the possibility of errors in VUZ admissions and

will leave no room for the negative practices with such a regrettable effect on admission procedures.

Today the school is changing its traditional features and is demanding a non-traditional approach to school management, but where can it find efficient and creative people capable of heading rayon, city, and oblast public education departments, schools, *tekhnikums*, vocational and technical institutes, and VUZ's? Perestroyka requires leaders of a new type, the minister stressed, competent and ingenious people with high administrative and political standards. Administrators of this kind, however, are not being trained anywhere. Unsatisfactory training frequently causes these administrators to shirk financial and other responsibilities, and this causes their work to suffer. All of their training consists in advanced training courses with an extremely low level of effectiveness. This is why the training of school administrators on all levels is one of the ministry's main short-range objectives.

The process of the democratization of society has also had a perceptible impact on the hiring of administrative personnel. The administrators of approximately 400 academic institutions and their assistants are selected on the basis of competition, but the selection process is often conducted in such a rush that some teams are headed by undemanding leaders who are incapable of exerting any influence to improve the state of affairs. They substitute bureaucratic trivia and unproductive activity for part of their daily organizing work.

These comments on the statements made at the republic conference are not intended to present a thorough analysis of the situation. The main thing I want to say is that the schools have reached a crossroads. They are gradually moving away from old ideas about their role in society and are seeking a new road. This is a difficult process, and they cannot do it without help.

All-Union 1989 Census Results for Latvia

90U13831 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
22 Mar 90 p 3

[Report of the Latvian SSR Goskomstat: "On the Results of the All-Union 1989 Census in the Latvian SSR"]

	Population (in thousands)				1989 as a Percentage of 1959	Average Annual Growth (in percentages)		
	1959	1970	1979	1989		1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Total	2 093.5	2,364.1	2,520.5	2,680.0	128.0	1.1	0.6	0.6
Urban	1,114.2	1,476.6	1,725.6	1,905.9	171.1	2.6	1.8	1.1
Rural	979.3	887.5	794.9	774.1	79.1	-0.9	-1.2	-0.3

Relatively high growth in population occurred before 1960. Then, during the entire subsequent decade the rate of population growth slowed due to a drop in the

[Text] In accordance with resolutions 626 and 122 of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, of 30 December 1986 and 16 April 1988, respectively, the state statistical organs conducted a census in January 1989.

The census plan involved a wide range of questions designed to provide a complex characterization of the population's sociodemographic makeup and its distribution over the territory of the republic. It provided, for the first time since World War II, information about the population's housing conditions.

The census was conducted by questioning citizens at their actual place of residence. The questioning and the recording of answers on the census sheets were carried out by specially trained census takers. In all, over 11,000 census personnel, drawn from workers in the state statistical organs and individuals brought in from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, participated in this work.

Thanks to widespread mass informational work and active support and practical assistance from the Party and soviet organs and the public, the census was completed in a timely and organized fashion.

In May of last year, preliminary census results were prepared and published. After computerized analysis of the census sheets, we now have final results on the population's age makeup, marital status, number and size of families, level of education, nationalities and languages, and source of income.

The precise number of the Latvian SSR population present at the moment of the census, i.e., on 12 January 1989, totaled 2,680,000, and the permanent population 2,667,000. The population present increased by 159,500 compared with 1979, or 6 per cent. (Across the USSR as a whole the growth totaled 9 per cent; in the Lithuanian SSR 8.6 per cent, in the Estonian SSR 7.3 per cent.) The dynamics of the republic's population numbers for various postwar censuses works out as follows:

birthrate. Since the early 1970s the growth rate has remained virtually unchanged, and in the Latvian SSR it was one of the lowest in the Soviet Union.

Along with the natural growth in population, immigration influenced population numbers. The following data

attests to the impact of both these factors on population growth (yearly averages):

	Thousands of People			Per 10,000 Population		
	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988	1959-1969	1970-1978	1979-1988
Overall growth in population	24.6	17.4	16.0	110.1	70.9	61.9
Including:						
Natural growth	10.3	5.8	6.7	46.1	23.6	25.9
As a percentage of the total	41.9	33.3	41.9	41.9	33.3	41.9
Migrational growth	14.3	11.6	9.3	64.0	47.3	36.0
As a percentage of the total	58.1	66.7	58.1	58.1	66.7	58.1

In the last ten years, the urban population grew by 180,300, or 10.4 per cent. In this period the rural population decreased by 20,800, or 2.6 per cent. The basic reason for the decrease in the rural population is migrational outflow to the city. However, the rate of decrease of the rural population for 1979-1988 was lower than for the last intercensus period. If for 1970-1978 the average yearly decrease was 10,300, then in 1979-1989 it was 2,100.

Rezekne (14.1 per cent), in Ogrskiy Rayon (13.7 per cent), in the city of Elgave (10.5 per cent), and in the republic's capital, Riga (9.5 per cent). The greatest population decrease was in Rezeknenskiy (11.6 per cent), Ludzenskiy (10.2 per cent), Balvskiy (8.9 per cent), and Kraslavskiy (7.1 per cent) rayons.

The highest population growth rates for the last ten years were in the Rizhskiy Rayon (18.5 per cent), in the city of

One of the most important demographic indicators is the age-sex structure, which is described by the following data:

	Permanent Population (in thousands)			As a Percentage of the Total Population	
	1979	1989	1989 as a Percentage of 1979	1979	1989
Total population, including ages:	2,502.8	2,666.6	106.5	100	100
0-9	346.1	396.4	114.5	13.9	14.9
10-19	354.9	359.0	101.2	14.2	13.5
20-29	382.3	394.5	103.2	15.3	14.8
30-39	348.7	383.9	110.1	13.9	14.4
40-49	360.9	334.9	92.8	14.4	12.5
50-59	289.3	334.7	115.7	11.5	12.5
60-69	204.8	251.1	122.6	8.2	9.4
70-79	159.2	140.6	88.3	6.4	5.3
80 and up	56.2	71.4	127.1	2.2	2.7
Under working age	544.4	606.3	111.4	21.1	22.8
Working age	1,460.0	1,507.4	103.2	58.3	56.5
Over working age	498.0	552.8	111.0	19.9	20.7

The present age structure reflects past tendencies in the processes of natural progress, especially the birthrate. These were strongly affected by World War II, which not only took away many thousands of lives but also led to a decline in the birthrate both during the war years and in

the years women born during the war and the generation of their daughters reached active childbearing age.

Of special interest from the standpoint of the creation of labor resources is the working-age population (men age

16-59, women age 16-54). Over the last ten years, the growth of the working population came to 47,000 overall, or 3 per cent (for the USSR, 4.6 per cent).

During the 1980s, the aging of the population continued. The number of people over working age increased in this time by 11 per cent, while the population overall increased only 6 per cent. If in the country as a whole pension-age persons comprise a total of 17.1 per cent of the total population, in the Latvian SSR they comprise 20.7 per cent.

Of the total permanent population of the republic, men comprise 1,239,000 (46.5 per cent), and women 1,428,000 (53.5 per cent). The gender structure of the population has improved notably. If in 1979 there were 853 men for every 1,000 women, then in 1989 there were 868. The rise in the number of women begins on average with the thirty-year-old group and is due to a higher mortality rate among men. The change in the gender structure has also been influenced by migrational processes, as a result of which the male population predominates in rural locales up to age 45. The relationship between the numbers of men and women according to age in 1989 were as follows:

	Men Per 1,000 Women	
	Urban	Rural
Total population, including ages:	853	903
0-4	1,040	1,040
5-9	1,044	1,029
10-14	1,024	1,044
15-19	1,055	1,105
20-24	1,047	1,087
25-29	960	1,126
30-34	932	1,143
35-39	901	1,141
40-44	883	1,066
45-49	860	1,000
50-54	826	925
55-59	795	820
60 and over	492	489

Annually, approximately 25,000 marriages are contracted in the republic. The 1989 census data counted 631,000 married couples. The distribution of the population according to family status was as follows:

	Portion of Individuals in a Given Marital State at a Given Age (percentages)							
	Men				Women			
	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Separated or Divorced	Married	Never Married	Widowed	Separated or Divorced
Entire population 16 years and older	67.8	21.4	3.2	7.3	56.0	15.4	17.7	10.7
16-19	3.3	96.2	0.0	0.0	10.0	89.3	0.1	0.2
20-24	37.0	61.1	0.1	1.4	57.9	38.3	0.2	3.2
25-29	72.8	22.2	0.1	4.5	76.0	15.2	0.6	7.9
30-39	79.7	10.8	0.4	8.9	76.7	8.2	1.7	13.3
40-49	78.7	7.1	1.3	12.7	71.0	5.4	5.5	17.9
50-59	81.1	4.5	3.3	10.9	64.0	5.6	14.6	15.6
60 and over	76.7	3.4	14.2	5.5	33.2	7.5	51.5	7.6

In recent times over 10,000 marriages have been celebrated annually. The census demonstrated that of the overall number of men 16 years and older, those separated and divorced comprise 7.3 per cent, whereas of the overall number of women of the same age it is 10.7 per cent. Compared with 1979, the proportion of broken

marriages has increased. The highest proportionate weight of those separated and divorced in the country is noted in Latvia and Estonia (about 7 per cent among men and 10-11 per cent among women, compared with 4.7 and 7.5 per cent, respectively, on average for the USSR).

According to the census data, the number of families came to 732,000, 47,000 (7 per cent) more than in 1979. Average family size has not changed and amounts, as it did ten years

ago, as a whole across the republic to 3.1 persons; 3.1 in urban and 3.2 in rural locales. Below are cited the data on the distribution of families by number of members:

	Number of Families (thousands)		1989 as a Percentage of 1979	As a Percentage of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
All families	685	732	106.8	100	100
2-person families	250	277	110.8	36.5	37.9
3-person families	217	210	96.7	31.7	28.7
4-person families	150	165	110.3	21.8	22.5
5-person families	48	55	113.8	7.1	7.5
6+-person families	20	25	125.9	2.9	3.4

Today 2,284,000 people live in families, or 85.7 per cent of the republic's population. Moreover, 132,000 (4.9 per cent) family members live apart from their families but are connected with them by a shared budget. 251,000 people (9.4 per cent) have lost their families or lost contact with them (are single). This negative demographic indicator is 1.6 times higher in our republic than the average for the country, and we occupy second place after Estonia among union republics for this indicator.

In the period 1979-1988 the population's level of education rose. The number of people possessing higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education increased over those ten years from 1,390,000 to 1,758,000, or by 26.5 per cent. Now 84 per cent of the republic's population 15 years and older possesses that level of education, as against 70 per cent in 1979. There was a significant increase for that age group in the number of individuals with higher and completed secondary education. According to the data of the current census, their number grew from 44 per cent in 1979 to 60 per cent in 1989. At the same time the proportion of individuals with incomplete secondary and elementary education fell from 49 per cent in 1979 to 36 per cent in 1989.

The population employed in the economy possesses a higher level of education than the population as a whole. Of those working, 92.5 per cent possess higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education, as against 79.5 per cent in 1979. For the same period the number of those employed in the economy with an elementary education decreased by a factor of 2.5 and now comprises only 6.8 per cent.

The Latvian SSR occupies fifth place among union republics after the Georgian SSR, Armenian SSR, Estonian SSR, and Azerbaijan SSR for the number of VUZ graduates per 1,000 employed, whereas for numbers of population with complete secondary education it is only in thirteenth place.

The level of education of the urban and rural population has leveled out. If in 1979 77 per cent of urban dwellers and 53 per cent of rural dwellers 15 years and older had a higher or secondary (complete and incomplete) education, then in 1989 the corresponding figures were 87 and 75 per cent, respectively.

A few differences in the level of education are observed among representatives of the various nationalities of the Latvian SSR. If among all residents of the republic 15 years and older 11.5 per cent possess a higher education, then among Latvians such people are only 9.6 per cent, and among representatives of other nationalities 13.4 per cent. 46.6 percent of the republic's inhabitants in this age group, including 44 per cent of the Latvians and 49 per cent of the representatives of other nationalities, possess either a specialized or general secondary education.

In the course of the 1989 census, information was gathered about the population of all the nationalities residing in the republic. Nationality, as in all past censuses, was specified by those questioned. Parents specified children's nationality.

According to census data, 1,459,000 Latvians reside in the whole Soviet Union, a number that has grown over the past ten years by 20,000, or 1.4 per cent. 1,388,000 Latvians live in the Latvian SSR, or 95 per cent of all the Latvians residing in the USSR. The proportion of Latvians to the total population of the republic decreased from 53.7 per cent in 1979 to 52.0 per cent in 1989. This was the result of interrepublic migration, as well as the fact that due to the unfavorable age structure and higher mortality rate, Latvians had a relatively lower natural growth than did the representatives of other nationalities residing in our republic.

The change in the number and proportion in the population of the basic nationalities of the Latvian SSR is characterized by the following data:

	Thousands of People		1989 as a Percentage of 1979	Percentage of Total Population	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population, including:	2,503	2,667	106.5	100	100
Latvians	1,344	1,388	103.2	53.7	52.0
Russians	821	906	110.2	32.8	34.0
Belorussians	112	120	107.4	4.5	4.5
Ukrainians	67	92	138.1	2.7	3.5
Poles	63	60	96.4	2.5	2.3
Lithuanians	38	35	91.6	1.5	1.3
Jews	28	23	80.9	1.1	0.9
Gypsies	6.1	7.0	114.8	0.2	0.3
Tatars	3.8	4.8	128.3	0.2	0.2
Germans	3.3	3.8	114.7	0.1	0.1
Estonians	3.7	3.3	90.0	0.1	0.1
Other nationalities	13	24	184.8	0.6	0.8

The census registered 135 Livs residing on the territory of the republic as well.

Among the urban population the proportion of Latvians at the beginning of 1989 was 44 per cent, among the rural population 71.5 per cent; whereas in the preceding 1979 census the figures were 45.1 and 71.9 per cent, respectively. 332,000 Latvians reside in Riga, or 36.5 per cent of the total population (38.3 per cent in 1979).

Among the towns belonging to the republic, the town with the greatest proportion of the core nationality was Elgave (49.7 per cent) and the least Daugavpils (13.0 per cent); for rural rayons the corresponding figures were 89.8 per cent in Talsinskiy Rayon and 36 per cent in Daugavpilsskiy Rayon.

The census also considered the native and second language of the peoples of the USSR spoken fluently by those questioned. The data testify to the fact that 97.4 per cent of Latvians consider Latvian their native language, and 68 per cent speak Russian. At the same time it should be noted that only 23 per cent of those of other nationalities indicated that they speak Latvian.

For source of income the republic's population distributed as follows: 55 per cent employed in social production; 20 per cent with a pension, subsidy, stipend, or other form of state welfare as a source of income; and 25 per cent are dependent on their parents or other relatives (mostly students and children of preschool age).

In comparison with 1979, the distribution of the population for source of income changed in the following way:

	Thousands of People		1989 as a Percentage of 1979	Percentage of Total Population	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	2,502.8	2,666.6	106.5	100	100
Workers in the economy (except persons employed in the private subsidiary economy)	1,371.6	1,458.6	106.3	54.8	54.7
Scholarship holders	56.4	65.8	116.7	2.3	2.5
Pensioners and persons receiving subsidies, or other persons receiving state welfare	430.3	468.7	108.9	17.2	17.6
Dependents as well as those employed in the private subsidiary economy	641.3	670.1	106.3	25.6	25.1
Persons with other unspecified sources	3.2	3.4	107.1	0.1	0.1

Between 1979 and 1988 the number of people working rose by 87,000, or an average of 8,700 per year. This growth is one-third less than the average annual growth between the 1970 and 1979 censuses. This is due primarily to the change in the age structure of the working-age population: in the 1980s young people born in the 1960s, when the birthrate

fell, reached working age, and the numerous generation born in the prewar years left that age group.

The 1989 census took into account for the first time new forms of employment: work in cooperatives and individual work activity. 11,200 named work in a cooperative as their

basic source of income (not counting people holding more than one job), and 3,400 named individual work activity.

The census also took into account persons possessing two sources of income. In all there were 465,600 such people altogether, or 17.5 per cent of the republic's population. These were mostly working pensioners, as well as those who combined their basic activity with employment in the private subsidiary economy, or else people who receive a scholarship and are dependents of parents or other persons.

Analysis of the materials from the 1979 All-Union Census continues. In accordance with the approved program, data will be acquired characterizing the living conditions of the population, employment, as well as other demographic and socioeconomic indicators both for the entire population and for individual nationalities.

	1988		1989	
	Soviet Citizens	Foreigners	Soviet Citizens	Foreigners
Entry granted for permanent residency in the USSR	875	1,019	789	1,183
The same with acceptance of Soviet citizenship	—	433	—	155
Total	2,327		2,127	

Indeed, there are people who want to resettle abroad and take up permanent residency in the USSR. But this flow is relatively minor and stable—on the order of 2,000 per year. Among them we can discern three groups.

First are our compatriots who have gone abroad (as a rule, having married a foreigner) but retained their Soviet citizenship and now want to return to their homeland. They enjoy no special privileges with respect to housing or employment. In my opinion, this is not altogether fair: after all, having gone abroad, a person has given the state his living space and has a right to expect at least elementary assistance in reacquiring it. Rumors to the effect that immigrants are presented with apartments out of turn in capital cities are absolutely unfounded.

The second category are the foreigners (judicially we treat these people as we do people who have not received citizenship) wishing to live with us without acquiring Soviet citizenship. With rare exceptions these are the wives and husbands of our compatriots. If conditions permit them to register to live with a spouse (for foreigners there are many restrictions regarding choice of residence—"closed" cities, rayons, and so on), a Soviet residence permit is issued. In principle we have no objections to foreigners without close relatives in the USSR entering for purposes of permanent residency, as long as the housing question is decided beforehand. Altogether approximately 30,000 foreigners reside permanently in the USSR.

A collection on the results of the 1979 All-Union Census in the Latvian SSR is being readied for publication. It will convey extensive and multifaceted information on the republic's population.

MVD Immigration Official on USSR Resettlement Laws

90UN1383B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 90
Second Edition p 5

[Article by R. Kuznetsov: "Immigrants"]

[Text] "Emigration from the USSR" (DIALOG, 14 January) provoked great reader interest. Several readers (B. Naumets from Putivel, B. Lukatskiy from Kharkov, and others) ask in their letters: Is there such a thing as a reverse flow, are there people who want to settle permanently in the USSR? What rights and privileges do they enjoy? R. Kuznetsov, head of the MVD Visa and Permissions Administration, talks about immigration to our country.

The third group of immigrants are those foreigners who acquire Soviet citizenship and only then receive the right to permanent residency. Among them are people of Armenian, Adyge, and other nationalities who wish to resettle in their historic homeland and children from mixed marriages (one of them being our compatriot). This category includes former Soviet citizens, although these are an absolute minority (in 1988 22 people returned and received Soviet citizenship; in 1989, 11).

Belorussian Population Migration 1897-1990

90UN1599A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by S. Krapivin: "Belorussians: Their Migration, Demography, and Ethnography"]

[Text] *How many Belorussians are there in the world? Where and to what extent have they migrated? What is the people's demography on the background of history?*

N. Kovalevskiy, city of Minsk.

Such questions are not voiced idly in an era when Belorussians and Belorussia are experiencing uplift in all spheres. Until recent times, however, summarized scientific research on the subject has not existed. It has been common practice to speak of Belorussia's population as a whole, as if not noticing that it is heterogeneous in composition. And now a voluminous work, on which S.A. Polskiy, a professor in the Economic Geography Department of the Minsk State Pedagogical Institute

imeni A.M. Gorkiy, and S.V. Matyunin, a graduate student, spent 7 years, has been completed. It is the atlas "Belorussians: Their Migration, Demography, and Ethnography."

...Spartak Aleksandrovich and Sergey Vladislavovich lay out hundreds of multicolored charts, diagrams, and type-written text pages on tables before me. Almost a century's worth of the Belorussians' demographic history—from 1897 (year of the first and only All-Russian population census) to our days—is reflected documentarily in these materials. Data and facts, the one more interesting than the other, simply leap from these sheets of paper.

I find out, for example, that the Belorussian percentage of Minsk's population barely exceeded a figure of 9 percent in 1897. Today the Belorussian percentage is 60 to 70 percent in most of the republic's cities. And to what extent have Belorussians migrated abroad? Why, just from 1906 through 1913, over 500,000 of them left. Here are the data for the present time: Poland, 500,000; USA, up to 200,000; Canada and Argentina, 30,000 each; Australia, 10,000; England, France, and the FRG, about 3,000 each.

The information about Belorussians' migration within USSR territory is not without interest. It turns out that Belorussians constituted a third of Stolypin's prerevolutionary flow of migrators. Thus it is not by chance that Belorussians make up such numerous and densely settled population groups today in the Maritime Territory, Amur Oblast, the Komi ASSR, and the Novosibirsk Zone as well as in Karelia and Murmansk and Kaliningrad Oblasts, and in the cities of Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Leningrad, and Moscow that it is appropriate to open national schools there (and they are being opened!).

Answers to many historical questions are contained in eight sections of the atlas. However, stress S.A. Pol'skiy and S.V. Matyunin, the work is addressed not so much to the past as to our present day. In order to be able to predict social processes and control them, it is necessary to know, putting it simply, what is arising and from what origin, and it is necessary to know the actual state of affairs.

This atlas is unique, not only by the very fact of its appearance, but also because of the great amount of materials contained in it. Here, for example, are the Belorussian data for the 1939 All-Union population census that the atlas' authors discovered in files, still secret not long ago, of the Central Archives of the National Economy in Moscow. Heretofore, except for two or three total figures, we had known nothing about

these. And there is reason to believe, assert S.A. Pol'skiy and S.V. Matyunin, that the information will produce the effect of an exploded bomb on the background of the familiar indicators of Belorussia's and Belorussians' human losses in the Second World War.

How soon will the "Belorussians" Atlas be able to appear on bookstore counters? The authors approached the Minsk Cartographic Factory with some timidity, knowing that the factory is not experiencing a shortage in orders from all parts of the country. However, the talk with the factory's management turned out to be encouraging, and the Belorussian Atlas was promised a "green light."

Most likely, publication will require certain subsidies. However, did we really have an immediate publishing-house profit in mind when we prepared for publication such fundamental, socially useful works as "Entsyklopedyya literatury i mastatstva belarusi," "Zbor pomnikau gistoryi i kultury belarusi," the encyclopedic reference book "Frantsysk Skaryna" [Titles in Belorussian], and a number of others. It should also be recalled that the last comprehensive atlas of the Belorussian SSR was published more than 30 years ago—in 1958. And, is there, perhaps, logical justification to include publication of the "Belorussians" Atlas in the program for developing the Belorussian language and culture being worked out by the republic government?

All-Union Census Results for Belorussian SSR

90UN14194 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 10 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Report by the Belorussian SSR State Committee for Statistics: "On the Results of the All-Union Census of 1989 in the Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] On the basis of the automated processing of census questionnaires, the Belorussian SSR State Committee for Statistics has received the final results on the size and age composition of the population, marital status, number and size of families, level of education, nationality and languages, and sources of means of livelihood.

1. The numerical strength of the population of the republic on 12 January 1989 came to 10.2 million people. By comparison with 1979, it increased by 639,200, or by 7 percent. The dynamic of the numerical size of the population according to the postwar censuses was composed as follows:

	Numerical Size, in Thousands			Average Annual Rates of Growth, in Percent			
	1959, 1970	1979, 1989	1959-1969	1970-1978		1979-1988	
Total population	8,056	9,002	9,560	10.206	1.0	0.7	0.7
Urban	2,481	3,908	5,263	6.639	4.2	3.4	2.4
Rural	5,575	5,094	4,297	3.521	0.8	-1.8	-2.0

During 1979-1988, the population increased in all oblasts; moreover, important differences in the growth

rates by regions of the republic were observed:

	Existing Population, in Thousands		1979 in % of 1989	Resident Population in Thousands		1979 in % of 1989
	1979	1989		1979	1989	
Belorussian SSR	9,560	10,200	106.7	9,532	10,152	106.5
Oblasts:						
Brest	1,361	1,458	107.1	1,358	1,449	106.7
Vitebsk	1,385	1,414	102.1	1,385	1,410	101.8
Gomel	1,599	1,674	104.7	1,595	1,668	104.6
Grodno	1,131	1,170	103.4	1,127	1,163	103.2
Minsk City	1,277	1,613	126.4	1,273	1,607	126.2
Minsk	1,558	1,587	101.9	1,547	1,575	101.8
Mogilev	1,249	1,284	102.8	1,247	1,280	102.6

The basic factor behind the population growth in the majority of oblasts is natural growth.

During the 10 years, the urban population increased by 1,415,200, or by 26.9 percent. The share of the urban dwellers in the total population increased from 55 percent in 1979 to 65 percent in 1989.

The number of rural inhabitants decreased in the 1980's by 776,000 people, or by 18 percent. The basic reason for the reduction of the rural population is the migration outflow into the cities. From 1970 to 1978, it came to 94,000 people on the average per year, from 1979 to 1988—76,000.

2. The distribution of the population in terms of age is characterized by the following indicators:

	Number, in Thousands		1989 in percent of 1979	In Percent of the Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	9,532	10,152	106.5	100	100
including ages:					
0-9	1,446	1,606	111.1	15.2	15.8
10-19	1,647	1,438	87.3	17.3	14.2
20-29	1,548	1,563	100.9	16.2	15.4
30-39	1,101	1,563	141.9	11.6	15.4
40-49	1,387	1,066	76.8	14.6	10.5
50-59	1,069	1,282	119.9	11.2	12.6
60-69	666	940	141.2	7.0	9.2
70-79	489	463	94.8	5.1	4.6
80 years and older	176	231	130.8	1.8	2.3
Younger than working age	2,380	2,483	104.3	25.0	24.5
Working age	5,546	5,685	102.5	58.2	56.0
Older than working age	1,603	1,984	123.8	16.8	19.5

The present age structure reflects past trends of the processes of natural movement, especially the birth rate. They were strongly influenced by the Second World War, which not only took millions of lives, but also led to the reduction of the number of births, both during the war years and in the years when women born during the war years or the generations of their daughters entered active child-bearing age. It is basically this reason which explains the differences in the rates of increase (or decrease) of the numerical size of the population for different age groups between 1979 and 1989.

During the past 10 years, the increase of the able-bodied population (men 16-59 years of age, women—16-54 years of age) came to 138,700 persons, or 2.5 percent.

The number of persons older than working age increased during the past period by 24 percent, while the entire population increased only by 7 percent. This age group as a whole for the republic accounts for 20 percent of the total population, in Brest and Gomel oblasts—for 20 percent, in Grodno and Mogilev oblasts—for 21 percent.

in Vitebsk and Minsk oblasts—for 22 percent, and in the city of Minsk—for 12 percent.

3. In the total numerical size of the population, men account for 4.749 million (47 percent), women—for 5.403 million (53 percent). An improvement of the sex structure of the population is being registered. If in 1979 there were 865 men for every 1,000 women, in 1989

there were 879. The excess in the number of women begins on the average at age 35 and is caused by the higher mortality rate of men.

4. According to the 1989 census, there were 2.6 million married couples.

The distribution of the population by marital status in 1989 was as follows:

	Share of Persons of Given Marital Status of Corresponding Age, in Percent							
	Men				Women			
	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Getting Divorced	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced and Getting Divorced
Total population:								
aged 16 and older	19.6	73.7	2.6	3.9	14.2	61.7	17.7	6.3
16-19 years	97.7	1.9	0.0	0.0	89.6	9.9	0.0	0.2
20-24 years	61.0	37.6	0.0	1.0	35.7	61.2	0.2	2.7
25-29 years	20.2	76.3	0.1	3.2	11.8	82.0	0.5	5.6
30-39 years	8.7	85.4	0.3	5.5	5.6	84.3	1.5	8.5
40-49 years	4.2	87.5	1.1	7.1	3.5	79.1	6.1	11.3
50-59 years	2.0	90.1	2.94.9	4.8	71.1	15.5	8.5	
60 years and older	1.2	84.4	12.3	2.0	6.2	36.3	53.4	3.9

5. The number of families, according to the census data, came to 2.796 million, which is 269,000 families (10.6) more than in 1979. The average size family in the republic has decreased and came to 3.2 persons as against 3.3 in 1979. In urban settlements it has remained without changes—3.3 percent. A reduction has taken place in the average size of the family in the rural locality from 3.3 in 1979 to 3 persons in 1989. Some changes have taken place in the structure of families in terms of

number of members. In connection with the change of the number of marriages and the level of the birth rate, there has been an increase in the proportion of families consisting of 4 persons and a decrease in the proportion of families consisting of 3, 5, and more persons; moreover, an increase has been registered in the number of families consisting of 2 persons.

The number of families and their grouping by size and by oblasts:

	Number of Families in Thousands	Including the Number of Families Consisting of					Average Size of Family (Family Members Living Together)
		2 Persons	3 Persons	4 Persons	5 Persons	6 and More Persons	
Belorussian SSR							
Entire population	2 796	972	766	748	212	98	3.2
Urban	1 790	503	542	556	133	56	3.3
Rural	1 006	469	224	192	79	42	3.0
Brest Oblast							
Total population	398	141	100	107	33	17	3.2
Urban	218	60	62	72	17	7	3.3
Rural	180	81	38	35	16	10	3.1
Vitebsk Oblast							
Total population	394	147	113	95	27	12	3.1
Urban	248	76	79	68	17	8	3.2
Rural	146	71	34	27	10	4	2.9
Gomel Oblast							

	Number of Families in Thousands	Including the Number of Families Consisting of (Continued)					Average Size of Family (Family Members Living Together)
		2 Persons	3 Persons	4 Persons	5 Persons	6 and More Persons	
Total population	459	162	122	121	37	17	3.2
Urban	287	82	84	89	23	9	3.3
Rural	172	89	38	32	14	8	3.1
Grodno Oblast							
Total population	326	121	86	84	24	11	3.2
Urban	179	49	53	58	13	6	3.3
Rural	147	72	33	26	11	5	3.0
City of Minsk							
Total population	434	117	139	136	30	12	3.3
Urban	434	117	139	136	30	12	3.3
Minsk Oblast							
Total population	436	159	113	114	34	16	3.2
Urban	200	55	59	65	15	6	3.3
Rural	236	104	54	49	19	10	3.1
Mogilev Oblast							
Total population	349	125	93	91	27	13	3.2
Urban	224	64	66	68	18	8	3.3
Rural	125	61	27	23	9	5	3.0

Today 8.935 million people, or 88 percent of the republic, lived in families. Furthermore, 447,000 (4.4 percent) of family members live separately from their family, but are connected with it through a common budget. 770,000 persons (7.6 percent) do not have a family or have lost connection with it (people living alone). The proportion of

family members living separately from their family, and persons living alone in the republic's oblast and in the city of Minsk, comes to 11-13 percent.

6. During 1979-1988, there was an appreciable increase in the educational level of both the total and the employed population:

Those With Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education	Completed Higher	Including				Total population
		Incomplete Higher	Secondary Specialized	Secondary General	Incomplete Secondary	
15 years old and older, in thousands						
1979	4,772	512	110	826	1,675	1,649
1989	6,023	843	116	1,323	2,426	1,315
1989 as % of 1979	126.2	164.8	104.8	160.2	144.8	79.8
Per 1,000 persons 15 years of age and older						
1979	652	70	15	113	229	225
1989	770	108	15	169	310	168
Employed population in thousands						
1979	3,803	476	52	750	1,417	1,108
1989	4,761	760	60	1,165	2,078	698
1989 as % of 1979	125.2	159.8	115.7	155.3	146.7	62.9

Those With Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete) Education	Completed Higher	Including (Continued)				Total population
		Incomplete Higher	Secondary Specialized	Secondary General	Incomplete Secondary	
Per thousands employed						
1979	763	95	10	151	284	223
1989	899	144	11	220	392	132

An equalization has taken place in the educational level of the city and rural population. If in 1979 among urban dwellers aged 15 and older there were 82.5 percent with higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education,

and among rural inhabitants—44.2 percent, in 1989 there were respectively 89.1 percent and 55.8 percent.

The educational level of the population of the oblasts in 1989 is characterized by the following data:

	Of 1000 Persons 15 Years of Age and Older With Education				Of 1000 Persons Employed in the National Economy			
	Including				Including			
	Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete)	Complete Higher	Complete Secondary	Incomplete Secondary	Higher and Secondary (Complete and Incomplete)	Complete Higher	Complete Secondary	Incomplete Secondary
Belorussian SSR	770	108	494	168	899	144	623	132
Oblasts:								
Brest	718	85	474	159	865	116	619	130
Vitebsk	753	87	473	193	895	119	615	161
Gomel	762	90	500	172	897	120	643	134
Grodno	702	86	461	155	853	118	608	127
City of Minsk	931	229	577	125	965	273	615	77
Minsk	730	79	464	187	885	108	620	157
Mogilev	773	86	498	189	911	117	645	149

7. In the course of the 1989 census, information was obtained on the population of all the republic's nationalities. As in previous censuses, nationality was indicated by the respondents on the basis of their self-consciousness. The nationality of children was determined by the parents.

The number of persons of the nationalities increased during 1979-1988. The increase took place mainly through natural growth.

The distribution of the population by nationality and language is characterized by the following data:

	Number of Persons of a Given Nationality, in Thousands		Of A Given Nationality, Those Who Consider That Language To Be Their First, in %		Of the Total Number of Persons of a Given Nationality, Those Having Fluent Command of a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR, in %			
					Russians		Belorussians	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989	1979	1989
Total population	9,532	10,152	79.9	77.7	53.6	50.8	12.8	12.0
Belorussians	7,568	7,905	83.5	80.2	62.9	60.4	10.1	9.5
Russians	1,134	1,342	98.5	97.7	1.1	1.8	29.4	24.5
Poles	403	418	7.8	13.3	48.5	44.7	10.8	17.8
Ukrainians	231	291	43.4	45.3	40.7	41.4	11.7	10.5
Jews	135	112	11.2	7.6	12.4	8.6	30.4	27.6

Along with nationality, the census took into account the native language and the second language of the peoples of the USSR of which the respondents have fluent command. The data obtained indicate that 77.7 percent of the republic's population regard as their native language the language of their nationality (among Belorussians—80.2 percent) and 22.3 percent—the languages of other peoples (from 1979 respectively 79.9 and 20.1)

3,244 million (in 1979—2,688 million) named the Russian language as their native language, of them 1,311 million Russians and 1,933 persons of other nationalities. In addition, 5,156 million indicated the Russian language as their second language, of which they have fluent command (in 1979—5,107 million persons).

8. By source of means of livelihood, the population of the republic was distributed as follows:

	Thousands of Persons		1989 as % of 1979	In Percent of Total	
	1979	1989		1979	1989
Total population	9,532	10,152	106.5	100	100
Those working in the national economy, (except those employed in private subsidiary farming)	4,982	5,296	106.3	52.2	52.2

	In Thousands			In Percent of Total	
	1979	1989	1989 in % of 1979	1979	1989
Scholarship holders	251	277	110.2	2.6	2.7
Pensioners and persons receiving assistance, as well as other persons on state support*)	1,590	1,897	119.4	16.7	18.7
Dependents of individuals, as well as family members employed in private subsidiary farming	2,702	2,675	99.0	28.4	26.3
Those with other sources of livelihood who did not indicate the source	7.6	7.1	93.8	0.1	0.1

*)The total of pensioners at the beginning of 1989 in the republic was 2,298,800 persons (in 1979—1,851,300).

In the census, persons are included in the group of pensioners for whom the pension constitutes the chief source of livelihood. Constantly working pensioners are considered as belonging to the employed population.

The 1989 census also took into account persons who have two sources of livelihood (in 1979 only one source was taken into account). They accounted for 18.9 percent of the total population. These are, in the main, pensioners who are working, as well as persons who are combining their basic activity with employment in private subsidiary farming, or who are receiving stipends, a pension, assistance and help from relatives.

Georgian Churches Granted Tax Exempt Status

90UN1531A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Apr 90 p 3

[GRUZINFORM report, containing comments of the Georgian Patriarchate's Bishop Konstantin, in the "News From the Government House" column: "The Church Is Exempted From Tax"]

[Text] Taking the proposals and wishes of the republic's believers and general public into account, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers has exempted religious sect [kult] clergymen, organizations and monasteries, publishing houses and eparchial ecclesiastic administrations, theological schools, believer groups, and enterprises of

these from payment of income tax and state duties. On the basis of this decree, the church in Georgia will henceforth be able to make a more substantial contribution to the development of material and spiritual culture, the maintenance and preservation of unique architectural monuments, sect facilities, and monasteries, and charitable activity.

In connection with this decree's adoption, a GRUZINFORM [Georgian News Agency] correspondent asked His Grace Konstantin, a bishop with the Catholicos and Patriarch of All Georgia, to comment on the decree.

"Through God's grace and good people's help, the republic's Council of Ministers has decided to change the effective law," he said. "We thank everyone for their support in the cause of reviving and strengthening the church and religion.

"The adopted decree is exceptionally important for the Georgian Orthodox Church. The clergy, as well as the church as a whole, has heretofore been obliged to pay a high income tax. Its amount has sometimes constituted a third of the monthly salary. The choir singers, whose salaries did not exceed 50 or 60 rubles per month, were in a particularly difficult position. Henceforth the situation will be radically changed. Contributions from the enterprises, publishing houses, various religious societies, and private individuals will mainly be applied to

the needs of single mothers and orphans, the settling of the demographic problem, and other common causes of the people."

USSR Council of Ministers Discusses Urgent Program to Help Families

90US06854 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Mar 90 p 1

[Interview with P.I. Mayeva, head of the Department for Women's Affairs and Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood, by S. Yevgenyev: "Helping the Family"]

[Text] **The other day the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers held an extraordinary discussion of urgent steps to improve the situation of women and the protection of motherhood and childhood and to strengthen the family. We interviewed P.I. Mayeva, head of the Department for Women's Affairs and Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood, on the discussion.**

[Yevgenyev] Polina Ivanovna, what made it so urgent to discuss this matter, when the development of a state program is right now in the final stage?

[Mayeva] Yes, the State Program for Improving the Situation of Women and the Family and Protecting the Health of Children is in the stage of active development. This is a future, long-term document, however. It needs major reworking and thorough legal and normative formulation, and it will have to specify the financial and material outlays.

Life does not stand still, however. Numerous problems and difficulties have accumulated for many families, which must be resolved immediately. Because of this the Committee for Women's Affairs and Protection of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood under the USSR Supreme Soviet, with the participation of central economic agencies and public organizations, has worked out urgent steps for improving the situation of families with children and of working women.

[Yevgenyev] Could you tell us who primarily will be affected by the immediate measures and when they will begin to be implemented?

[Mayeva] Overall, these measures will affect the interests of around five million families. The most extensive measure will be an increase, taking effect in 1991, in the amount of aid paid to mothers on maternity leave until the child reaches the age of a year and a half to the minimum wage (70 rubles at the present time). In addition, while this aid was designated for only one child in the past, even if twins or

triplets were born, the aid is now provided in that same amount for each child. The decision has been made to pay the same amount of aid to working mothers below the age of 18 years for one and a half years, regardless of their length of employment. In addition, it is planned to increase the amount of this aid for children from 35 to 70 rubles per month for first-term servicemen's wives.

[Yevgenyev] The list of proposals apparently also covers other groups of the population, does it not?

[Mayeva] Yes, to some degree even men. The present statute provides that a widow not receiving a pension for children due to loss of breadwinner has the right to state aid in the amount of 20 rubles, while a widower does not receive this aid.

I feel that the decision to double the amount paid for children under guardianship or in foster care was a very important one. We hope that the new level of assistance will change the situation. It will improve the welfare of 300,000 orphans and children deprived of the support of their parents.

[Yevgenyev] But we have one other category of orphans: children and adolescents deprived of parental support and cared for at special facilities of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[Mayeva] You are absolutely right. The state found it possible to care for these children. Outlays for their keep and education have been increased, and funds have been provided to enable them to continue their education at secondary specialized or higher educational institutions upon completing special schools.

[Yevgenyev] And have measures been provided for protecting motherhood?

[Mayeva] They have. Backed up by the authority of the nation's Supreme Soviet, they will provide the basis for accelerating the development of urgently needed normative acts to improve the system for protecting the rights of the mother, the child and the family as a whole by the ministries and the councils of ministers of Union republics.

[Yevgenyev] It was obviously not easy to take this step, given the acute budget deficit.

[Mayeva] I believe that when it comes to motherhood and children, the future of the nation, there can be no doubts about the expediency of or the need for these outlays. The government took precisely this position when deciding the issue. Understanding the importance of this problem, the government has ordered the USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance to come up with the necessary funds.

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